OpenClaw CVE-2026-100548

Requires ALL of: (1) OpenClaw memory embedding configured with remote cross-provider fallback enabled (non-default resilience setting); (2) the primary embedding provider failing so that failover is actually invoked; and (3) the primary and fallback providers being distinct vendors so the reused key reaches an unintended party. Impact is bounded by the privileges attached to the primary provider's API key. Limiting factors: this is not a reachable attacker-triggered network endpoint - the leak is an accidental transmission during provider failover, so it depends entirely on operator configuration and an operational failure event rather than any adversary action. Fully mitigated by disabling cross-provider embedding fallback or giving each provider separate, narrowly scoped credentials.

Real-world risk is LOW-to-MODERATE and this is not an urgent priority despite the 6.0 medium score. The vendor CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N) is confidentiality-only and explicitly encodes high attack complexity (AC:H) plus an attack requirement (AT:P) - the defect only manifests when cross-provider embedding fallback is configured (non-default) AND the primary embedding provider actually fails, triggering failover. There is no attacker in the classic sense: the 'exposure' is the primary provider's API key being leaked as a bearer token to a fallback vendor the operator themselves configured, not an arbitrary internet attacker. EPSS is not provided, there is no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit is identified - consistent with a configuration-dependent leak rather than a widely exploitable flaw. The PR:N is technically defensible (no authentication gates the leak) but somewhat misleading, because the precondition is an operator configuration choice, not a reachable network endpoint. Net: a genuine credential-hygiene bug worth patching, but not something that warrants emergency response.

An operator configures OpenClaw's memory-embedding with a primary provider and a different remote fallback provider for resilience. The primary provider experiences an outage or error, failover kicks in, and OpenClaw sends the embedding request to the fallback vendor while still attaching the primary provider's API key as the bearer token - disclosing that credential to an unintended third party whose logs or staff could then reuse it up to the key's privileges. No public exploit code exists; realization depends on the specific providers configured and whether failover actually occurs.