Termix EUVD-2026-86162

Requires the attacker to already possess an offline copy of the Termix SQLite database (e.g., an exposed/stolen backup, filesystem access, or a separate exfiltration bug), AND the target must have OIDC or WebAuthn users whose secrets were stored while OIDC_SYSTEM_SECRET and WEBAUTHN_SYSTEM_SECRET were left unset - which is the default because Termix's default deployment artifacts do not configure them. Password-authenticated users are NOT affected by this key-derivation path. Limiting factors: no live/network exploitation is possible; the vulnerability yields nothing without the database file; operators who set custom OIDC_SYSTEM_SECRET/WEBAUTHN_SYSTEM_SECRET values are not exposed via the default-secret path. Affected versions 1.7.0 through 2.5.0; fixed in 2.5.1.

This is a genuine but access-gated data-confidentiality flaw, not a network-facing critical. All signals are consistent and modest: the NVD/vendor CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N = 5.5 Medium) correctly reflects that exploitation is NOT remote - the description's decisive precondition is 'an attacker with an offline SQLite database copy,' which maps to AV:L. There is no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public POC, so exploitation status is: no public exploit identified at time of analysis. The weakness (CWE-321, hard-coded default cryptographic secrets) is real and confirmed by the source diff (the committed strings 'termix-oidc-system-secret-default' and 'termix-webauthn-system-secret-default' were removed in the fix), which makes the crypto trivially breakable ONCE the database is obtained - but obtaining that database is the true gating step and is out of scope of this CVE. Net: real priority only for operators whose SQLite DB may leak (backups, shared hosts, a separate file-read/exfil vuln); low real-world risk absent that exposure. No conflicting signals; the main missing datum is any independent exploitation telemetry (none exists yet).

An attacker who obtains a copy of Termix's SQLite database - via a stolen/misconfigured backup, host compromise, or a separate file-disclosure bug - reads the committed default system secret from the open-source code, combines it with the per-user userId (which serves as the public PBKDF2 salt), and re-derives each OIDC/WebAuthn user's key-encryption key offline. This lets them unwrap the Data Encryption Key and decrypt stored SSH passwords, private keys, and key passphrases with no interaction with the live service. No public exploit code exists, but the derivation is deterministic and requires only standard crypto libraries.