Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessPosition within Bluetooth range of target
-
DeliveryCraft MESSAGE packet with TTL=0 field
-
ExploitTransmit unauthenticated BLE packet
-
ExecutionBypass validatePacket() sender authentication
-
PersistInject arbitrary entries into mesh gossip cache
-
ImpactExhaust cache capacity and deny mesh service
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A06:2025 - Insecure Design
ASVS 5.0
V4 - API and Web Service HTTP request consistency
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires physical Bluetooth adjacency - the attacker must be within BLE radio range (approximately 10-100m, hardware-dependent) of a device running BitChat for iOS v1.5.0. No authentication, device pairing, or prior relationship with the target is required (PR:N confirmed by CVSS vector). The BLE mesh feature must be active, which is BitChat's default operating mode. No special target-side configuration is needed. Exploitation is bounded by Bluetooth radio range and requires the ability to craft raw BLE packets with specific TTL=0 field values; standard BLE tooling (e.g., nRF Sniffer, custom firmware) is sufficient. The public PoC lowers the skill threshold for exploitation. |
| Impact | CVSS 6.5 with AV:A correctly constrains exploitation to Bluetooth adjacency - typically 10-100m - which significantly limits the attack surface compared to network-layer vulnerabilities and makes mass opportunistic exploitation unlikely. EPSS at 0.22% (13th percentile) reflects very low observed exploitation probability despite a public PoC existing, consistent with the app's niche user base of privacy-focused and activist communicators. No KEV listing confirms no known widespread active exploitation. The primary risk is localized disruption: an attacker must be physically co-located with victims running BitChat, making this a targeted rather than broad threat. The zero-authentication exploitation path and public PoC mean patching should not be deferred in any active deployment, but the overall enterprise risk surface is minimal given the app's limited footprint. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker positions themselves within Bluetooth range of one or more BitChat iOS v1.5.0 users and transmits crafted BLE MESSAGE packets bearing TTL=0, which the app's validatePacket() function accepts unconditionally as anonymous messages, bypassing timestamp and sender checks. Repeated injection floods the mesh gossip cache, disrupting mesh availability for all nearby participants. A public proof-of-concept hosted at github.com/BARGHEST-ngo/PoC_Bitchat1.15.0_iOS-BLEcache-poisoning demonstrates this technique. |
Get an e-mail when this CVE is exploited, patched or re-scored. Free account.
Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Sep 01, 2026
Unauthenticated BLE packet injection in BitChat for iOS v1.5.0 (reported in the CVE as v1.15.0) allows any device within Bluetooth adjacency range to inject crafted MESSAGE packets into the mesh gossip cache, causing denial of service for all mesh participants. The attack exploits a TTL=0 validation bypass in BLEService.swift that accepted packets as anonymous without full sender authentication. A public proof-of-concept is available at a named GitHub repository; no active exploitation has been confirmed by CISA KEV.
RemediationAI
The upstream fix is available in GitHub PR #998, which increments MARKETING_VERSION to 1.5.1 and replaces the TTL=0 anonymous acceptance path with per-link sender binding in BLEService.swift. Users should upgrade to BitChat iOS v1.5.1 once distributed through the App Store; the fix version is confirmed by the PR diff but a released App Store build has not been independently verified at time of analysis. If an App Store update is not yet available, users in sensitive deployment contexts should restrict BitChat usage to physically trusted environments or disable the BLE mesh feature entirely, accepting loss of the app's core mesh-communication functionality. No partial workaround mitigates the validation bypass without disabling packet ingestion. The PR also resolves a TOCTOU race identified in code review comments within the same patch, so intermediate pre-PR attempts to mitigate should not be relied upon.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affects your stack
Find out whether the stacks and servers you run are on an affected version.
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
BitChat is an open-source, decentralized peer-to-peer Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) mesh messaging application for iOS, maintained by the permissionlesstech organization on GitHub. The vulnerability resides in BLEService.swift where the validatePacket() function treated incoming packets with TTL=0 as 'legacy RSR' or anonymous messages - assigning them a synthesized 'anon' + peerID prefix - and accepted them unconditionally, bypassing timestamp validation and sender binding checks. This allowed arbitrary MESSAGE packets to be inserted into the gossip cache without any authentication. The PR #998 fix introduces a ConnectionSource enum, per-link sender binding tracked via a local boundPeerID variable updated within each notification batch, and removes the TTL=0 anonymous acceptance path entirely. The assigned CWE-444 (HTTP Request Smuggling) is a category mismatch for a BLE mesh protocol; the actual root cause is absence of packet-sender authentication and missing per-link binding, more accurately described by CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) or CWE-923 (Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints). The NVD CPE is the placeholder 'n/a'; the actual affected product is BitChat iOS 1.5.0 from permissionlesstech.
Know when the next one hits your stack
- Watch products and get an email when something new is published
- Check this CVE against your own stack and servers
- Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources
No credit card · 7-day full trial
Severity by source
AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
AV:A confirmed by Bluetooth adjacency requirement; unauthenticated TTL=0 bypass enables both cache flooding (A:H) and injection of spoofed messages (I:L).
Primary rating from Vendor (mitre).
CVSS VectorVendor: mitre
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
An issue in BitChat for iOS v1.15.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via an unauthenticated MESSAGE packet into the mesh gossip cache
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
HTTP request smuggling exploits inconsistencies in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP message boundaries.
Denial of Service attacks render applications or systems unavailable by overwhelming resources or triggering failure conditions.
EUVD-2026-67916
GHSA-4gxj-rhqq-64r3
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
Exploit-DB