Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessCraft skill with malicious .pyc + benign .py decoy
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DeliveryDistribute skill package to target operator
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ExploitOperator runs skill-scan against package
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ExecutionScanner skips __pycache__ and .pyc files, reports SAFE
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PersistOperator installs skill
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ImpactCPython imports package, executes malicious bytecode
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A06:2025 - Insecure Design
ASVS 5.0
V15 - Secure Coding and Architecture Protection mechanism completeness
|
| Exploitation Conditions | The operator must use a vulnerable version of AI-Infra-Guard (through v4.6.0) with the skill-scan component to evaluate a skill package, then install that package on a system running CPython. The attacker must be able to deliver a crafted skill package to the operator - via a public or private skill marketplace, a supply-chain compromise of a legitimate skill repository, or social engineering. No special server-side configuration is required; the bypass is present in the default scanner behavior. Exploitation is limited by the requirement for one user interaction (UI:P): the operator must choose to install the skill after receiving the false SAFE verdict. Automated CI/CD pipelines that install skills without human review of scan output would reduce this barrier. Exploitation does not require any credentials, network privileges, or non-default settings on the target host. |
| Impact | The CVSS 4.0 score of 7.1 with vector AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P captures the attack well: the malicious skill can be distributed over any network channel (marketplace, email, repository), requires no special attack conditions or attacker privileges, but does require the operator to perform the installation step (UI:P). The impact is scoped to VI:H on the vulnerable system with no confidentiality or availability impact per the upstream assessment, though code execution at import time could realistically extend to C:H/A:H in practice - this discrepancy should be verified with Tencent. No CISA KEV listing and no public exploit code identified, limiting immediate widespread risk. The realistic threat actor is one who can publish a skill to a marketplace or deliver a skill package socially; the attack is deterministic and requires no vulnerability in CPython itself. Risk is meaningful for organizations actively vetting third-party skills through AI-Infra-Guard before the patch, particularly in automated pipelines where operator review of scanner output may be cursory. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker publishes a skill package to a shared skill marketplace containing a clean, human-readable |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Sep 02, 2026
Tencent AI-Infra-Guard's skill-scan component allows scanner bypass via hardcoded exclusion of Python compiled bytecode, enabling malicious skill packages to pass a false SAFE verdict and execute arbitrary code on operator hosts. Attackers supply a skill with benign .py source decoys alongside malicious .pyc/.pyo/.pyd bytecode in __pycache__ directories; because three separate scanning surfaces in versions through v4.6.0 unconditionally skip these artifacts, the auditing LLM never sees the malicious payload. CPython's PEP 552 UNCHECKED_HASH behavior executes .pyc at import time regardless of source presence, triggering code execution when an operator installs the skill. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the upstream fix commit and GitHub Issue #531 confirm the flaw.
RemediationAI
Apply upstream commit 7e0f749e3c023e5c6ab7b32fe97b3f6f2e8aeb04 from the AI-Infra-Guard repository, which removes __pycache__ from all ignored-directory sets and compiled bytecode extensions from all ignored-extension sets across agent.py, dir_actions.py, and pre_scan.py, and adds explicit [compiled-bytecode] warnings surfaced to the LLM auditor. A patched release tag is not confirmed at time of analysis - build from the fixed commit or pin to a version released after this commit. As a compensating control prior to patching, operators should manually decompile and inspect .pyc/.pyo/.pyd files in any skill package before installation using tools such as uncompyle6 or decompile3; note this requires bytecode to be decompilable and may miss obfuscated payloads. Restricting skill installation to verified internal sources eliminates the distribution vector entirely and is the most reliable short-term control.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 2 packages in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
AI-Infra-Guard is Tencent's AI infrastructure security scanning toolkit; the skill-scan sub-component uses an LLM-based auditor to vet third-party skill packages before installation. The vulnerability spans three files: skill_scan/agent/agent.py (directory tree builder), skill_scan/tools/dir/dir_actions.py (directory listing tool), and skill_scan/utils/pre_scan.py (pre-scan pattern matcher). All three hardcoded __pycache__ into ignored-directory sets and {'.pyc', '.pyo', '.pyd'} into ignored-extension sets, making compiled Python bytecode entirely invisible to the auditor. The root cause class is CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure): the scanner's safety check is deliberately bypassed by a format the tool was designed to handle. CPython's import system (PEP 552 UNCHECKED_HASH) executes .pyc bytecode at import time without verifying a matching .py source or its hash, making the bypass fully reliable on any CPython runtime. The fix (commit 7e0f749) removes bytecode from all skip sets and adds [compiled-bytecode] markers so the auditing LLM can flag them explicitly.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Skill distributed over network (AV:N), no attacker privileges needed (PR:N), operator must install (UI:R); impact scoped to integrity per upstream assessment, though RCE could extend C and A in practice.
Primary rating from Vendor (vulncheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: vulncheck
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Tencent AI-Infra-Guard's skill-scan component excludes compiled Python bytecode files from analysis by hardcoding __pycache__ directories and .pyc/.pyo/.pyd extensions into skip lists across multiple scanning surfaces. Attackers can distribute skills with benign Python source files alongside malicious compiled bytecode that executes on import while the scanner reports a safe verdict, enabling code execution when operators install the skill.
Articles & Coverage 1
Executive ViewAI
Tencent AI-Infra-Guard's skill-scan component fails to detect malicious Python bytecode embedded within skill packages, allowing adversaries to deploy packages that pass automated security validation and execute arbitrary code on operator workstations. Organizations using AI-Infra-Guard versions 4.6.0 and earlier face direct compromise of systems managing AI infrastructure if malicious skills are installed, potentially escalating to broader network access.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: disable skill-scan functionality or disable skill installation entirely until patched; require offline manual security audits of all skill packages including Python bytecode inspection before deployment; restrict network access from operator hosts running AI-Infra-Guard; enable detailed logging of skill package installations and Python code execution; isolate affected systems on a separate network segment with limited lateral movement paths.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
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