OpenPanel EUVD-2026-110526

Requires an authenticated account holding read-level (bare project-membership) access to a target project - the lowest project role, which cannot create or edit integrations. The project must have at least one notification rule with an attached integration (Slack, incoming webhook, or custom webhook) configured by a write/admin user; no non-default setting beyond having integrations wired to notification rules is needed. Exploitation is a single tRPC call to notification.rules with the projectId the member can already see, no user interaction. Limiting factors: the attacker must already be invited into the project (PR:L), and there must be integration secrets configured on notification rules for anything to leak; a project with no integrations attached to rules exposes nothing.

Signals point to a genuine but access-gated priority. The vendor CVSS 4.0 vector (8.4) is AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N with VC:H and SC:H, meaning network-reachable, low-complexity, no user interaction, but requiring authenticated privileges (PR:L) - specifically read-level project membership, not an anonymous internet attacker. EPSS is low (0.30%, 23rd percentile) and the vulnerability is NOT in CISA KEV, so there is no confirmed active exploitation and no evidence of widespread opportunistic scanning. A public PoC reference exists (benign step-by-step walkthrough in the GHSA advisory); it is not verified as working weaponized exploit code. These signals are consistent rather than conflicting: a trivially-triggered flaw (any read member can call one tRPC query and receive plaintext credentials) that nonetheless depends on the attacker already holding a valid low-trust account in a multi-member project. The real-world severity driver is the SC:H subsequent-system impact - the leaked Slack bot tokens, webhook URLs, and authorization headers are live credentials usable directly against the organization's external systems. Per the vuln.today decision label this_week and the confirmed privilege-boundary crossing, this warrants prompt patching, especially in shared/multi-tenant OpenPanel deployments where low-trust analysts are routinely invited; it is not an emergency internet-wide unauthenticated issue.

A low-trust analyst invited with only read-level access to view a project's dashboards calls the notification.rules tRPC query, which eager-loads integration rows and returns them raw without calling redactIntegration. The response contains the admin-configured Slack bot token, incoming webhook URLs, and webhook authorization headers in plaintext, which the attacker then replays against the organization's external Slack and webhook endpoints. A benign proof-of-concept walkthrough is published in the GHSA advisory, but no verified working exploit code is confirmed.