Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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ReconObserve victim session token
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DeliveryExtract server IP/PID/timestamp components
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ExploitReference mod_unique_id algorithm
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InstallGenerate candidate session IDs
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C2Test predicted tokens against application
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ExecuteHijack authenticated session
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ImpactAccess confidential data or perform privileged operations
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
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| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires the target application to use Apache::Session::Generate::ModUniqueId (versions 1.54-1.94) for session management AND be deployed on Apache HTTP Server with mod_unique_id module enabled. The attacker must obtain at least one valid session ID through observation (network interception, browser history, application logs, or referrer leakage) to reverse-engineer the predictable components. No authentication is required-the attack is possible against any session-based functionality. Default Apache configurations do not enable mod_unique_id automatically, so exploitation is limited to environments where administrators explicitly activated this module. Applications using alternative session generators (Random, MD5, SHA256) within Apache::Session are not vulnerable. Local network positioning or man-in-the-middle capability accelerates exploitation by enabling passive session token collection, though not strictly required if tokens are observable through application features (session IDs in URLs, verbose error messages). |
| Impact | Real-world exploitation risk is HIGH despite absence of confirmed active exploitation. The CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N indicates trivial exploitation-remote attackers need no authentication, special access, or user interaction. SSVC classification confirms automatable exploitation with partial technical impact. The 9.1 CVSS score accurately reflects severity: complete confidentiality and integrity compromise (session hijacking grants full user privileges) without availability impact. While EPSS and KEV data are not provided, the automatable nature and public vulnerability details significantly increase exploitation likelihood. The attack requires only network access to observe session tokens (via cookies/URLs) and algorithmic prediction-no sophisticated exploit tooling needed. Primary risk is to web applications using affected Apache::Session versions in production with Apache httpd and mod_unique_id enabled. The deterministic nature means attackers can pre-compute valid session IDs or perform targeted hijacking by observing victim tokens and predicting nearby values. Mitigation urgency is CRITICAL for internet-facing applications handling authenticated sessions, particularly those with sensitive data or privileged operations. The vulnerability has existed since version 1.54 through 1.94, suggesting potentially widespread deployment in legacy Perl web applications. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker observes a victim's session cookie (e.g., via network sniffing on shared WiFi or leaked in referrer headers). The session ID reveals server IP, approximate timestamp, and process ID through the mod_unique_id structure. The attacker writes a script to predict adjacent session IDs by incrementing the counter component and adjusting timestamps within a narrow window around the HTTP Date header value. By systematically testing predicted session tokens against the application, the attacker identifies active sessions belonging to other users and hijacks accounts with administrative privileges, accessing sensitive data or performing unauthorized transactions. Publicly available documentation of mod_unique_id's algorithm at https://httpd.apache.org/docs/current/mod/mod_unique_id.html provides the specification needed to implement prediction logic. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – May 06, 2026
Predictable session ID generation in Apache::Session::Generate::ModUniqueId 1.54-1.94 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to forge session tokens and hijack user sessions. The vulnerability stems from using Apache mod_unique_id values as session identifiers-these values are deterministic and constructed from publicly observable or easily guessable components (server IP, process ID, timestamp, counter). With CVSS 9.1 and SSVC automation classification, this enables systematic session hijacking at scale despite no confirmed active exploitation.
RemediationAI
Immediately migrate to Apache::Session::Generate::Random or other cryptographically secure session ID generators as documented at https://metacpan.org/pod/Apache::Session::Generate::Random. No patched version of ModUniqueId is available-the fundamental design is insecure as mod_unique_id was never intended for security contexts per Apache documentation at https://httpd.apache.org/docs/current/mod/mod_unique_id.html. Application-level remediation requires changing session generation configuration in Apache::Session to use Random, MD5, or SHA256 generators instead of ModUniqueId. As temporary mitigation while planning migration, invalidate all existing sessions to prevent exploitation of previously issued predictable tokens, though this does not address ongoing vulnerability. Deploy additional session binding controls (IP address validation, user-agent fingerprinting) as compensating controls, understanding these add usability friction (legitimate users behind NAT or VPNs may experience logouts) and do not fully mitigate the root cause. Monitor for anomalous session usage patterns (multiple IPs using same session, rapid session enumeration) to detect exploitation attempts during transition period.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
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Technical ContextAI · show details
Apache::Session::Generate::ModUniqueId is a Perl module for generating session identifiers, introduced in version 1.54 of the Apache::Session package. The vulnerable implementation relies on the UNIQUE_ID environment variable populated by Apache's mod_unique_id module. While mod_unique_id serves legitimate purposes for request correlation in logging, it generates identifiers using a deterministic algorithm combining IPv4 address, process ID (PID), Unix epoch timestamp, a 16-bit counter, and thread index-none of which are cryptographically random or obfuscated. This violates CWE-340 (Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers Used in Security Contexts), as session tokens must be cryptographically unpredictable to prevent forgery. The timestamp component is further leaked via standard HTTP Date response headers, providing attackers with precise timing information. Server IP addresses are typically discoverable through DNS resolution or previous session observations, and process IDs can be inferred through statistical analysis of sequential session IDs.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Primary rating from Vendor (CPANSec).
CVSS VectorVendor: CPANSec
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
Apache::Session::Generate::ModUniqueId versions from 1.54 through 1.94 for Perl session ids are insecure.
Apache::Session::Generate::ModUniqueId (added in version 1.54) uses the value of the UNIQUE_ID environment variable for the session id. The UNIQUE_ID variable is set by the Apache mod_unique_id plugin, which generates unique ids for the request. The id is based on the IPv4 address, the process id, the epoch time, a 16-bit counter and a thread index, with no obfuscation.
The server IP is often available to the public, and if not available, can be guessed from previous session ids being issued. The process ids may also be guessed from previous session ids. The timestamp is easily guessed (and leaked in the HTTP Date response header).
The purpose of mod_unique_id is to assign a unique id to requests so that events can be correlated in different logs. The id is not designed, nor is it suitable for security purposes.
Executive ViewAI
Apache::Session::Generate::ModUniqueId versions 1.54-1.94 contain a critical session management flaw that allows attackers to forge valid session tokens and impersonate legitimate users without authentication, directly compromising the confidentiality and integrity of user sessions across any application using this module. Organizations running affected versions face immediate risk of account takeover, data theft, and unauthorized actions performed on behalf of compromised users.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: (1) Immediately switch session generation algorithm to Apache::Session::Generate::SHA256 or similar cryptographically secure alternative without upgrading the main package version; (2) Implement strict session timeout policies (5-15 minutes) to reduce hijacking window; (3) Force session regeneration on privilege escalation or sensitive operations; (4) Deploy behavioral analytics to detect simultaneous sessions from different IP addresses or geographies; (5) Require step-up authentication for high-risk operations (password changes, payments, admin functions); (6) Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement if sessions are compromised.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.
EUVD-2026-27823
GHSA-546v-xqjf-qgcr
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
VulDB
Exploit-DB