Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
AV:L because victim must locally run aider in the cloned directory; UI:R for the required clone-and-run action; PR:N as attacker only needs a hosted repository; full C/I/A from arbitrary shell execution.
Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
aider (aider-chat) automatically loads a .aider.conf.yml configuration file from the root of the git repository it is launched in. A crafted repository can set test-cmd (executed at startup) or lint-cmd (executed on the first file edit), which aider runs through a shell (subprocess with shell=True) without any user confirmation, LLM interaction, or API key. Consequently, a user who clones and runs aider inside an attacker-supplied repository achieves arbitrary command execution on their machine. The behavior is long-standing and was confirmed on 0.86.3.dev (current main).
AnalysisAI
Arbitrary shell command execution in aider (aider-chat) is triggered silently when a user runs the tool inside a crafted git repository containing a malicious .aider.conf.yml configuration file. The tool unconditionally reads this file at startup and passes test-cmd and lint-cmd values directly to Python's subprocess with shell=True, with no user confirmation, no LLM involvement, and no API key required. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | The victim must clone a repository controlled by the attacker and then run aider from within that repository's directory. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P, score 8.5) correctly classifies this as a local-vector, passive-user-interaction attack, which meaningfully constrains the threat model relative to a fully remote unauthenticated flaw. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | No vendor-released patch has been identified at time of analysis; monitor the upstream issue at https://github.com/Aider-AI/aider/issues/5254 and the main repository at https://github.com/Aider-AI/aider for a fix. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: inventory all aider deployments across development teams, communicate to users to avoid running aider in untrusted external or third-party repositories until patched, and audit Git repositories for suspicious .aider.conf.yml files. …
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Same weakness CWE-94 – Code Injection
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-71130
GHSA-h3gc-qfjg-2m69