JetBrains TeamCity EUVD-2026-93505

Requires that the TeamCity server builds a Git-based VCS configuration that resolves submodules, and that the attacker can control a submodule URL - typically by committing or submitting a malicious .gitmodules file to a repository TeamCity checks out, or by configuring a VCS root. The disclosure is limited to local repositories readable by the TeamCity service account, with no integrity or availability impact. Exploitation is constrained to instances on versions before 2026.2.1 that process Git submodules; environments that disable submodule checkout or tightly restrict who can define VCS configurations and push commits are not exposed.

This is a moderate-priority information-disclosure flaw rather than an urgent emergency. The provided CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N, C:H/I:N/A:N, score 7.5) describes an unauthenticated, network-reachable read of local server repositories, but the signals around it argue for calmer prioritization: EPSS is only 0.62% (48th percentile), SSVC from CISA rates Exploitation as 'none', Automatable as 'no', and Technical Impact as only 'partial', and the vulnerability is NOT on the CISA KEV list and has no public POC referenced. Exploitation status is therefore 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis'. There is a notable tension in the data: the vendor-supplied vector claims PR:N (unauthenticated), yet the mechanism - missing validation of Git submodule URLs so a crafted submodule can point at local repositories - in practice requires the attacker to control VCS configuration or commit a malicious .gitmodules into a repository TeamCity builds, which usually implies at least low-privileged access. Treat the PR:N claim with caution and verify against your TeamCity access model. Confidentiality-only impact (I:N/A:N) plus SSVC 'partial' technical impact means no code execution or integrity loss - this is a scoped disclosure bug, a steady patch-cycle item, not a drop-everything event.

An attacker who can influence a Git repository that TeamCity builds (for example via a pull request or commit containing a malicious .gitmodules) sets a submodule URL to a local file path or internal repository on the TeamCity server. When TeamCity checks out and resolves submodules without validating the URL, it reads the targeted local repository and exposes its contents to the attacker. No public exploit code is referenced, and the attack depends on TeamCity processing Git submodules during checkout.