Monthly
Unauthenticated cross-origin RCE in Windows ML CLI (winml-cli < 0.4.0) is reachable when a developer runs the `serve` command, which exposes a localhost HTTP API with a wildcard CORS policy and no authentication gate. Any malicious webpage visited by the user while the server is running can send cross-origin requests to `/v1/cli/build` or `/v1/cli/config`, inject `trust_remote_code=true`, and cause the server to call `AutoConfig.from_pretrained(trust_remote_code=True)` - downloading and executing attacker-controlled Python code from a remote model repository as the server user. The vendor has released a fix in version 0.4.0; no public exploit is identified at time of analysis.
Cross-origin credential exposure in HeyForm before 3.0.0-rc.8 allows any attacker-controlled web page visited by a logged-in user to make fully authenticated GraphQL API requests against the HeyForm server. The server's default CORS configuration (`origin: true, credentials: true`) unconditionally echoed the request Origin header back as `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` while also asserting `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`, defeating the browser's same-origin policy for all origins. This exposes workspaces, projects, forms, submissions, and respondent data to exfiltration and permits account settings modification; no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis.
CORS misconfiguration in Rybbit before 2.7.0 allows any attacker-controlled website to issue credentialed cross-origin requests to the Rybbit analytics server, because the server unconditionally reflects the request's Origin header in Access-Control-Allow-Origin while simultaneously enabling Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. Authenticated victims who visit a malicious page expose their analytics data, account information, and permit the attacker's script to perform state-changing API operations on their behalf. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the underlying attack class requires only standard browser Fetch API usage and is trivial to implement.
Permissive CORS misconfiguration in the Grav API Plugin (all versions prior to 1.0.0-rc.16) allows cross-origin JavaScript on any attacker-controlled website to submit a stolen JWT via Authorization or X-API-Token headers and read full authenticated API responses, enabling data exfiltration and account modification with the token owner's privileges. The wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header was returned by default for all /api/v1 endpoints - including authenticated ones - bypassing browser Same-Origin Policy protections entirely. A secondary vector existed via URL query-string token acceptance (?token=) on general API routes, leaking JWTs into server logs and Referer headers where they could be harvested and then weaponized via the CORS bypass. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and no CISA KEV listing is present.
CORS misconfiguration in the openssl_encrypt pip package (versions before 1.4.0) enables any website to issue fully credentialed cross-origin API requests on behalf of authenticated users, exposing sensitive API responses to attacker-controlled origins. Both standalone server components - key-server and telemetry-server - ship with the maximally permissive combination of allow_origins=["*"] and allow_credentials=True as their default configuration, propagated through docker-compose.yml and .env.example. No active exploitation has been confirmed (not in CISA KEV) and no public exploit code is known at time of analysis, though the attack pattern is a well-understood, low-complexity web exploit.
Cross-origin read bypass in Electron's custom protocol handler exposes sensitive application data to remote pages via fetch() and XMLHttpRequest. Electron apps on any branch prior to 39.8.10, 40.9.3, 41.4.0, or 42.0.0 that register a custom scheme with supportFetchAPI: true but omit corsEnabled: true fail to enforce CORS, allowing a malicious remote page loaded in the renderer to read the full response body of privileged custom-scheme requests. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis and the vulnerability is not in CISA KEV, but the confidentiality impact is rated high by the vendor given the potential to exfiltrate internal application data.
Information disclosure in Progress MOVEit Transfer (all versions before 2025.1.5, and 2026.0.0 before 2026.0.3) stems from an overly permissive cross-domain (CORS) security policy that trusts untrusted origins, allowing a malicious website to read sensitive responses from an authenticated victim's MOVEit session. The vendor rates it CVSS 9.8, though the underlying weakness (CWE-942) and vendor tags point squarely at cross-origin data leakage rather than direct server compromise. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and EPSS is low at 0.18% (8th percentile).
Cross-origin data exposure in the Grav API plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.0-rc.16 stems from a hardcoded 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *' header returned on every response, including authenticated endpoints and preflight (OPTIONS) responses. Because the plugin authenticates via the Authorization and X-API-Token request headers rather than cookies, any malicious website scripting a leaked access token can read the response bodies of authenticated endpoints and perform write actions as that token's user. Reported by VulnCheck with no public exploit identified at time of analysis; not listed in CISA KEV.
Cross-origin data theft in LightRAG server versions prior to 1.5.4 allows any malicious website to make authenticated, credentialed API calls on behalf of a logged-in victim because the server ships with CORS_ORIGINS=* paired with allow_credentials=True. When an authenticated LightRAG user browses to an attacker-controlled page, that page can silently read documents and knowledge-graph data or issue destructive requests such as deleting the entire document store. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis and the flaw is not in CISA KEV, but the fix is confirmed released in version 1.5.4.
Credential theft in ASUS GameSDK allows a remote attacker to capture a local user's NTLM hash by luring them to a crafted web page that abuses a permissive cross-domain policy to send a UNC-path request to GameSDK's local service endpoint. The flaw affects systems running the ASUS GameSDK local service (bundled with ASUS gaming utilities) and requires the victim to visit an attacker-controlled page (UI required); no authentication is needed. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and it is not listed in CISA KEV, but the leaked NTLM material can be relayed or cracked to reach other services.
Unauthenticated cross-origin RCE in Windows ML CLI (winml-cli < 0.4.0) is reachable when a developer runs the `serve` command, which exposes a localhost HTTP API with a wildcard CORS policy and no authentication gate. Any malicious webpage visited by the user while the server is running can send cross-origin requests to `/v1/cli/build` or `/v1/cli/config`, inject `trust_remote_code=true`, and cause the server to call `AutoConfig.from_pretrained(trust_remote_code=True)` - downloading and executing attacker-controlled Python code from a remote model repository as the server user. The vendor has released a fix in version 0.4.0; no public exploit is identified at time of analysis.
Cross-origin credential exposure in HeyForm before 3.0.0-rc.8 allows any attacker-controlled web page visited by a logged-in user to make fully authenticated GraphQL API requests against the HeyForm server. The server's default CORS configuration (`origin: true, credentials: true`) unconditionally echoed the request Origin header back as `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` while also asserting `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`, defeating the browser's same-origin policy for all origins. This exposes workspaces, projects, forms, submissions, and respondent data to exfiltration and permits account settings modification; no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis.
CORS misconfiguration in Rybbit before 2.7.0 allows any attacker-controlled website to issue credentialed cross-origin requests to the Rybbit analytics server, because the server unconditionally reflects the request's Origin header in Access-Control-Allow-Origin while simultaneously enabling Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. Authenticated victims who visit a malicious page expose their analytics data, account information, and permit the attacker's script to perform state-changing API operations on their behalf. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the underlying attack class requires only standard browser Fetch API usage and is trivial to implement.
Permissive CORS misconfiguration in the Grav API Plugin (all versions prior to 1.0.0-rc.16) allows cross-origin JavaScript on any attacker-controlled website to submit a stolen JWT via Authorization or X-API-Token headers and read full authenticated API responses, enabling data exfiltration and account modification with the token owner's privileges. The wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header was returned by default for all /api/v1 endpoints - including authenticated ones - bypassing browser Same-Origin Policy protections entirely. A secondary vector existed via URL query-string token acceptance (?token=) on general API routes, leaking JWTs into server logs and Referer headers where they could be harvested and then weaponized via the CORS bypass. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and no CISA KEV listing is present.
CORS misconfiguration in the openssl_encrypt pip package (versions before 1.4.0) enables any website to issue fully credentialed cross-origin API requests on behalf of authenticated users, exposing sensitive API responses to attacker-controlled origins. Both standalone server components - key-server and telemetry-server - ship with the maximally permissive combination of allow_origins=["*"] and allow_credentials=True as their default configuration, propagated through docker-compose.yml and .env.example. No active exploitation has been confirmed (not in CISA KEV) and no public exploit code is known at time of analysis, though the attack pattern is a well-understood, low-complexity web exploit.
Cross-origin read bypass in Electron's custom protocol handler exposes sensitive application data to remote pages via fetch() and XMLHttpRequest. Electron apps on any branch prior to 39.8.10, 40.9.3, 41.4.0, or 42.0.0 that register a custom scheme with supportFetchAPI: true but omit corsEnabled: true fail to enforce CORS, allowing a malicious remote page loaded in the renderer to read the full response body of privileged custom-scheme requests. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis and the vulnerability is not in CISA KEV, but the confidentiality impact is rated high by the vendor given the potential to exfiltrate internal application data.
Information disclosure in Progress MOVEit Transfer (all versions before 2025.1.5, and 2026.0.0 before 2026.0.3) stems from an overly permissive cross-domain (CORS) security policy that trusts untrusted origins, allowing a malicious website to read sensitive responses from an authenticated victim's MOVEit session. The vendor rates it CVSS 9.8, though the underlying weakness (CWE-942) and vendor tags point squarely at cross-origin data leakage rather than direct server compromise. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and EPSS is low at 0.18% (8th percentile).
Cross-origin data exposure in the Grav API plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.0-rc.16 stems from a hardcoded 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *' header returned on every response, including authenticated endpoints and preflight (OPTIONS) responses. Because the plugin authenticates via the Authorization and X-API-Token request headers rather than cookies, any malicious website scripting a leaked access token can read the response bodies of authenticated endpoints and perform write actions as that token's user. Reported by VulnCheck with no public exploit identified at time of analysis; not listed in CISA KEV.
Cross-origin data theft in LightRAG server versions prior to 1.5.4 allows any malicious website to make authenticated, credentialed API calls on behalf of a logged-in victim because the server ships with CORS_ORIGINS=* paired with allow_credentials=True. When an authenticated LightRAG user browses to an attacker-controlled page, that page can silently read documents and knowledge-graph data or issue destructive requests such as deleting the entire document store. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis and the flaw is not in CISA KEV, but the fix is confirmed released in version 1.5.4.
Credential theft in ASUS GameSDK allows a remote attacker to capture a local user's NTLM hash by luring them to a crafted web page that abuses a permissive cross-domain policy to send a UNC-path request to GameSDK's local service endpoint. The flaw affects systems running the ASUS GameSDK local service (bundled with ASUS gaming utilities) and requires the victim to visit an attacker-controlled page (UI required); no authentication is needed. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and it is not listed in CISA KEV, but the leaked NTLM material can be relayed or cracked to reach other services.