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CI4MS CVE-2026-41890

| EUVD-2026-28292 MEDIUM
Improper Input Validation (CWE-20)
2026-05-04 https://github.com/ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms GHSA-vgrf-pr28-vf98
6.9
CVSS 4.0
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CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
High
User Interaction
None
Scope
X

Lifecycle Timeline

3
CVSS changed
May 07, 2026 - 04:35 NVD
6.9 (MEDIUM)
Source Code Evidence Fetched
May 04, 2026 - 21:30 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
May 04, 2026 - 21:30 vuln.today

DescriptionNVD

Summary

The deleteProcess() action accepts a POST parameter tables[] containing arbitrary table names. These are passed directly to $forge->dropTable() without validating that the tables belong to the theme being deleted.

The deleteConfirm view correctly populates tables[] from the theme's own migration files, but the server-side deleteProcess does not verify the received values against those files. An authenticated admin can craft a POST request with arbitrary table names and drop any table in the database.

This is a real bug even within the admin trust model: the action should be scoped to the theme's own tables. The permission grants delete this theme's data", not "drop any table".

Details

Location

modules/Theme/Controllers/Theme.php :: deleteProcess() ~line 147

Vulnerable Code

php
public function deleteProcess(string $slug)
{
    $themeName = $slug;
    $activeTheme = setting('App.siteTheme');
    if ($activeTheme === $themeName) {
        return redirect()->route('templateSettings')...;
    }

    $tablesToDrop = $this->request->getPost('tables');  // ← user-supplied, unvalidated
    if (!empty($tablesToDrop) && is_array($tablesToDrop)) {
        $forge = \Config\Database::forge();
        $db    = \Config\Database::connect();
        foreach ($tablesToDrop as $table) {
            if ($db->tableExists($table)) {
                $forge->dropTable($table, true);  // ← no whitelist check
            }
        }
    }

PoC

  1. Authenticate to the backend (any user with theme.delete permission)
  2. POST to /backend/themes/delete-process/<any_non_active_theme_slug>
  3. Include tables[]=<any_table> in POST body
  4. The named tables are dropped without validation

Impact

  • Dropped ci4ms_blog (confirmed in test)
  • Dropped ci4ms_users + ci4ms_auth_identities simultaneously - disables all authentication (confirmed)
  • Any table in the database can be targeted

Additional note

Quick note on the design intent for deleteProcess - I noticed delete_confirm.php scopes the checkboxes to the theme's own migration files, and the CHANGELOG confirms the selective deletion was intentional (admins can choose which tables to keep). The server-side deleteProcess already has all the information it needs to validate the input - deleteConfirm derives the valid table set from the migration files, deleteProcess just needs to do the same before acting on the POST. Happy to clarify if useful.

AnalysisAI

Arbitrary database table drop in CI4MS theme deletion allows authenticated administrators with theme.delete permission to craft malicious POST requests to the /backend/themes/delete-process/ endpoint and drop any table in the database, including critical tables such as ci4ms_users and ci4ms_auth_identities. The vulnerability exists because the deleteProcess() action accepts user-supplied table names without validating them against the theme's own migration files, violating the principle of least privilege even within the admin trust model. …

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CVE-2026-41890 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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