EUVD-2026-62350Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Timing attack requires low-jitter network proximity and statistical measurement precision, warranting AC:H over NVD's AC:L; confidentiality is high given PLAINTEXT exposes raw secrets.
Primary rating from Vendor (CPANSec).
CVSS VectorVendor: CPANSec
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
5DescriptionCVE.org
Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl check HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256 and PLAINTEXT signatures with a non-constant-time comparison in verify.
Each of the three compares the signature carried in the message against the locally computed one with the eq operator, which returns as soon as the two strings differ. The time taken to reject a signature varies with the length of the matching prefix. RSA-SHA1 is not affected, as it verifies through the RSA key object rather than by comparing strings.
A client that can submit messages and time the replies may recover a valid signature one byte at a time rather than searching the whole signature space. Under PLAINTEXT the value compared against is the signature key itself, so the search recovers consumer_secret and token_secret.
AnalysisAI
Timing side-channel in Net::OAuth before 0.33 for Perl allows remote unauthenticated attackers to recover valid signatures byte-by-byte by measuring server response latency during signature rejection. For HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA256 methods the oracle yields a forged HMAC token; under the PLAINTEXT signature method the comparison is performed directly against the signature key, meaning the timing oracle exposes the raw consumer_secret and token_secret. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | The attacker must be able to submit arbitrary OAuth-signed requests to the vulnerable endpoint and measure server response latency with sub-millisecond precision - conditions best satisfied from the same datacenter or local network to minimize jitter. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The NVD CVSS 3.1 score of 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) overstates practical exploitability - AC:L is generous for a timing side-channel that requires reliable sub-millisecond measurement across a network link. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker with low-latency access to an OAuth endpoint sends a series of crafted requests varying the signature one byte at a time, measuring server response latency to determine which candidate byte produces the longest matching prefix. Repeating this process across each byte position recovers the full valid signature without brute-forcing the entire space. … |
| Remediation | Upgrade to Net::OAuth 0.33 or later via CPAN (`cpan Net::OAuth` or `cpanm Net::OAuth`). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, identify all systems using Net::OAuth and document which signature methods are deployed, prioritizing any PLAINTEXT implementations. …
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Same weakness CWE-208 – Observable Timing Discrepancy
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External POC / Exploit Code
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