Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessObtain any local user account
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DeliveryOpen world-readable /var/run/reparsed_door
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ExploitSend nfs-basic request with overlong host/path
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ExecutionOverflow 1024-byte stack buffer in get_fs_locations()
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PersistStack protection aborts reparsed
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ImpactRepeat to force service into maintenance (DoS)
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
ASVS 5.0
V15 - Secure Coding and Architecture Stack buffer bounds checking
MITRE ATT&CK
1 technique across 1 tactic: Execution The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Requires: (1) a local account on the target host - the reparsed door at /var/run/reparsed_door is readable by all users and the door server performs no caller credential check, so any unprivileged local user qualifies; (2) the svc:/system/filesystem/reparse service must be enabled, which it is NOT by default - this is the primary limiting factor; (3) a crafted nfs-basic reparse request with a host or path component exceeding the 1024-byte stack buffer. Exploitation is further limited to a denial-of-service outcome because default stack protection aborts the process rather than permitting code execution; on a hypothetical system built without stack protection the overflow behavior could differ. No remote vector exists (local door IPC only). |
| Impact | This is a genuinely low-priority, availability-only issue despite the stack-based overflow classification. All signals align toward limited real-world risk: the CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) requires a local, logged-in account, and impact is confined to availability (VA:H) with no confidentiality or integrity effect (VC:N/VI:N) - because default stack protection converts the overflow into a controlled abort rather than code execution. The CVSS 4.0 threat metric carries E:P (Proof-of-Concept), indicating POC-level maturity rather than mature/weaponized exploitation; there is no CISA KEV listing and no EPSS value supplied, so there is no evidence of active or widespread exploitation. Two further mitigations sharply reduce priority: the svc:/system/filesystem/reparse service is disabled by default, and the affected operating systems (illumos/OmniOS) have a small deployment footprint. Note a limitation: no EPSS score is provided, so probabilistic exploitation likelihood cannot be quantified, and the discoverer-reported E:P maturity is not independently corroborated by a referenced public exploit. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | On an illumos/OmniOS host where an administrator has enabled the reparse service, an unprivileged local user opens the world-readable door at /var/run/reparsed_door and sends an nfs-basic request containing an overlong host or path component. The overflow of the fixed 1024-byte stack buffer in get_fs_locations() trips stack protection, aborting reparsed; repeating the request drives the service into maintenance state, denying reparse functionality. The CVSS threat metric E:P indicates proof-of-concept exploit maturity, and the low attack complexity (AC:L) with no required user interaction makes the crash trivially reproducible for any local user. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 09, 2026
Local denial of service in the illumos reparsed daemon (reparsed) lets a low-privileged authenticated local user crash the daemon and, through repeated requests, drive the svc:/system/filesystem/reparse service into maintenance. The bug is a stack buffer overflow (CWE-121) in the nfs-basic reparse plugin's get_fs_locations(), which copies attacker-supplied host and path components of a reparse string into a fixed 1024-byte stack buffer with no length validation, reachable because the door at /var/run/reparsed_door is world-readable and the door server does not verify caller credentials. Exploitation is availability-only on default builds (stack protection aborts the process rather than yielding code execution), no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and the affected service is disabled by default, which substantially limits real-world exposure; this is a genuinely low-priority, availability-only issue despite the stack-based overflow classification.
RemediationAI
Apply the upstream fix in illumos-gate commit 6a2df4aa5381599179ab6afb3165db81960dee35 (patch availability reported by the vendor and by illumos issue 18496), or install the corresponding patched OmniOS/illumos distribution release once it ships that commit; the fix bounds-checks the reparse string in get_fs_locations(), bounds the door argument with strndup(), rejects non-kernel callers via door_ucred()/pid check, and sets the /var/run/reparsed_door mode to 0600. If immediate patching is not possible, the primary compensating control is to keep the svc:/system/filesystem/reparse service disabled (svcadm disable system/filesystem/reparse), which it already is by default - this removes the attack surface entirely at the cost of disabling reparse-point resolution for NFS autofs paths that depend on the nfs-basic plugin. If the service must run, restrict /var/run/reparsed_door to owner-only access (chmod 600 /var/run/reparsed_door) after service start to block unprivileged callers; note that reparsed recreates its door on restart and this does not prevent a determined local user with access to the service's own account, and that it may break legitimate non-kernel consumers of the door. Monitor for repeated aborts of reparsed via syslog and the svc:/system/filesystem/reparse service entering maintenance state, which is the observable signature of exploitation; an aborting crash loop should be treated as a potential local attack attempt and the caller identified from door/audit records.
Affected VersionsENISA
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The flaw resides in usr/src/cmd/fs.d/nfs/rp_basic/libnfs_basic.c, part of the nfs-basic reparse plugin consumed by the illumos reparse point daemon. illumos reparse points are analogous to Windows reparse points: user-space daemons are consulted through door IPC when the kernel resolves a reparse point. The door server registers /var/run/reparsed_door with permissive mode (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IROTH) and, in the vulnerable code, reparsed_doorfunc() performed no caller credential check, so any unprivileged local process could invoke it. get_fs_locations() then parsed a reparse string and copied its host and path components into a fixed 1024-byte stack buffer (buf2) without bounds checking, producing a classic CWE-121 stack-based buffer overflow when either component exceeded that size. The defect dates to illumos-gate commit 2f172c55 (2009) and is fixed by commit 6a2df4aa, which adds an early strlen(buf) >= sizeof(buf2) rejection in get_fs_locations(), replaces strdup() with strndup() over the bounded argument size, adds a door_ucred()-based check that only kernel upcalls (pid 0, as issued by reparse_kderef()) are served and returns EPERM otherwise, and tightens the door's mode to S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR (0600). CPE data identifies illumos-gate and OmniOS as affected products.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Local door IPC gives AV:L; any local account suffices via the unchecked world-readable door so PR:L; trivially reproducible crash is AC:L; impact is availability-only (A:H), no C/I effect.
Primary rating from Vendor (illumos).
CVSS VectorVendor: illumos
DescriptionCVE.org
A stack-based buffer overflow in the illumos reparse point daemon (reparsed) allows a local user to crash the daemon. get_fs_locations() in usr/src/cmd/fs.d/nfs/rp_basic/libnfs_basic.c, part of the nfs-basic reparse plugin, copies the host and path components of a reparse string into a fixed 1024-byte stack buffer without checking their length. The reparsed door at /var/run/reparsed_door is readable by all users and the door server does not check the caller's credentials, so an unprivileged local user can send an nfs-basic request with an overlong host or path component to overflow the buffer. On systems built with stack protection, which is the default, this causes reparsed to abort; repeated requests place the svc:/system/filesystem/reparse service into maintenance. The service is disabled by default. The flaw has existed since 2009 (illumos-gate commit 2f172c55), and affects any illumos distribution prior to illumos-gate commit 6a2df4aa.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
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A stack-based buffer overflow occurs when a program writes more data to a buffer located on the stack than it was allocated to hold.
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EUVD-2026-95804
GHSA-gwf6-7hwv-r7vq
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB