VeraCrypt EUVD-2026-64056

Two specific conditions must both be satisfied for exploitation: first, the targeted volume must have been created by a VeraCrypt binary built from source with both WOLFCRYPT=1 and WOLFCRYPT_BACKEND enabled - a non-default configuration not used in any official release; second, the attacker must have physical or logical possession of the volume file, disk image, or exported volume header. Official precompiled binaries and distribution packages are completely unaffected regardless of volume age or PIM settings. Remote exploitation is not possible; the vulnerability only reduces offline password-guessing cost against already-obtained files. Additionally, any PIM value or elevated iteration count the user configured in an affected build provided no security benefit whatsoever, because the iteration parameter was silently discarded.

The CVSS 6.2 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) correctly captures that exploitation requires local possession of the volume file - a meaningful prerequisite that forecloses opportunistic remote exploitation entirely. The affected population is further constrained to a rare deployment class: only custom source builds using the non-default wolfCrypt backend are vulnerable; the vast majority of VeraCrypt deployments using official binaries face zero exposure. EPSS data was not provided in the available intelligence, and this vulnerability does not appear in CISA KEV, with no reported POC. These signals together indicate no confirmed active exploitation and low probability of mass targeting. Real-world urgency is high specifically for any organization or individual that did perform wolfCrypt-enabled custom builds - because in those cases, all PIM and iteration-count hardening the user believed they had applied was entirely ineffective, and affected volumes must be recreated, not merely re-encrypted. The CVSS score reasonably reflects the confidentiality impact but would overstate risk to the typical VeraCrypt user who relies on official binaries.

An attacker obtains a copy of a VeraCrypt volume file - through stolen storage media, exposed cloud backup, or decommissioned hardware - and identifies that it was encrypted by a wolfCrypt-backend build. Because the volume's key derivation used HKDF rather than iterated PBKDF2, the attacker's offline dictionary or brute-force tool tests password candidates at a rate orders of magnitude faster than intended, recovering the correct passphrase and decrypting the volume contents in a fraction of the time that correctly implemented PBKDF2 would have required.