What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-35470?

EUVD-2026-35470 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.5 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.1%.

Which versions of FreeSWITCH are affected by EUVD-2026-35470?

FreeSWITCH installations prior to version 1.11.0 are vulnerable to a remotely triggered denial-of-service attack from unauthenticated network sources with no public exploit identified at time of…. A patch is available.

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-35470?

Within 24 hours: Conduct complete inventory of FreeSWITCH installations and identify which are network-reachable from untrusted sources. Within 7 days: Implement firewall rules restricting STUN (UDP port 3478) access to authorized endpoints only, configure rate limiting on STUN traffic, and enable detailed logging. Within 30 days: Monitor FreeSWITCH project advisories for version 1.11.0 release and plan staged deployment of the patch across all affected instances.

FreeSWITCH EUVD-2026-35470

| CVE-2026-49475 HIGH

Improper Input Validation (CWE-20)

2026-06-09 GitHub_M

Buffer Overflow Freeswitch

7.5

CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory

Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY

7.5 HIGH

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

None

Integrity

None

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Patch available

Jun 09, 2026 - 18:02 EUVD

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Jun 09, 2026 - 16:46 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Jun 09, 2026 - 16:46 vuln.today

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to version 1.11.0, a STUN packet whose declared attribute length is shorter than the structure the parser casts to causes the parser to read and write past the end of the attribute, producing an out-of-bounds memory access on the per-leg media buffer. This issue has been patched in version 1.11.0.

AnalysisAI

Out-of-bounds memory access in FreeSWITCH versions prior to 1.11.0 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to crash the telephony stack by sending a malformed STUN packet whose declared attribute length is smaller than the structure the parser casts it to. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the network-reachable nature of STUN on media-handling deployments makes this a denial-of-service risk for any exposed FreeSWITCH instance handling WebRTC or NAT-traversal traffic.

Technical ContextAI

FreeSWITCH is an open-source Software Defined Telecom Stack maintained by SignalWire (cpe:2.3:a:signalwire:freeswitch) that handles SIP, WebRTC, and media routing. STUN (Session Traversal Utilities for NAT, RFC 5389) is used to discover NAT mappings during ICE candidate negotiation for media sessions. The flaw maps to CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation): the STUN attribute parser trusts the attribute length field declared in the packet header and casts the payload to a fixed C struct without verifying that the declared length is large enough to contain that struct. When the declared length is shorter than the structure size, the parser reads and writes past the end of the per-leg media buffer, producing an out-of-bounds access on heap memory tied to the call leg.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade to FreeSWITCH 1.11.0 (https://github.com/signalwire/freeswitch/releases/tag/v1.11.0), which the project flags as an important release containing critical security fixes; review the migration notes for breaking changes since 1.11.0 also switches the regex engine to PCRE2, removes roughly thirty legacy modules, and upgrades the Windows OpenSSL build to 3.x. Until upgrade is possible, restrict UDP reachability to the FreeSWITCH media ports (default RTP/ICE range and any configured STUN listeners) so only known SIP/WebRTC peers can send STUN traffic - typically by ACL'ing the media interface to trusted carrier and client subnets at the edge firewall - with the trade-off that this breaks NAT traversal for clients outside the allowlist and is not viable for public WebRTC services. Where edge filtering is impractical, place the instance behind a STUN-aware SBC or session border element that validates attribute lengths before forwarding, accepting the added latency and operational complexity. Refer to the GHSA-9j6h-hc95-q926 advisory for the authoritative fix metadata.