Monthly
Unauthenticated network attackers can elicit Java stack traces from Red Hat IdM's Dogtag CA REST enrollment endpoint (POST /ca/rest/certrequests) by submitting malformed requests, causing HTTP 500 responses that expose internal implementation details under CWE-209. The same error path simultaneously amplifies the CA debug log with large multi-line stack traces, creating a log-fill resource exhaustion vector that drives disk growth and I/O contention on affected RHEL 6 through 10 deployments. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the attack requires no authentication and low complexity, making it accessible to unskilled opportunistic attackers targeting IdM infrastructure.
Sensitive field value disclosure in Ash Framework's atomic confirmation validator allows any caller of a vulnerable action to extract a stored sensitive attribute by intentionally submitting a wrong confirmation argument. Versions 2.17.20 through before 3.32.2 of ash-project/ash are affected: when an actor supplies only the confirmation argument and omits the field itself, the atomic `Confirm` validator resolves the mismatch error's `value` through `atomic_ref/2` to the field's current stored database value and returns it in the error payload. No public exploit exists beyond the regression test shipped with the fix commit, and this vulnerability does not appear in the CISA KEV catalog.
Sensitive application data leaks from HTTP 500 responses in ash_typescript versions 0.15.0 through 0.17.x due to an ungated code path that serializes handler return values verbatim using Elixir's inspect/2. Any unauthenticated caller who can trigger a typed-controller route whose handler falls through with a non-conn term - such as {:error, %User{}} - receives the full Elixir struct inspection, potentially including hashed passwords, session tokens, and tenant identifiers, in the JSON error body. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the disclosure is trivially reproducible with a standard HTTP client given the right application-layer condition.
Sensitive internal error data - including runtime secrets potentially carried in Ash error vars fields - leaks to unauthenticated network clients in ash_typescript 0.8.0 through 0.17.x when a configured error handler raises a FunctionClauseError on an unmatched error shape. The rescue clause in apply_error_handler/3 was intended as a safety net but fell back to returning the original, unredacted error map rather than a safe generic response, inverting the intended suppress-on-failure semantics. No public exploit code has been identified and there is no CISA KEV listing; a patched release (0.18.0) is available from the Ash Project.
Sensitive form parameters leak into server logs, crash reports, and the Phoenix development error page in ash_phoenix versions 1.2.17 through 2.3.24, where AshPhoenix.Form.Auto embeds the complete raw submitted param map verbatim into exception messages when a union sub-form receives an unrecognized _union_type value. Because the exception is raised inside library code rather than Phoenix's controller layer, the standard :filter_parameters configuration cannot redact the exposure-any field co-submitted with the union form field, including passwords and tokens, appears in plaintext in the raised message. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but any user capable of submitting a form with a union field can deliberately trigger the leak regardless of intent.
Credential leakage in ash_ai (versions 0.1.0 through before 1.0.0) exposes embedding provider API keys and request internals to authenticated API callers via unsanitized error messages. In AshAi.Changes.Vectorize, a failed embedding provider call caused the raw Elixir error struct - which HTTP clients commonly populate with the outbound Authorization header, request URL, and provider response body - to be passed through inspect/1 directly into a user-facing changeset error. AshJsonApi and AshGraphql serialize these changeset errors into API responses, making the full credential material readable by any caller who can trigger a provider failure. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the trigger condition (oversized or malformed vectorized content) is trivially reachable by any authenticated user of an exposed endpoint.
Unfiltered exception serialization in ash_ai 0.6.0-0.x leaks internal application details - database schema, raw SQL fragments, policy module names - to authenticated chat users via the LLM conversation stream. AshAi.ToolLoop and AshAi.Tools used Elixir's Exception.message/1 verbatim to encode any raised tool exception into the tool-result payload, which the language model then relayed to the requesting user. Any authenticated user able to steer tool arguments into a code path that raises an exception could extract sensitive internal reconnaissance data; ash_ai 1.0.0 closes the gap by routing all tool exceptions through a safe formatter. No public exploit code and no CISA KEV listing have been identified at time of analysis.
Internal Ash attribute and argument names leak through GraphQL error responses in ash_graphql 1.9.0 through 1.10.x, bypassing application-configured error handlers intended to redact them. A logic flaw in AshGraphql.Errors causes a sanitizing error_handler's decision to suppress the :path field to be silently overridden, re-injecting raw internal field names via build_error_path/5. Unauthenticated remote clients can trigger validation failures on non-exposed or nested fields to enumerate internal schema structure that the application deliberately chose to hide. No public exploit or KEV listing exists at time of analysis.
Cleartext credential exposure in Spring AMQP affects applications that use the RabbitMQ management aliveness check: when that check fails at runtime, the configured admin password is embedded verbatim in the thrown Java exception message, making it visible to anyone with access to exception output. The vulnerability spans multiple major release lines - 2.4.x, 3.2.x, and 4.0.x through 4.1.0 - and was reported by security@vmware.com, the Spring Security team. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and CISA KEV status is unconfirmed, but a successful credential leak would yield full RabbitMQ administrative control.
Spring WebFlux applications that enable WebSocket connections leak request headers - potentially containing Authorization tokens, session cookies, or API keys - through exception reason messages exposed over the WebSocket channel. All maintained Spring Framework release trains from 5.2.x through 7.0.x are affected, covering the vast majority of actively deployed Spring reactive applications. The vulnerability is classified as information disclosure (CWE-209), and while the CVSS score is 7.5, the EPSS score of 0.14% (4th percentile) indicates very low observed exploitation probability; no public exploit or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis.
Unauthenticated network attackers can elicit Java stack traces from Red Hat IdM's Dogtag CA REST enrollment endpoint (POST /ca/rest/certrequests) by submitting malformed requests, causing HTTP 500 responses that expose internal implementation details under CWE-209. The same error path simultaneously amplifies the CA debug log with large multi-line stack traces, creating a log-fill resource exhaustion vector that drives disk growth and I/O contention on affected RHEL 6 through 10 deployments. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the attack requires no authentication and low complexity, making it accessible to unskilled opportunistic attackers targeting IdM infrastructure.
Sensitive field value disclosure in Ash Framework's atomic confirmation validator allows any caller of a vulnerable action to extract a stored sensitive attribute by intentionally submitting a wrong confirmation argument. Versions 2.17.20 through before 3.32.2 of ash-project/ash are affected: when an actor supplies only the confirmation argument and omits the field itself, the atomic `Confirm` validator resolves the mismatch error's `value` through `atomic_ref/2` to the field's current stored database value and returns it in the error payload. No public exploit exists beyond the regression test shipped with the fix commit, and this vulnerability does not appear in the CISA KEV catalog.
Sensitive application data leaks from HTTP 500 responses in ash_typescript versions 0.15.0 through 0.17.x due to an ungated code path that serializes handler return values verbatim using Elixir's inspect/2. Any unauthenticated caller who can trigger a typed-controller route whose handler falls through with a non-conn term - such as {:error, %User{}} - receives the full Elixir struct inspection, potentially including hashed passwords, session tokens, and tenant identifiers, in the JSON error body. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the disclosure is trivially reproducible with a standard HTTP client given the right application-layer condition.
Sensitive internal error data - including runtime secrets potentially carried in Ash error vars fields - leaks to unauthenticated network clients in ash_typescript 0.8.0 through 0.17.x when a configured error handler raises a FunctionClauseError on an unmatched error shape. The rescue clause in apply_error_handler/3 was intended as a safety net but fell back to returning the original, unredacted error map rather than a safe generic response, inverting the intended suppress-on-failure semantics. No public exploit code has been identified and there is no CISA KEV listing; a patched release (0.18.0) is available from the Ash Project.
Sensitive form parameters leak into server logs, crash reports, and the Phoenix development error page in ash_phoenix versions 1.2.17 through 2.3.24, where AshPhoenix.Form.Auto embeds the complete raw submitted param map verbatim into exception messages when a union sub-form receives an unrecognized _union_type value. Because the exception is raised inside library code rather than Phoenix's controller layer, the standard :filter_parameters configuration cannot redact the exposure-any field co-submitted with the union form field, including passwords and tokens, appears in plaintext in the raised message. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but any user capable of submitting a form with a union field can deliberately trigger the leak regardless of intent.
Credential leakage in ash_ai (versions 0.1.0 through before 1.0.0) exposes embedding provider API keys and request internals to authenticated API callers via unsanitized error messages. In AshAi.Changes.Vectorize, a failed embedding provider call caused the raw Elixir error struct - which HTTP clients commonly populate with the outbound Authorization header, request URL, and provider response body - to be passed through inspect/1 directly into a user-facing changeset error. AshJsonApi and AshGraphql serialize these changeset errors into API responses, making the full credential material readable by any caller who can trigger a provider failure. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the trigger condition (oversized or malformed vectorized content) is trivially reachable by any authenticated user of an exposed endpoint.
Unfiltered exception serialization in ash_ai 0.6.0-0.x leaks internal application details - database schema, raw SQL fragments, policy module names - to authenticated chat users via the LLM conversation stream. AshAi.ToolLoop and AshAi.Tools used Elixir's Exception.message/1 verbatim to encode any raised tool exception into the tool-result payload, which the language model then relayed to the requesting user. Any authenticated user able to steer tool arguments into a code path that raises an exception could extract sensitive internal reconnaissance data; ash_ai 1.0.0 closes the gap by routing all tool exceptions through a safe formatter. No public exploit code and no CISA KEV listing have been identified at time of analysis.
Internal Ash attribute and argument names leak through GraphQL error responses in ash_graphql 1.9.0 through 1.10.x, bypassing application-configured error handlers intended to redact them. A logic flaw in AshGraphql.Errors causes a sanitizing error_handler's decision to suppress the :path field to be silently overridden, re-injecting raw internal field names via build_error_path/5. Unauthenticated remote clients can trigger validation failures on non-exposed or nested fields to enumerate internal schema structure that the application deliberately chose to hide. No public exploit or KEV listing exists at time of analysis.
Cleartext credential exposure in Spring AMQP affects applications that use the RabbitMQ management aliveness check: when that check fails at runtime, the configured admin password is embedded verbatim in the thrown Java exception message, making it visible to anyone with access to exception output. The vulnerability spans multiple major release lines - 2.4.x, 3.2.x, and 4.0.x through 4.1.0 - and was reported by security@vmware.com, the Spring Security team. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and CISA KEV status is unconfirmed, but a successful credential leak would yield full RabbitMQ administrative control.
Spring WebFlux applications that enable WebSocket connections leak request headers - potentially containing Authorization tokens, session cookies, or API keys - through exception reason messages exposed over the WebSocket channel. All maintained Spring Framework release trains from 5.2.x through 7.0.x are affected, covering the vast majority of actively deployed Spring reactive applications. The vulnerability is classified as information disclosure (CWE-209), and while the CVSS score is 7.5, the EPSS score of 0.14% (4th percentile) indicates very low observed exploitation probability; no public exploit or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis.