What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-60454?

EUVD-2026-60454 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.0 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.1%.

Which versions of FreeCAD are affected by EUVD-2026-60454?

FreeCAD prior to version 1.1.2 contains a critical remote code execution vulnerability triggered when users open crafted .FCStd design files, enabling arbitrary Python execution within user systems.. A patch is available.

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-60454?

Within 24 hours: identify all FreeCAD installations across the organization and determine which users receive or open .FCStd files from external sources; issue immediate user alert advising against opening design files from untrusted parties. Within 7 days: implement email gateway and file-sharing platform rules to block inbound .FCStd files from external domains, and escalate to CAD team leads to establish approved-source-only workflows. Within 30 days: subscribe to FreeCAD Project security advisories and maintain a deployment plan for version 1.1.2 or later; coordinate immediate patching across all affected installations upon vendor release, prioritizing users who handle customer or partner design files.

FreeCAD EUVD-2026-60454

| CVE-2026-34789 HIGH

Code Injection (CWE-94)

2026-08-17 GitHub_M

RCE Python Code Injection Freecad

7.0

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: GitHub_M

Severity by source

Vendor (GitHub_M) PRIMARY

7.0 HIGH

AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

vuln.today AI

7.8 HIGH

AV:L because victim must open a local file; AC:L because payload crafting requires no race condition or environmental complexity beyond knowing the FCStd XML schema; PR:N as no attacker privilege is needed; full CIA impact from arbitrary Python code execution.

3.1 AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Red Hat

7.8 HIGH

qualitative

Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).

CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M

Attack Vector

Local

Attack Complexity

High

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

Required

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Patch available

Aug 17, 2026 - 22:03 EUVD

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Aug 17, 2026 - 21:32 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Aug 17, 2026 - 21:32 vuln.today

CVE Published

Aug 17, 2026 - 20:47 cve.org

HIGH 7.0

DescriptionCVE.org

FreeCAD is a free and open-source multiplatform 3D parametric modeler. Prior to 1.1.2, src/App/PropertyPythonObject.cpp in PropertyPythonObject::Restore() passes the attacker-controlled module attribute from serialized PropertyPythonObject XML directly to PyImport_ImportModule() while restoring a crafted FCStd document, which executes module-level Python code, and the legacy pickle branch also imports an attacker-controlled module and invokes its class constructor through PyObject_CallObject(). This issue is fixed in version 1.1.2.

Articles & Coverage 1

News 10 New Python Vulnerabilities - 3 Critical, 7 High, 2 With POC Aug 18, 2026

AnalysisAI

Remote code execution via crafted .FCStd document in FreeCAD prior to 1.1.2 allows arbitrary Python execution when a victim opens a malicious file. The deserialization path in PropertyPythonObject::Restore() passes attacker-controlled module names directly to PyImport_ImportModule(), executing module-level Python code on import; the legacy pickle branch additionally invokes an attacker-controlled class constructor via PyObject_CallObject(). No public exploit or CISA KEV listing is identified at time of analysis, but exploit construction is straightforward for any researcher who can craft the FCStd XML schema.

Technical ContextAI

FreeCAD stores scene properties in .FCStd files (ZIP archives containing XML). The PropertyPythonObject property type serializes Python objects, recording their module and class for later deserialization. During restore, src/App/PropertyPythonObject.cpp calls PyImport_ImportModule() with the raw module attribute from the XML without any allowlist check, meaning the import side-effect - executing __init__.py and any module-level code - fires with attacker-controlled input. The legacy pickle path similarly calls PyObject_CallObject() on an attacker-specified class. CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code) is the root cause: user-supplied data flows unsanitized into a code-execution primitive. The fix introduces isAllowedModule() which uses importlib.util.find_spec() to locate the module on disk without loading it, then enforces that the resolved path falls under known FreeCAD Mod/Ext directories. CPE cpe:2.3:a:freecad:freecad:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* covers all versions prior to 1.1.2.

RemediationAI

Upgrade FreeCAD to version 1.1.2, which introduces the isAllowedModule() allowlist in PropertyPythonObject::Restore() - the vendor-released patch is confirmed via https://github.com/FreeCAD/FreeCAD/releases/tag/1.1.2 and three associated commits (81b73925, 983037f3, e2dc6c81). If immediate upgrade is not possible, the most effective compensating control is to refuse to open .FCStd files from untrusted sources, enforcing file-origin policies at the organizational level (e.g., email gateway stripping .FCStd attachments or blocking them in collaboration platforms). Disabling Python scripting support in FreeCAD (if the build configuration allows) would eliminate the attack surface but would break legitimate parametric modeling workflows that rely on Python macros. There is no network-level control applicable since the attack requires local file interaction. The side effect of the patch's allowlist is that lazy-loaded workbench modules not yet in sys.modules must resolve to a path under FreeCAD's own Mod or Ext directories - third-party modules installed outside these paths may require additional vetting.