Adobe Bridge EUVD-2026-44498

Exploitation requires the victim to open a malicious file within Adobe Bridge (UI:R) - this user-interaction step is the primary prerequisite and limiting factor. The attack vector is local (AV:L), so no network-facing exposure or listening service is involved; the attacker must get their crafted file onto the target and induce the user to open it in Bridge. No authentication or pre-existing privileges are needed on the attacker's part (PR:N), and attack complexity is low (AC:L), meaning once the file is opened, no additional special configuration or timing is required. The scope is unchanged (S:U), so code executes only with the current user's privileges, not elevated. The key limiter is entirely the reliance on tricking a user into opening attacker-supplied content in the specific application.

The CVSS 3.1 base score is 7.8 (High) with vector AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - a local attack vector requiring user interaction but no prior privileges, yielding full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. The local vector plus mandatory user interaction (opening a malicious file) means this is not wormable or remotely automatable; realistic exploitation depends on social engineering to deliver the file. No EPSS score, SSVC decision, or KEV listing was provided in the input, and no public exploit was identified, so real-world exploitation pressure appears low-to-moderate rather than urgent. This is a genuine RCE-class issue worth patching on normal cycles, but absent KEV/POC signals it is not an emergency compared to network-facing, unauthenticated flaws. No conflicting signals were observed between the CVSS vector and the description; both consistently describe local, user-interaction-dependent code execution.

An attacker crafts a malicious file that triggers the heap overflow in Adobe Bridge and delivers it via email, a shared drive, or a download disguised as a legitimate creative asset. When the victim opens the file in Bridge, the overflow corrupts heap memory and executes attacker-controlled code with the victim's privileges. No public proof-of-concept was identified at time of analysis, and the local vector with required user interaction means delivery relies on social engineering.