Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessObtain physical or forensic access to device
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DeliveryAcquire VeraCrypt file-hosted container
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ExploitScan container at 128 MiB sector offsets
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ExecutionIdentify anomalous zeroed plaintext sectors
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PersistConfirm hidden volume presence
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ImpactChallenge deniability claim
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A06:2025 - Insecure Design
ASVS 5.0
V15 - Secure Coding and Architecture Protection mechanism completeness
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| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires that the victim previously created a file-hosted hidden volume using VeraCrypt 1.26.6 through 1.26.28 - the plaintext markers are introduced at hidden volume creation time, not during normal use. The attacker (e.g., forensic examiner) must have physical or forensic-level read access to the container file; no special privileges beyond file readability are required once access is obtained. Device-hosted hidden volumes (created on raw partitions or physical disks) are not affected because the vulnerable code path is explicitly conditioned on !bDevice. Outer volumes and non-hidden file containers are also unaffected. Exploitation is further limited by the fact that no hidden-volume content is disclosed - only the existence of the hidden volume becomes detectable - and by the requirement for prior physical access to the device, which represents a substantial real-world barrier. The CVSS UI:A metric confirms that the victim's active creation of a hidden volume is a prerequisite for the vulnerability to manifest. |
| Impact | The CVSS 4.0 score of 4.6 (AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N) accurately reflects a local-access, user-interaction-dependent flaw with low confidentiality impact, and the real-world risk profile closely tracks this rating for most users. Enterprises and general-purpose encryption users face negligible operational risk since encryption strength and data confidentiality are entirely unaffected. Risk is concentrated among threat-model-specific populations - journalists, dissidents, activists, and human rights workers - for whom plausible deniability failure during device seizure or border inspection is a high-consequence event. Exploitation requires physical or forensic-level access to the container file, meaning the attacker is already in a position of significant advantage. No EPSS data was provided; given the niche threat model and local-only attack vector, mass exploitation probability is low, though targeted risk for high-risk individuals may be elevated. This vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV, and no POC or exploit code has been publicly identified. There is no conflict between CVSS signals and the description - all indicators consistently point to a low-to-medium real-world priority except for users with active deniability threat models. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | A forensic examiner seizes a device containing a VeraCrypt file-hosted container suspected of holding a hidden volume. Using a hex editor or forensic imaging tool, the examiner scans the container at 128 MiB boundaries and observes zeroed sectors where uniformly encrypted data is expected, confirming the hidden volume was created on a vulnerable VeraCrypt version and undermining the owner's deniability claim. No exploit code or POC has been publicly identified; this scenario requires physical or legal access to the container file and is not exploitable over a network. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Aug 21, 2026
Hidden volume creation in VeraCrypt 1.26.6 through 1.26.28 leaves forensically detectable plaintext markers inside file-hosted hidden volume containers, directly undermining plausible deniability guarantees. The FormatNoFs and FormatFat functions apply a quick-format optimization that writes zeroed sectors at predictable 128 MiB intervals via WriteFile, bypassing the EncryptDataUnits path that would fill the area with indistinguishable ciphertext; a forensic examiner with access to the container can identify these anomalous plaintext artifacts and infer hidden volume presence. Encryption strength and hidden-volume contents are not compromised - impact is confined to deniability failure. No public exploit has been identified and this vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: VeraCrypt 1.26.29, available at https://github.com/veracrypt/VeraCrypt/releases/tag/VeraCrypt_1.26.29. The underlying source fix is commit 689a59cd584f090ca5f9214d5f2f3a9eac499e53. Upgrading prevents future hidden volumes from being created with the defective quick-format path, but does not retroactively remediate existing hidden volumes - the plaintext markers are already written into containers created on versions 1.26.6 through 1.26.28. Users in high-risk deniability threat models (journalists, activists, individuals subject to device seizure) should recreate any file-hosted hidden volumes from scratch using 1.26.29 or later; pre-existing affected containers must be treated as potentially forensically detectable regardless of the installed VeraCrypt version. There is no configuration toggle or workaround that removes existing markers from already-created volumes - the only effective remediation for those containers is recreation.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
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Technical ContextAI · show details
VeraCrypt's hidden volume feature provides plausible deniability by placing a hidden volume within the free space of an outer volume, making both volumes cryptographically indistinguishable from random noise. The vulnerability resides in FormatNoFs (src/Common/Format.c) and FormatFat (src/Common/Fat.c), which implement a quick-format shortcut for file-hosted containers by calling WriteFile to zero a sector at every 128 MiB boundary rather than routing through EncryptDataUnits, which would produce properly encrypted random data. For normal (non-hidden) file containers this shortcut is harmless, but the code failed to exempt hidden volumes from this path, leaving deterministic structural artifacts - plaintext zero sectors at predictable offsets - in regions where uniform ciphertext is the deniability invariant. CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure) precisely captures the root cause: a performance optimization bypassed the core protection mechanism without accounting for the hidden-volume context. The fix (commit 689a59cd584f090ca5f9214d5f2f3a9eac499e53) introduces a hiddenVol boolean check, restricting the quick-format path to non-hidden file containers only.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Local file access required by forensic examiner; victim's active hidden-volume creation is prerequisite (UI:R); confidentiality impact is low, limited to existence disclosure with no content exposure.
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).
CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. From 1.26.6 until 1.26.29, file-hosted hidden volume creation forces quick format and the FormatNoFs function in src/Common/Format.c and FormatFat function in src/Common/Fat.c use WriteFile to place raw zeroed sectors at predictable 128 MiB intervals. These writes bypass the normal EncryptDataUnits formatting path, leaving deterministic plaintext markers in an area expected to resemble random ciphertext. The markers can weaken plausible deniability during forensic inspection, although they do not disclose hidden-volume content or reduce the strength of VeraCrypt encryption. This issue is fixed in version 1.26.29.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.
The IsDriveLetterAvailable method in Driver/Ntdriver.c in TrueCrypt 7.0, VeraCrypt before 1.15, and CipherShed, when run
Untrusted search path vulnerability in the installer for TrueCrypt 7.2 and 7.1a, VeraCrypt before 1.17-BETA, and possibl
The (1) IsVolumeAccessibleByCurrentUser and (2) MountDevice methods in Ntdriver.c in TrueCrypt 7.0, VeraCrypt before 1.1
VeraCrypt 1.24 allows Local Privilege Escalation during execution of VeraCryptExpander.exe. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.
VeraCrypt 1.26.29 (FUSE-T build) on macOS can leave a dismounted volume's decrypted contents readable, because VeraCrypt
Key derivation in VeraCrypt's non-default wolfCrypt backend silently substituted HKDF for PBKDF2-HMAC in SHA-256 and SHA
Information disclosure in the VeraCrypt Windows kernel driver (veracrypt.sys) in version 1.26.29 and earlier allows a lo
IDRIX, Truecrypt Veracrypt, Truecrypt Prior to 1.23-Hotfix-1 (Veracrypt), all versions (Truecrypt) is affected by: Buffe
EUVD-2026-64057
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
GitHub
Exploit-DB