pgAdmin 4 CVE-2025-13780

Exploitation requires pgAdmin 4 running in server (web) mode - not desktop mode - and the attacker (a PR:L authenticated user) must be able to perform a restore operation using a PLAIN-format dump file whose contents they control; the injected commands execute during that restore. Limiting factors: the instance must be deployed in server mode (not every pgAdmin deployment is), the attacker needs a valid account with restore capability, and the malicious PLAIN-format dump must be processed by the restore workflow. These conditions confine realistic exploitation to authenticated or internal users rather than fully anonymous internet attackers.

This is a genuine high-priority issue, though not a drop-everything emergency. The CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) reflects network-reachable, low-complexity exploitation requiring only low privileges and no user interaction, with full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability - consistent with arbitrary command execution on the host (CWE-94). The signals are, however, not uniformly alarming: EPSS is only 0.94% (60th percentile), indicating modest predicted exploitation likelihood in the near term, and there is no CISA KEV listing and no identified public exploit code, so this is not confirmed active exploitation. The one key tension is PR:L: the vector assumes the attacker already holds a low-privileged pgAdmin account and the ability to run a restore operation, which meaningfully narrows the realistic attacker population to authenticated/internal users or anyone who can obtain valid credentials to a server-mode instance. No SSVC decision data was provided in the input, so automatable/technical-impact framing cannot be independently stated. Net: a legitimately serious authenticated RCE in a DBA tool, warranting prompt patching, but currently lacking evidence of widespread or automated exploitation.

An authenticated low-privileged user of a server-mode pgAdmin 4 instance (version ≤9.10) supplies a maliciously crafted PLAIN-format PostgreSQL dump file and triggers a restore operation. The restore logic allows injected OS commands to execute on the server hosting pgAdmin, yielding remote code execution in the context of the pgAdmin process. No public proof-of-concept exploit was identified at the time of analysis; the only referenced source is the vendor GitHub issue.