Mir100 Firmware
CVE-2020-10274
HIGH
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionNVD
The access tokens for the REST API are directly derived (sha256 and base64 encoding) from the publicly available default credentials from the Control Dashboard (refer to CVE-2020-10270 for related flaws). This flaw in combination with CVE-2020-10273 allows any attacker connected to the robot networks (wired or wireless) to exfiltrate all stored data (e.g. indoor mapping images) and associated metadata from the robot's database.
AnalysisAI
The access tokens for the REST API are directly derived (sha256 and base64 encoding) from the publicly available default credentials from the Control Dashboard (refer to CVE-2020-10270 for related. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.1), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, low attack complexity. No vendor patch available.
Technical ContextAI
This vulnerability is classified as Exposure of Sensitive Information (CWE-200), which allows attackers to access sensitive data that should not be disclosed. The access tokens for the REST API are directly derived (sha256 and base64 encoding) from the publicly available default credentials from the Control Dashboard (refer to CVE-2020-10270 for related flaws). This flaw in combination with CVE-2020-10273 allows any attacker connected to the robot networks (wired or wireless) to exfiltrate all stored data (e.g. indoor mapping images) and associated metadata from the robot's database. Affected products include: Mobile-Industrial-Robots Mir100 Firmware, Mobile-Industrial-Robots Mir200 Firmware, Mobile-Industrial-Robots Mir250 Firmware, Mobile-Industrial-Robots Mir500 Firmware, Mobile-Industrial-Robots Mir1000 Firmware.
RemediationAI
No vendor patch is available at time of analysis. Monitor vendor advisories for updates. Minimize information in error messages, implement proper access controls, encrypt sensitive data at rest and in transit.
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Same weakness CWE-200 – Information Exposure
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External POC / Exploit Code
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