Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessLure victim to render hostile output
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DeliveryEmit OSC 1337;File with inline=0
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ExploitWarp decodes base64 payload
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ExecutionWrite .zshenv to session CWD
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PersistWait for next shell start
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ImpactMalicious snippet executes as user
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V2 - Validation and Business Logic Input validation, allowlisting
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires that the victim is running a vulnerable Warp build (>= 0.2025.03.05.08.02.stable_00 and < 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01) and that attacker-controlled bytes reach the terminal containing a non-inline OSC 1337;File or MultipartFile escape sequence (inline=0) - for example via cat/less of a hostile file, a remote SSH/program output stream, or a malicious repository's command output. Warp must have a known current working directory for the active block (the payload is written relative to it), and the filename in the payload determines what gets created or overwritten (e.g., .zshenv for execution-on-next-shell). Limiting factors: it is not zero-click - per CVSS UI:R the user must actually render or run the output carrying the sequence; no authentication to Warp is required (PR:N); and the file lands in the session's working directory, so leveraging it for code execution depends on writing to a path that is later read/executed (such as a shell rc file in that directory or the user's home). |
| Impact | The provided CVSS 3.1 vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (base 8.8, High) is consistent with the mechanism: the trigger arrives over the network via terminal output (AV:N), requires no authentication to Warp itself (PR:N), is low-complexity (AC:L), but needs the victim to render the hostile output (UI:R). The triple-High impact is justified because overwriting .zshenv/.bashrc yields code execution and thus full confidentiality, integrity, and availability loss on the user's account. No SSVC, EPSS, KEV, or POC signals were supplied; the only exploitation artifact is the vendor's own fix commit and regression tests (which demonstrate the .zshenv overwrite-to-RCE pattern), so this is a credible, easy-to-weaponize issue rather than an inflated high-CVSS-but-low-real-risk finding. The realistic limiter is UI:R - the victim must actually run or view a command whose output an attacker controls - so this is high priority for anyone piping untrusted/remote content through Warp, but not a wormable, zero-click exploit. Caveat: AV:N is the standard rating for terminal-escape injection, but exploitation in practice depends on the user routing attacker-controlled bytes to their terminal, which sits between purely remote and local - defenders should weight that nuance. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker hosts a file or controls a remote command's output containing a crafted OSC 1337;File=name=LnpzaGVudg==;inline=0:<base64 payload> sequence whose decoded payload is a malicious shell snippet and whose name is .zshenv. When the victim views or runs the command in a vulnerable Warp build (for example, cat'ing the file or reading a hostile SSH banner), Warp silently writes .zshenv into the session's working directory; the attacker's code then runs the next time a shell is started. No public exploit tool is identified, but the vendor's regression test demonstrates exactly this overwrite-to-execution path (touch /tmp/warp-pwned via .zshenv). |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jun 24, 2026
Arbitrary local file write in Warp terminal (0.2025.03.05.08.02.stable_00 through builds before 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01) lets malicious terminal output silently drop attacker-controlled files onto disk. Warp honored non-inline OSC 1337;File (and multipart MultipartFile) iTerm2 escape sequences by base64-decoding the payload and writing it to the active block's current working directory using the attacker-supplied filename, with no confirmation prompt. Because shell startup files such as .zshenv can be overwritten this way, the write converts into code execution on the victim's host; no public exploit identified at time of analysis and the issue is not in CISA KEV.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to the fixed build: Vendor-released patch: 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01 (or any later stable release). The fix, in commit f3b9ce1c8fd13d037526c447418d809087722daa, removes the save_as_file() call entirely and replaces it with a log warning, so non-inline iTerm file payloads are now ignored while inline images still render. Review the advisory at https://github.com/warpdotdev/warp/security/advisories/GHSA-5h96-jrrq-6hxq. If you cannot update immediately, the practical compensating control is to avoid rendering untrusted output in Warp: do not cat, less, tail, or curl attacker-controlled files/streams and be cautious with remote SSH sessions or program output you do not trust, since any of these can emit the OSC 1337;File sequence - the trade-off is reduced day-to-day convenience and it does not fully close the gap. After patching or as a detection measure, audit shell startup files (~/.zshenv, ~/.zshrc, ~/.bashrc, ~/.profile) and recent session working directories for unexpected modifications, since a successful pre-patch attack would persist there.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
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Technical ContextAI · show details
Warp is an agentic, Rust-based terminal/development environment (cpe:2.3:a:warpdotdev:warp). The flaw lives in the terminal emulation layer's ANSI handler (app/src/terminal/model/terminal_model.rs), which implements iTerm2's proprietary OSC 1337 file-transfer protocol. That protocol carries a base64 'name' and base64 payload, with an 'inline' flag distinguishing images meant to render in-line from files meant to be saved to disk. The vulnerable handler treated non-inline payloads (inline=0) - delivered either as a single File OSC or as a chunked MultipartFile/FilePart/FileEnd sequence - as a request to call save_as_file() into the block's current_working_directory(). Because any program writing to the terminal (a remote SSH session, a curl'd log, a malicious repo's output, cat of a hostile file) can emit these escape sequences, untrusted output becomes an unauthenticated file-write primitive. The root cause maps to CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation): the emulator trusted a control sequence that should never have materialized files without user consent.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Hostile terminal output is delivered remotely (AV:N) with no auth (PR:N) but requires the victim to render it (UI:R); overwriting a shell rc file yields code execution, so C/I/A are all High.
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).
CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
Warp is an agentic development environment. From 0.2025.03.05.08.02.stable_00 until 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01, Warp accepts non-inline OSC 1337;File payloads from terminal output and materialize the decoded payload as a local file without an additional confirmation step. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01.
Executive ViewAI
Warp terminal versions 0.2025.03.05.08.02.stable_00 through 0.2026.05.05 contain a critical vulnerability enabling silent arbitrary file writes via terminal escape sequences, allowing attackers to inject code into shell startup files and achieve code execution on developer machines. Organizations face elevated supply chain and credential compromise risk if development teams access untrusted or compromised remote systems.
Restrict Warp to trusted corporate networks and approved systems only; prohibit terminal use when connecting to third-party or external systems; implement file integrity monitoring on shell startup configuration files; enable monitoring and alerting on unexpected process execution from shell initialization scripts; enforce strict network segmentation isolating developer machines from untrusted networks; consider temporary rollout to alternative terminal emulators with improved escape sequence filtering until patched version is deployed organization-wide.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.
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EUVD-2026-39017
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
GitHub
Exploit-DB