Ansible Automation Platform EUVD-2026-64918

Exploitation requires one of three distinct preconditions: (1) the attacker holds AWX admin or project-manager privileges sufficient to configure a project's archive URL to point to an attacker-controlled server; (2) a trusted upstream archive source used by an existing AWX project has been compromised at the server level; or (3) the AWX instance fetches project archives over plain HTTP (not HTTPS), enabling a network man-in-the-middle attacker to intercept and substitute a malicious archive. The extraction vulnerability itself is unconditional - no special AWX configuration is required beyond the project_archive plugin being invoked during a project sync, which is standard behavior. Exploitation is limited to: the high-privilege requirement for direct URL configuration (CVSS PR:H), the difficulty of MITM attacks on HTTPS connections (eliminating vector 3 for properly configured deployments), and the need for write-accessible sensitive filesystem paths on the execution node. The vulnerability does not affect AWX instances that source all project content exclusively from SCM (git/svn) rather than archive URLs.

The CVSS 3.1 score of 7.2 with vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H accurately reflects that network delivery is possible but requires high privilege - specifically the ability to configure a project's archive source within AWX. This PR:H requirement is the primary friction point: an external attacker cannot exploit this without first obtaining admin or project-manager access in AWX, or achieving a man-in-the-middle position on an HTTP archive fetch (which would raise effective AC). No EPSS data was provided, and the absence of a KEV listing and public POC means exploitation probability is low in the near term, though the attack is conceptually straightforward once preconditions are met. The technical impact (C:H/I:H/A:H) is fully justified given the RCE potential via file-write primitives. The practical risk is highest in organizations running AWX projects sourced from untrusted or external HTTP URLs, where supply chain or network interception is plausible; even a mid-sized infrastructure team running AAP against external content repositories should treat misconfigured HTTP-sourced projects as a meaningful exposure surface. Overall: elevated theoretical severity, moderate real-world priority absent active exploitation evidence.

An attacker with AWX admin access (or who has compromised an upstream archive server) crafts a zip archive containing a member named '../../.ssh/authorized_keys' with their own SSH public key as content. When AWX processes a project sync using this archive via the project_archive plugin, the file is written to the execution node user's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, granting the attacker SSH login access to the execution node without further exploitation steps. No public proof-of-concept code has been identified at time of analysis, but the technique is a well-documented zip-slip variant requiring only a crafted archive.