JunoClaw EUVD-2026-29538

Upgrade immediately to JunoClaw version 0.x.y-security-1 or later, available at https://github.com/Dragonmonk111/junoclaw/releases/tag/v0.x.y-security-1. The patch commit a7886cd (https://github.com/Dragonmonk111/junoclaw/commit/a7886cd) introduces a comprehensive path-guard validation module that enforces: directory containment within WASM_ROOT via resolved absolute path comparison, symlink target validation to prevent escapes, 8MB file size limit to block exfiltration of large datasets, and WebAssembly magic number verification (0x00 0x61 0x73 0x6d header) to prevent upload of arbitrary file types. If immediate patching is not feasible, implement these compensating controls with noted trade-offs: (1) Disable the upload_wasm MCP tool entirely via configuration - eliminates attack surface but breaks legitimate WebAssembly module upload workflows. (2) Run JunoClaw agents in a chroot jail or container with read-only mounts for all directories except a dedicated wasm upload directory - limits blast radius but requires container orchestration expertise and may break integrations expecting filesystem access. (3) Implement mandatory access control (AppArmor/SELinux) policies restricting agent process reads to /var/lib/junoclaw/wasm and denying access to /etc, /root, /home - effective containment but operationally complex and platform-specific. (4) Deploy file integrity monitoring (FIM) on sensitive paths to detect unauthorized reads as a detection control - provides forensic visibility but does not prevent initial exfiltration. None of these workarounds match the security posture of the vendor patch, which addresses the root cause via input validation. Verify patch application by confirming the path-guard module exists in mcp/src/utils/path-guard.ts and version string matches v0.x.y-security-1 in package metadata.