Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessGain access to OT network segment
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DeliveryScan network for N-Tron 700 Series devices
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ExploitPush unsigned firmware/bootloader via SNMP/TFTP
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ExecutionDevice loads tampered image without integrity check
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PersistPersist as compromised switch
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ImpactDisrupt or pivot across industrial network
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A08:2025 - Software or Data Integrity Failures
ASVS 5.0
V15 - Secure Coding and Architecture Code integrity verification
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| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires network reachability to an N-Tron 700 Series switch's management plane with SNMP and TFTP firmware-transfer functionality accessible - typically from within an OT/ICS network segment. The specific enabling condition is the device's firmware/bootloader update path, which performs no authentication and no integrity/signature validation on uploaded images, so an attacker using the standard N-Tron management software can scan for devices and push or pull firmware directly. Limiting factors: exploitation depends on the attacker already having routable access to the (usually segmented and non-internet-facing) industrial network, and the official CVSS vector encodes PR:L, implying some privilege may be required - this conflicts with the description and should be confirmed with the vendor. No user interaction is needed. |
| Impact | This is a genuine operational-technology (OT) priority within its deployment niche, though the signals partially conflict. The official CVSS 4.0 vector (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) scores 8.4 (High) with network attack vector, low complexity, no attack requirements, and no user interaction - all of which favor the attacker. However, there is a direct contradiction between the vector and the description: the vector encodes PR:L (some privilege/authentication required), while the description states twice that 'No authentication is required' and that firmware can be pushed/pulled 'without authenticating' via SNMP/TFTP. This discrepancy should be verified with the vendor (HMS Networks/Red Lion); if the description is accurate, the true privilege requirement is PR:N and real-world risk is higher than the vector implies. Impact is integrity-dominant (VI:H / SI:H, CWE-494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check): an attacker can overwrite firmware or bootloader with unsigned/malicious images, giving persistent control of the switch. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public POC are present in the provided data, so there is no evidence of active or automated exploitation - this is a high-severity-by-design-flaw case rather than a confirmed in-the-wild threat. The low real-world mitigant is prevalence: N-Tron 700 Series are industrial Ethernet switches with a limited, OT-specific footprint, not ubiquitous enterprise software. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker with network reachability to an N-Tron 700 Series switch (e.g., a foothold on the OT/ICS network segment) uses the vendor's own management software to scan for N-Tron devices and then pushes a malicious firmware or bootloader image over SNMP/TFTP without supplying credentials. Because there is no integrity check (CWE-494), the device accepts and runs the tampered image, handing the attacker persistent control of a network switch. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis, but the attack reportedly requires only the standard management software. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv2 – Oct 09, 2026
Firmware and bootloader updates on Red Lion Controls' N-Tron 700 Series industrial Ethernet switches can be pushed or pulled without authentication or image integrity checks, so an attacker running the standard N-Tron management software can scan an OT network over SNMP and TFTP and load arbitrary firmware, taking control of the device image (CWE-494). The published CVSS 4.0 score is 8.4, while the assessed CVSS 3.1 vector (network, scope-changed, High integrity and availability impact) is more severe; the two vectors also disagree on prerequisites, with the published vector encoding PR:L (some privilege) versus PR:N in our assessment, a conflict to confirm with the vendor. Firmware updates are unauthenticated on the update path per the reported description, but there is no confirmed active exploitation (not in CISA KEV) and no public exploit identified at time of analysis; exploitation still requires routable access to the switch management plane, typically from inside a segmented, non-internet-facing OT/ICS network.
Earlier versions of this analysis (1)
Firmware and bootloader update paths in Red Lion/N-Tron 700 Series industrial switches are described as requiring no authentication, allowing network-reachable attackers to push malicious firmware or pull firmware via SNMP/TFTP; the supplied CVSS vector's PR:L conflicts with that no-auth claim. The independent assessment rates this as high severity with network reachability, low complexity, no user interaction, low confidentiality impact, and high integrity/availability impact, but exploitation requires access to the OT/management segment rather than the open internet. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, no CISA KEV active exploitation is indicated, and no EPSS score was supplied.
RemediationAI
No fixed firmware version is identified in the available intelligence, so the first step is to pull the current guidance in ICSA-26-281-01 (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-281-01) and the vendor security page (https://www.hms-networks.com/cybersecurity) and apply the vendor's patched firmware if and when one is published; until a version is confirmed, treat existing units as unpatched. Because the update path itself is unauthenticated, apply compensating controls: block UDP 69 (TFTP) and UDP 161/162 (SNMP, especially SNMP write) between the switches and any segment other than a dedicated, tightly controlled management VLAN - the trade-off is that legitimate remote firmware pushes and SNMP-based monitoring stop working and must be performed from that management VLAN or via a serial/console/out-of-band path. Restrict management-plane reachability with switch ACLs, OT firewalls and 802.1X/NAC so that only authorised engineering hosts can reach the switches; the trade-off is added operational complexity and the risk of locking out legitimate engineers, so validate rules before enforcing. Where the firmware toolchain permits, verify firmware images against vendor-published hashes or signatures before loading, keep offline golden images for recovery, and log/alert on any unexpected TFTP transfer or SNMP SET activity against the switches (these are indicators of the exact attack pattern described). Physical and console-port access should also be restricted, since an attacker with console or local network access can bypass perimeter filtering entirely.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 2 packages in euvd
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The weakness class is CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check), mapped here to a firmware/bootloader update path that accepts uploaded images with neither authentication nor cryptographic signature/hash validation, so any image delivered to the device is trusted and installed. The attack surface is the switch's management plane and its SNMP and TFTP firmware-transfer functionality: an attacker using the vendor's own N-Tron management software can enumerate devices on the local network and push or pull firmware directly, which effectively turns the device into an attacker-controlled node. The affected CPE entry is cpe:2.3:a:red_lion_controls:700_series:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* with no version constraints, indicating all tracked 700 Series releases are in scope as published; the resulting integrity impact is high because a tampered bootloader/firmware image sits below the operating system and is difficult to detect or remove remotely. Advisory references resolve to HMS Networks' security pages (the parent organization behind the Red Lion Controls/N-Tron brand) and to CISA ICS advisory ICSA-26-281-01, whose CSAF JSON is also referenced, consistent with an ICS vendor-coordinated disclosure; the accompanying tag 'Information Disclosure' reflects that firmware can also be read back (pulled) unauthenticated, but the more consequential exposure is unauthorized modification and replacement of device code.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N
Description states no authentication, so PR:N; network SNMP/TFTP with no interaction gives AV:N/AC:L/UI:N; malicious firmware yields I:H and A:H, and a compromised switch affects downstream systems (S:C), with C:L from firmware pull.
Primary rating from Vendor (icscert).
CVSS VectorVendor: icscert
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
No authentication is required when updating firmware or bootloader, making it easy for malicious files to be pushed to the device. Additionally, anyone with the same software can scan a network for N-Tron devices and push/pull firmware without authenticating by using SNMP/TFTP.
Executive ViewAI
Red Lion Controls N-Tron 700 Series industrial Ethernet switches, commonly used in OT networks, are affected by CVE-2026-29797 (CVSS 8.4), which could allow an attacker to replace firmware and take control of the device image. This creates organizational risk of operational disruption and persistent tampering in segmented industrial environments if the switch management plane is reachable. No public exploit identified at time of analysis and no vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis, so leadership should prioritize compensating controls and vendor coordination.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations include isolating the switch management plane from routable OT and IT networks, disabling or tightly restricting SNMP and TFTP services, enforcing dedicated management VLANs with ACLs, monitoring firmware changes, and limiting use of standard N-Tron management software to trusted hosts. Apply vendor patch when released.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.
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EUVD-2026-95813
GHSA-p567-rmrg-wwq4
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
Exploit-DB