What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-59321?

CVE-2025-59321 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8 (Critical). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.2%.

Which versions of CryptoPro Secure Disk are affected by CVE-2025-59321?

CPSD CryptoPro Secure Disk for BitLocker versions prior to 7.7.4 contain a critical flaw in the default TPM sealing policy that enables attackers with physical access to bypass full-disk encryption…

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2025-59321?

Within 24 hours, conduct a comprehensive inventory of all systems running CPSD CryptoPro Secure Disk below version 7.7.4, prioritizing endpoints that process classified or highly sensitive data. Within 7 days, implement strict physical access controls on affected systems through hardware security locks, restricted facility access, and continuous environmental monitoring; simultaneously audit all TPM PCR sealing policies to validate proper configuration and identify non-compliant deployments. Within 30 days, establish an upgrade timeline to version 7.7.4 or later pending vendor release availability, monitor CPSD security advisories weekly for patch confirmation, and evaluate migration to alternative full-disk encryption solutions for systems in physically accessible environments where access restrictions cannot be adequately enforced.

CryptoPro Secure Disk CVE-2025-59321

EUVD-2025-210716 CRITICAL

Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default (CWE-1188)

2026-08-12 mitre

GHSA-8p6w-m6x6-m837

Information Disclosure N A

9.8

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: mitre

Severity by source

Vendor (mitre) PRIMARY

9.8 CRITICAL

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

vuln.today AI

5.7 MEDIUM

Requires physical possession and relocation/unintended-boot manipulation, so AV:P and AC:H; no credentials (PR:N); unsealing keys yields full disk read/write (C:H/I:H) with no availability impact.

3.1 AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

4.0 AV:P/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (mitre).

CVSS VectorVendor: mitre

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Aug 13, 2026 - 16:23 vuln.today

CVSS changed

Aug 13, 2026 - 16:22 NVD

9.8 (CRITICAL)

CVE Published

Aug 12, 2026 - 00:00 cve.org

CRITICAL 9.8

CVE Published

Aug 12, 2026 - 00:00 cve.org

UNKNOWN (no severity yet)

DescriptionCVE.org

CPSD CryptoPro Secure Disk for Bitlocker before v7.7.4 contains a default TPM PCR policy that fails to consider the system boot state. This allows the TPM to be unsealed via an unintended execution path or from another hardware platform.

AnalysisAI

Full-disk-encryption bypass in CPSD CryptoPro Secure Disk for BitLocker before v7.7.4 stems from a default TPM PCR sealing policy that ignores the system boot state, letting an attacker with physical access unseal the TPM through an unintended execution path or by relocating the drive/TPM to another hardware platform and recover the BitLocker keys. The flaw was documented in the Black Hat USA 2026 research 'The Cost of Obscurity' by Burch; there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, it is not on CISA KEV, and EPSS is low at 0.18% (8th percentile), consistent with a physical-access rather than mass-exploitable weakness.

Technical ContextAI

The product is a pre-boot full-disk-encryption/authentication layer that leverages Microsoft BitLocker and a hardware Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Disk encryption keys are 'sealed' to the TPM against a set of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) that are supposed to measure the boot chain, so the key only releases when the machine boots in its expected, trusted state. The root cause maps to CWE-1188 (insecure default initialization of a resource): the shipped default PCR policy does not bind the sealed secret to the actual system boot state, so the measured-boot integrity guarantee is effectively absent. As a result the TPM will release the sealed material even when the boot path is not the legitimate one, defeating the core assumption of measured-boot key protection. CPE data is uninformative here (the feed lists only the placeholder 'cpe:2.3:a:n/a:n/a'), so exact affected component identification relies on the vendor version boundary (before v7.7.4).

RemediationAI

Upgrade to CryptoPro Secure Disk for BitLocker v7.7.4 or later, which corrects the default TPM PCR policy (Vendor-released patch: v7.7.4); consult the vendor at https://www.cpsd.at/blog/ for release and deployment guidance. As a compensating control until patched, reconfigure the TPM sealing policy to bind the key to a boot-state-inclusive PCR set (typically PCRs covering firmware, boot manager and boot configuration) so the secret only unseals in the legitimate boot path - noting that tightening PCRs can trigger recovery-key prompts after legitimate firmware/OS updates and requires that recovery keys be escrowed. Additionally require TPM+PIN (pre-boot authentication) so that possession of the hardware alone is insufficient, accepting the usability cost of a boot-time PIN, and enforce physical security and firmware/Secured-core protections on at-risk endpoints. Do not rely on TPM-only sealing on affected versions.