Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Arbitrary code execution via untrusted local file processing: AV:L and UI:R because the victim must run respect on an attacker-supplied description; PR:N as no auth needed; full C/I/A:H from RCE.
Primary rating from Vendor (github).
CVSS VectorVendor: github
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
Redocly CLI makes OpenAPI validation, linting, and documentation workflows easier. Prior to version 2.33.0 of @redocly/respect-core and @redocly/cli, the respect command dynamically evaluates $faker runtime expressions in Arazzo descriptions. A crafted expression can traverse constructor, prototype, or __proto__ properties in packages/respect-core/src/modules/context-parser/get-value-from-context.ts, reach the JavaScript Function constructor, and execute arbitrary code when a user processes an untrusted description. The executed code runs with the privileges of the CLI process and can execute shell commands or read CI secrets. Users processing only trusted, self-authored workflows are not affected. This issue is fixed in @redocly/respect-core and @redocly/cli version 2.33.0.
AnalysisAI
Arbitrary code execution in Redocly CLI and @redocly/respect-core before version 2.33.0 allows a crafted Arazzo description to run attacker-controlled JavaScript with the privileges of the CLI process. The flaw lives in the respect command's $faker runtime-expression evaluator (get-value-from-context.ts), which permits property traversal through constructor, prototype, and __proto__ to reach the JavaScript Function constructor; because the vector is local (AV:L) with required user interaction (UI:R, PR:N), a victim or CI job must actually process an untrusted, attacker-supplied workflow description for exploitation to occur. …
Unlock full vulnerability intelligence
- Risk assessment & exploitation conditions
- Attack chain visualization
- Remediation with exact patch versions
- Threat intelligence from 22 sources
- Personal watchlist & email alerts
Free forever · No credit card required
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Requires that a user or CI pipeline run the Redocly `respect` command (Arazzo workflow testing) against an untrusted, attacker-supplied Arazzo description containing a crafted $faker runtime expression, on @redocly/respect-core or @redocly/cli before version 2.33.0. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The vendor CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, 7.8 High) is internally consistent and I broadly agree with it. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: upgrade @redocly/respect-core and @redocly/cli to 2.33.0 (or, for consumers pinned to the 1.x line of respect-core, to the referenced 1.34.17 release), as documented in GHSA-xw2f-5386-m542 and the corresponding release tags; the fix commit d26d452368066be1400f43cea915dd9ea508e18b and PRs 2881/2922 harden get-value-from-context.ts so constructor/prototype/__proto__ traversal no longer resolves. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, inventory every instance of the Redocly CLI and @redocly/respect-core across developer laptops, build agents, and CI images to determine which deployments are below version 2.33.0, and treat any pipeline that processes externally sourced or third-party Arazzo workflow descriptions as the priority tier. …
Sign in for detailed remediation steps and compensating controls.
Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.
Same weakness CWE-94 – Code Injection
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-81012