EUVD-2026-39491
GHSA-cj56-5c53-9qjf
Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Network-reachable with no auth or interaction, but AC:H reflects the requirement that the app feed attacker-controlled PKCS#7 to the compat verify API; impact is integrity-only (signature bypass), no C or A loss.
Primary rating from Vendor (wolfSSL).
CVSS VectorVendor: wolfSSL
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles.
AnalysisAI
Signature-verification bypass in wolfSSL's OpenSSL compatibility layer allows a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object - one with empty signerInfos and no actual signature - to be falsely reported as verified by wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify(). Applications using the PKCS7_verify() compat API to authenticate attacker-supplied PKCS#7/CMS bundles can be tricked into treating unsigned content as authentic, undermining integrity guarantees. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires that the target application is built with wolfSSL's OpenSSL compatibility layer AND calls the PKCS7_verify() / wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() API on PKCS#7 bundles whose contents an attacker can influence. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N, score 8.2 / High) cleanly matches the defect: network-reachable, no privileges or user interaction, but with an Attack Requirement (AT:P) - the victim application must actually pass a potentially degenerate, attacker-controlled PKCS#7 bundle to the compat verify API. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker crafts a degenerate PKCS#7 SignedData object containing only certificates (or empty content) and no SignerInfo, then submits it to a network service that authenticates payloads via wolfSSL's PKCS7_verify() compat API. The call returns success, so the service accepts the unsigned content as if it were validly signed, allowing the attacker to spoof a trusted/signed message. … |
| Remediation | Upstream fix available (PR/commit); released patched version not independently confirmed - apply the change from wolfSSL pull request https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/10702 and track the wolfSSL security advisory page https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/ for the tagged release that includes it, then upgrade to that version. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Inventory all systems and applications using wolfSSL's PKCS7_verify() function; prioritize those processing untrusted or attacker-supplied PKCS#7 content in production. …
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