VMware ESX EUVD-2026-51106

Exploitation requires an actor to already hold VM deployment/provisioning privileges (CVSS PR:H) - the attacker must be able to deploy or configure a virtual machine on the affected host or management plane; this is not exploitable by an unauthenticated external attacker. On ESX, success crosses from the guest/VM context into the host VMX process (scope change) and most likely yields a host-process Denial-of-Service, with possible host information disclosure. On VMware Workstation and Fusion the impact is explicitly limited to information disclosure only, with no host DoS. Limiting factors: the required VM-deployment authorization, the absence of any known public exploit, and product-dependent impact (DoS applies to ESX host, not to Workstation/Fusion).

The CVSS 3.1 base score is 7.6 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L): high privileges required (PR:H, i.e. an actor with VM deployment rights), low complexity, no user interaction, a scope change (guest process to host process), high confidentiality impact and low availability impact. There is no EPSS value, no CISA KEV listing, and no POC referenced in the supplied data, so the practical exploitation likelihood is currently unquantified but not evidenced as active. The realistic risk is bounded by the PR:H prerequisite - this is not an unauthenticated internet-facing bug; the attacker must already be able to deploy/control a VM. The most probable outcome per the vendor is a Denial-of-Service of the host process rather than reliable data theft, which tempers the C:H rating. Note a tension worth verifying: the vector is AV:N yet the described precondition ('VM deployment privileges') is an operational/management-plane capability rather than a raw network path, so the effective attack surface depends on who holds VM provisioning rights in the environment.

An actor with VM deployment privileges (for example a semi-trusted tenant admin or a compromised provisioning account) deploys or configures a VM whose emulated-device input triggers the out-of-bounds read in the host process. On ESX this crashes or leaks memory from the host VMX process, causing a Denial-of-Service or disclosing adjacent host memory; on Workstation and Fusion the result is limited to information disclosure. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, and low attack complexity (AC:L) means a reliable trigger requires no special timing once the actor has the required privileges.