EUVD-2026-64186Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Network-reachable auth endpoint (AV:N); high complexity for timing feasibility under realistic jitter (AC:H); no prior auth needed (PR:N); credential exposure only, no integrity or availability impact (C:H/I:N/A:N).
Primary rating from Vendor (vendor:ubuntu).
CVSS VectorVendor: vendor:ubuntu
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
[GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc: Non-Constant-Time Password Hash Comparison in Relay Authentication]
AnalysisAI
Non-constant-time password hash comparison in Relay's authentication layer exposes a timing side-channel that allows credential inference via statistical analysis of response latencies. Attackers who can issue repeated authentication requests and measure response timing with sufficient precision can progressively reconstruct valid hashes or credentials byte-by-byte. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires the ability to make repeated requests to Relay's authentication endpoint and to measure response times with sufficient statistical resolution to distinguish sub-millisecond differences. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | Timing attacks are theoretically well-established but operationally demanding: successful exploitation requires an adversary capable of issuing large volumes of authentication requests while maintaining low-jitter, high-stability network conditions to statistically separate sub-millisecond response time differences from noise. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | The definitive fix is to upgrade Relay to a version in which the non-constant-time hash comparison is replaced with a constant-time equivalent. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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Same weakness CWE-208 – Observable Timing Discrepancy
View allSame technique Information Disclosure
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| openSUSE Leap 16.0 | Fixed |
| openSUSE Tumbleweed | Fixed |
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External POC / Exploit Code
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