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microtar EUVDEUVD-2026-33741

| CVE-2026-43623 HIGH
Stack-based Buffer Overflow (CWE-121)
2026-06-01 VulnCheck GHSA-mwwm-v74q-mvh9
8.7
CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: VulnCheck
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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain

  1. Recon
    Craft TAR with unterminated name field
  2. Delivery
    Deliver archive to victim application
  3. Exploit
    Victim opens or unpacks archive
  4. Install
    strcpy overflows stack buffer in raw_to_header
  5. C2
    Overwrite saved return address
  6. Execute
    Hijack control flow
  7. Impact
    Execute attacker code in host process

Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness
CWE
ASVS 5.0
V15 - Secure Coding and Architecture Stack buffer bounds checking
MITRE ATT&CK

1 technique across 1 tactic: Execution

The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up.

Exploitation Conditions

Exploitation requires the target application to invoke microtar's mtar_open(), mtar_find(), or mtar_read_header() on an attacker-supplied TAR archive whose ustar name or linkname fields are fully populated to 100 bytes WITHOUT a trailing null byte - the exact precondition documented in the CVE. The CVSS vector specifies UI:P (passive user interaction), meaning the victim must perform a normal action such as opening, importing, or unpacking the archive; no authentication is required (PR:N). Practical limiting factors: the target must be built against vulnerable microtar through 0.1.0, the archive must reach a microtar entry point (so applications that pre-validate headers or use a different TAR parser are not vulnerable), and successful code execution further depends on the target platform's stack protections (canaries, ASLR, NX) since this is a classic stack overflow rather than a logic flaw.

Impact

CVSS 4.0 scores this 8.7 with AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:P and high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact - meaning remote unauthenticated exploitation is possible but requires a user to feed the malicious archive to a microtar-based application (passive UI). Publicly available exploit code exists (referenced VulnCheck advisory and GitHub issue #28), elevating real-world risk, but the vulnerability is not in CISA KEV and no EPSS score was provided in the input, so widespread automated exploitation is not confirmed. The realistic priority depends heavily on downstream consumers: microtar is embedded into other software, so risk concentrates wherever an application accepts attacker-controlled TAR input. CVSS shows network attack vector, but the practical delivery model is file-based (archive supplied to a microtar caller), which defenders should weigh - the network vector is satisfied by any flow that delivers an archive (web upload, update package, asset fetch).

Exploit ScenarioDerived

An attacker hosts or delivers a crafted TAR archive whose ustar name or linkname field is fully populated to 100 bytes without a trailing null. When a victim application built on microtar opens the archive - for example, a game loader fetching asset packs, an installer processing an update bundle, or a backend service unpacking a user upload - strcpy() in raw_to_header() overwrites the return address on the stack, allowing the attacker to redirect execution. Publicly available exploit code referenced from GitHub issue #28 lowers the barrier to weaponization.

Monitor Track and reassess. Why: Vendor states no customer action required.
No patch listed yet 0.0% exploitation probability (EPSS)

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AnalysisAIv1 – Jun 01, 2026

Stack-based buffer overflow in microtar through 0.1.0 allows remote attackers to corrupt stack memory and potentially achieve code execution when an application using the library parses a malicious TAR archive. The flaw in raw_to_header() uses strcpy() on non-null-terminated 100-byte ustar fields, enabling writes of up to 355 bytes into a 100-byte buffer. Publicly available exploit code exists and the issue was reported by VulnCheck, raising the practical risk despite no current CISA KEV listing.

RemediationAI

No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis - upstream issues #28, #29, and #30 at https://github.com/rxi/microtar/issues track the report but no tagged release beyond 0.1.0 is referenced in the provided data; monitor the repository for a fixed release. As compensating controls, downstream maintainers should patch their vendored copy of src/microtar.c by replacing the strcpy() calls in raw_to_header() with bounded copies (memcpy of 100 bytes followed by explicit null termination, or strnlen-validated copies) - this is a minimal change with no functional side effect. Applications that accept TAR archives from untrusted sources should additionally validate that name and linkname fields contain a null terminator within the first 100 bytes before invoking mtar_open(), mtar_find(), or mtar_read_header(), and treat untrusted archive parsing as a privilege boundary by sandboxing the process (seccomp, separate UID, or a parser subprocess), accepting the trade-off of slightly higher complexity in archive handling pipelines. Consult the VulnCheck advisory for further detail.

Affected VersionsENISA

microtar 0 ≤0.1.0

Affected Packages

euvd microtar no fix

Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)

Affects your stack

Affects 1 package in euvd

Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.

Technical ContextAI · show details

microtar is a small single-file C library by rxi (cpe:2.3:a:rxi:microtar) used by embedded systems, games, and tooling to read and write TAR archives. The bug is a textbook CWE-121 stack-based buffer overflow: the ustar header format reserves fixed 100-byte fields for name and linkname that are NOT required to be null-terminated when fully populated, yet raw_to_header() copies them with strcpy(), which only stops at a null byte. A crafted header that omits terminators causes strcpy to continue reading across adjacent header fields (up to ~355 bytes), overwriting return addresses and saved registers on the call stack of any caller of mtar_open(), mtar_find(), or mtar_read_header().

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  • Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources

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Severity by source

Vendor (VulnCheck) PRIMARY 8.7 HIGH
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck) · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Attack Requirements
None
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
Passive
Vulnerable system: Confidentiality
High
Vulnerable system: Integrity
High
Vulnerable system: Availability
High
Subsequent system: Confidentiality
None
Subsequent system: Integrity
None
Subsequent system: Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

1
CVSS changed
Jun 01, 2026 - 19:22 NVD
8.8 (HIGH) 8.7 (HIGH)

DescriptionCVE.org

microtar through 0.1.0 contains a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the raw_to_header() function in src/microtar.c that allows attackers to corrupt adjacent stack memory by supplying a crafted TAR archive with non-null-terminated name or linkname fields. The function uses strcpy() to copy 100-byte ustar format fields that lack null terminators, causing writes of up to 355 bytes into a 100-byte destination buffer when mtar_open(), mtar_find(), or mtar_read_header() process attacker-supplied TAR archives.

Executive ViewAI

Why It Matters

microtar library (versions through 0.1.0) contains a remote code execution vulnerability in TAR archive parsing that enables attackers to execute arbitrary code by submitting malicious files. Organizations using this library to process untrusted archives face immediate exploitation risk; publicly available exploit code exists and the vendor has not released a patch.

Business Impact: Severe
Compensating Controls

Implement strict TAR file validation (reject files exceeding expected specifications, disable TAR format where not critical); require cryptographic verification of TAR archives before processing; apply network-level controls to restrict TAR file sources to trusted endpoints only; run TAR processing in isolated containers with minimal privileges; disable TAR parsing functionality entirely pending vendor patch if operationally feasible.

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score
0.0%
Top 88% exploitable
Exploit
POC
Public exploit code exists
Social Media
1
Sightings
Data Quality
7 sources
Confidence: High

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue
Severity HIGH
CISA KEV No
Public POC Yes
EPSS 0.0%
Patch available No
Active threat No
Deciding rule
Vendor states no customer action required
What every action level means
Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.
Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.
This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.
This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.
Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.

SSVC AssessmentENISA

SSVC Decision
Out-of-Cycle
Exploitation
Poc
System Exposure· derived
Open
Automatable
No
Human Impact
Very High
Technical Impact
Total

Priority Score

64
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: 0
CVSS: +44
PoC: +20
Weaponized: 0
Threat intel: 0
Gov advisory: 0

Attack Technique

A buffer overflow occurs when a program writes more data to a memory buffer than it was allocated to hold, causing the excess data to spill into adjacent memory regions.

A stack-based buffer overflow occurs when a program writes more data to a buffer located on the stack than it was allocated to hold.

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