Metabase CVE-2026-50148

Exploitation requires an authenticated Metabase account that holds permission to add or edit a database connection (a database-management/admin-level capability), plus the ability to configure a Snowflake-type connection pointing at an attacker-controlled server that impersonates Snowflake and drives the JDBC driver's arbitrary file write. The Metabase host must also be able to make an outbound network connection to that attacker server. Limiting factors: this is NOT unauthenticated despite the CVSS PR:N rating - the description explicitly requires connection-management privilege, so instances that tightly restrict that permission and constrain outbound network access are far less exposed; there is no user-interaction requirement beyond the attacker's own configuration actions, and the target must be running an affected 1.54.0-pre-fix version.

The published CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 10.0) presents this as trivially exploitable and unauthenticated, but the description directly contradicts PR:N: exploitation requires 'a Metabase user with permission to add or edit a database connection,' which is a privileged, authenticated operation - verify with the vendor, as this materially lowers real-world exposure. Correcting for that, the practical risk is a privileged-insider or post-compromise escalation path rather than a drive-by internet attack, so a low-privilege attacker on a hardened, properly-permissioned Metabase instance cannot reach it. No EPSS score, KEV entry, or SSVC decision data was provided in the input, and no public exploit was identified at time of analysis, so there is no signal of active or automatable exploitation; the priority is driven almost entirely by the vendor's CVSS 10.0 and the clean host-RCE impact. Net: real and worth prompt patching wherever untrusted or numerous users hold database-management rights, but the 'unauthenticated' framing of the raw score overstates the attack surface.

An attacker who has obtained (or been granted) a Metabase account with database-management permission stands up a malicious server that speaks the Snowflake protocol, then creates or edits a Metabase database connection pointing at it. When Metabase's Snowflake JDBC driver connects, the malicious server drives it to overwrite one of Metabase's own driver files on disk, and the next time that driver is loaded the attacker's code runs inside the Metabase process. No public POC was identified at time of analysis, and the network attack vector with low complexity makes the technical steps straightforward once the privileged account is in hand.