NVIDIA NemoClaw CVE-2026-65097

A user or automated system must actively run the NemoClaw installation or update script on a Linux host running version 0.0.21 or earlier - no exploitation is possible absent this trigger. The attacker must be network-positioned to intercept the download, requiring MitM capability (same-segment ARP/DNS manipulation) or prior compromise of the upstream download server or CDN; purely remote exploitation without network positioning is not possible. The CVSS UI:R confirms mandatory user interaction, ruling out fully automated mass exploitation. No special NemoClaw configuration is required - the flaw is in the default installation flow. Exploitation is significantly limited by the need for network interception infrastructure, which precludes opportunistic internet-scale attacks and favors targeted scenarios (e.g., compromised enterprise network segments or supply-chain attacks on package mirrors).

The NVD CVSS 3.1 score of 8.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) reflects full-system compromise potential if the attack succeeds, and the high impact metrics are well-founded. However, the AC:L rating understates the practical difficulty: successful exploitation requires the attacker to be network-positioned via MitM (ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning) or to have compromised the upstream download server - neither is trivial or opportunistic. EPSS at 0.20% (9th percentile) strongly contradicts the high CVSS score and aligns with SSVC's Automatable: no finding. SSVC Technical Impact: total is consistent with code execution during a privileged installation context. The divergence between CVSS severity and EPSS/SSVC exploitation signals is notable: this is a structurally serious supply-chain flaw in software with a small deployment footprint and no observed exploitation, making it a lower urgency patch than raw score implies. Organizations running NemoClaw installations or automated update pipelines should treat this as a targeted remediation priority rather than an emergency.

An attacker with MitM capability on the network path used during NemoClaw installation - achieved via ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning, or compromise of a CDN or package mirror - waits for a user or automated pipeline to run the installation script. Because no integrity check is performed, the attacker intercepts the download request and serves a trojanized payload in place of the legitimate package. The malicious code executes in the installation context, which may carry elevated or root privileges, resulting in full system compromise.