watsonx.data Intelligence EUVD-2025-210377

Exploitation requires an authenticated session with at least low-privilege access to IBM watsonx.data Intelligence (PR:L per CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N). The attacker must be able to send HTTP requests to the application from a network-reachable position (AV:N). Error disclosure is triggered by crafting requests that cause application-level exceptions or error conditions, which the application then returns verbosely to the browser. Unauthenticated exploitation is not possible per the PR:L CVSS metric - the authentication barrier is the primary limiting factor. Additional limits: no user interaction is required on the victim's part; scope is unchanged, meaning the attacker cannot pivot to other systems through this flaw alone; configuring the application or its proxy layer to suppress verbose errors would eliminate the vulnerability as a practical attack surface.

The CVSS 3.1 base score of 4.3 (Medium) is calibrated accurately for this class of flaw: the vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N reflects a network-accessible, low-complexity attack requiring authenticated low-privilege access, with limited confidentiality impact and no integrity or availability consequence. No EPSS data was provided in the source intelligence, and the vulnerability does not appear in the CISA KEV catalog. No public POC has been identified. The real-world risk is moderate: this flaw cannot directly compromise the system but reduces the attacker's effort to discover exploitable attack surfaces, making it a meaningful force-multiplier for a threat actor who already holds low-privilege access. The PR:L requirement is the most significant limiting factor - this is not an unauthenticated exposure. Organizations running watsonx.data Intelligence in multi-tenant or externally-accessible deployments face higher practical risk than those restricting access to internal trusted users only.

An authenticated low-privilege user deliberately submits malformed or boundary-condition HTTP requests to watsonx.data Intelligence API endpoints, causing the application to return detailed technical error messages in the browser response. The attacker captures these messages to extract internal file paths, stack frame details, or backend service identifiers, then uses that intelligence to identify and target a more impactful secondary vulnerability within the same system. No public POC has been identified, but the technique requires only authenticated access and basic HTTP manipulation skills.