EUVD-2026-91049
GHSA-qx8v-m72v-pf53
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessGain adjacent-network foothold
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ExploitSniff cleartext control endpoint
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ExecutionHijack/modify active session
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ImpactInject unauthorized robot commands
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A04:2025 - Cryptographic Failures
ASVS 5.0
V12 - Secure Communication Transport encryption
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| Exploitation Conditions | Attacker must have adjacent-network access (AV:A) to the segment carrying Teledyne FLIR Aware2's primary control endpoints for PackBot robots - on-path positioning via a compromised control station, tapped operational LAN, or rogue wireless link. No authentication is required (PR:N) and no user interaction (UI:N); exploitation works against default configurations because the control endpoints transmit in cleartext with no transport encryption. The principal limiting factor is that exploitation is NOT internet-routable: the attacker cannot reach the robot across arbitrary networks and must be local to the control traffic, which materially narrows the realistic threat to operational-environment insiders or attackers with physical/wireless proximity. |
| Impact | Signals are mixed and should temper the headline 9.4 CVSS 4.0 score. The vector is AV:A (adjacent network), not fully remote (AV:N), meaning the attacker must be positioned on the same network segment as the PackBot control traffic rather than attacking across the open internet - a meaningful limiter the raw score obscures. Impact is genuinely severe: cleartext primary control endpoints allow interception, session hijacking, and modification, mapping to full confidentiality/integrity/availability loss (VC/VI/VA:H) and total technical impact per CISA SSVC. However, SSVC also reports Exploitation: none and Automatable: no, and there is no CISA KEV listing, no EPSS score provided, and no public POC referenced - the sole source is a Mandiant coordinated-disclosure writeup. So this is a high-impact, low-complexity flaw whose real-world risk is gated by physical/network proximity to specialized robots rather than mass exploitability. Conflict to verify: the CVSS 4.0 vector marks subsequent-system impact (SC/SI/SA:H) as HIGH, implying a scope-crossing effect, yet the description confines impact to the robot's own session traffic - confirm with the vendor whether compromise genuinely cascades to adjacent systems. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who gains a foothold on the operational network segment carrying PackBot control traffic (e.g., a compromised field laptop, rogue wireless access, or tapped LAN) passively sniffs the unencrypted control session to recover commands and telemetry, then actively injects or modifies packets to hijack the session and issue unauthorized movement or actuator commands. Because the primary control endpoints transmit in cleartext with no authentication barrier on the transport, no credentials or user interaction are needed once the attacker is on-path. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 01, 2026
Cleartext transmission in the primary control endpoints of Teledyne FLIR Aware2 (all versions through 6.9.0.2) allows an unauthenticated attacker positioned on the same network segment to passively intercept and actively hijack or modify the command-and-control session traffic used to operate Teledyne FLIR PackBot robots. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:A/PR:N/UI:N, with high confidentiality, integrity and availability impact on both the vulnerable and subsequent systems) yields a 9.4 severity, while our independent CVSS 3.1 assessment scores it 8.8 (AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H); the practical limiting factor is that the flaw is adjacent-network only and not internet-routable, so exploitation requires on-path positioning via a compromised control station, a tapped operational LAN, or a rogue wireless link. No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation have been identified at time of analysis - CISA SSVC records Exploitation: none and Automatable: no - and no vendor-released patch was identified in the available data, so the realistic threat is an operational-environment insider or a physically/wirelessly proximate attacker rather than a remote internet adversary.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch was identified at time of analysis - the provided references contain only the Mandiant disclosure (MNDT-2026-0028, https://github.com/mandiant/Vulnerability-Disclosures/blob/master/2026/MNDT-2026-0028.md) and the EUVD record for "Aware2 0 ≤ 6.9.0.2", with no fix version, so operators should confirm patch status directly with Teledyne FLIR before assuming remediation is available. Because the defect is the absence of transport encryption, the most effective compensating control is to remove the cleartext link from any shared network: place the control station and robot on an isolated, point-to-point or dedicated operational VLAN with no routing to general-purpose networks, accepting the trade-off that this constrains operational flexibility and requires re-architecting any shared wireless relay. Where the hardware and radios support it, tunnel the control traffic through IPsec or an equivalent encrypted overlay, or enable MACsec/WPA3 and 802.1X on the operational wireless segment - the trade-offs are added latency and jitter that can degrade teleoperation responsiveness, plus provisioning overhead and possible session drops on legacy clients. Harden the segment against on-path positioning using DHCP snooping, dynamic ARP inspection with static ARP entries for the control station and robot, port security, and RF monitoring to detect rogue access points; these are cheap but only raise the attacker's cost and do not fix the cleartext exposure. Finally, restrict physical access to control hardware and layer-2 infrastructure, and treat any period of adjacent-network exposure as a compromise of session traffic - since passive sniffing of cleartext is undetectable by the endpoint, rotate any credentials or session material carried over the link once isolation or encryption is in place.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The root cause is CWE-319 (Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information): Teledyne FLIR Aware2's primary control endpoints - the channel operators use to drive and command PackBot robots - exchange session traffic without transport-layer encryption such as TLS, IPsec, or an equivalent protected tunnel. Because the protocol carries both control commands and session state in the clear, an attacker who can observe the segment can read it, and one who can inject (ARP spoofing, rogue AP, compromised switch or control station) can rewrite or replay it, effectively seizing the robot. The CVSS 4.0 vector is notable for setting Subsequent System impacts to High (SC:H/SI:H/SA:H) alongside the vulnerable-system impacts, reflecting that a hijacked robot platform can propagate harm to connected systems, while our independent CVSS 3.1 assessment treats scope as unchanged (S:U) and scores 8.8. The adjacent-network vector (AV:A) in both scorings is the key scoping fact: this is a control-link privacy and integrity failure within an operational LAN or wireless footprint, not a remotely exploitable service. Exploitation works against default configurations because there is no opt-in transport security to enable, and the attacker needs no credentials (PR:N) and no user interaction (UI:N). The absence of a CVE-level patch reference - only Mandiant's coordinated disclosure MNDT-2026-0028 and an EUVD entry (EUVD-2026-91049) listing "Aware2 0 ≤ 6.9.0.2" - suggests the fix depends on the vendor adding transport encryption or on operators isolating the link; CISA SSVC rates technical impact as total, meaning full control of the affected channel is at stake once on-path access is achieved.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Cleartext control traffic is sniffable and injectable from the adjacent network without auth or interaction, giving AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N and full C/I/A loss through session hijacking.
Primary rating from Vendor (Mandiant).
CVSS VectorVendor: Mandiant
DescriptionCVE.org
Cleartext transmission in the primary control endpoints of Teledyne FLIR Aware2 versions through 6.9.0.2 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to intercept, hijack, or modify session traffic against Teledyne FLIR PackBot robots running this software via sniffing or hijacking network traffic.
Executive ViewAI
Teledyne FLIR Aware2, the control software used to operate PackBot field robots, sends operator command-and-control traffic in cleartext across all versions through 6.9.0.2, allowing anyone already positioned on the same network segment to read, alter, or seize control of an active robot session. No vendor fix is available, so every unit running these versions remains exposed until network-level isolation is put in place. This matters most to bomb-disposal, public-safety, and defense teams whose missions depend on robot integrity, where a hijacked command link can translate directly into safety and operational risk.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: isolate Aware2 control networks from general-purpose traffic, enforce 802.1X port authentication and MAC filtering, segment the robot control plane into a dedicated VLAN with deny-by-default rules, tunnel all command-and-control traffic through IPsec or MACsec to restore confidentiality and integrity, disable unnecessary wireless links, restrict physical access to network segments and control stations, and monitor the control segment for session hijacking or anomalous command traffic.
Threat Intelligence Overview
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.
Unvalidated pathnames in the Teledyne FLIR Aware2 web interface let remote unauthenticated attackers read configuration
Hardcoded credentials in Teledyne FLIR Aware2 let unauthenticated attackers within radio or network adjacency (CVSS AV:A
Unauthenticated attackers on the same adjacent network or RF segment can intercept, hijack, or modify cleartext UDP cont
Unauthenticated denial of service against Teledyne FLIR PackBot robots running the Aware2 web interface, where the reboo
Cleartext 802.11 session traffic between Teledyne FLIR Aware2 (versions through 6.9.0.2) and PackBot robots can be sniff
Exploit-DB