Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessReach device management interface
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ExploitLog in with persistent factory default admin credentials
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ExecutionObtain full administrative control
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ImpactAlter controller configuration and downstream OT process
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
ASVS 5.0
V6 - Authentication Credential externalization
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Persistence, Credential Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires access to the administrative/management interface of a Red Lion Controls 700 Series device and use of the factory default administrator credentials; critically, these default credentials remain enabled and cannot be eliminated by creating other administrator accounts, so even hardened-looking deployments stay vulnerable. No non-default configuration is needed - the condition is present out of the box. The primary LIMITING factor is reachability of the device's management interface: ICS/OT networks are frequently segmented, so realistic exposure depends on whether the interface is accessible from an attacker-controlled network segment. Note the input CVSS marks PR:H, but the defining feature is publicly/known default credentials, which practically require no legitimate privileges. |
| Impact | This is a genuine high-priority defect for the environments where Red Lion Controls 700 Series devices are deployed, driven by the nature of the flaw rather than hype: CWE-798 (hard-coded/default factory credentials with administrative access) that persist even after new administrator accounts are configured, meaning operators who believe they have secured the device remain fully exposed. The vulnerability is confirmed via a CISA ICS advisory (icsa-26-281-01) and vendor material (HMS Networks/Red Lion). There is NO EPSS score, NO CISA KEV listing, and NO public POC in the provided data, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis - exploitation is not confirmed in the wild. SIGNAL CONFLICT TO VERIFY: the supplied CVSS 4.0 vector is AV:L/AC:L/PR:H (local access, high privileges required) yet the vulnerability is the existence of publicly-known default admin credentials, which by definition requires no prior authorization and is typically reachable over a management interface - the PR:H and AV:L choices appear inconsistent with a default-credential weakness and should be verified with the vendor/ICS-CERT. If the management interface is network-reachable, real-world risk is materially higher than the local-vector score implies. No SSVC decision data was provided. Net: a real, actionable issue (standing admin backdoor) but exploitation likelihood in a given environment depends heavily on network exposure and segmentation of the OT device. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who can reach the management interface of a Red Lion 700 Series device logs in using the undocumented/known factory default administrator credentials, which remain active regardless of any additional admin accounts the operator created. With full administrative control the attacker reconfigures the device, reads sensitive configuration, and manipulates the connected OT process. No public exploit code is required - the attack is simply authenticating with the persistent default credentials. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv2 – Oct 09, 2026
Factory default administrator credentials on Red Lion Controls 700 Series devices remain active and cannot be removed by configuring additional administrator accounts, so an attacker who can reach the device's management interface can log in with administrative privileges on a device that operators believe is fully hardened. The independent assessment rates this as a high-impact, effectively unauthenticated network-reachable issue (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N), acknowledging that the supplied CVSS 4.0 vector marks PR:H while the defining feature - publicly known default credentials - means no legitimate account or privilege is required in practice. The practical limiting factor is reachability: ICS/OT networks are often segmented, so real-world exposure depends on whether the management interface is accessible from an attacker-controlled segment; no public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV) was identified at time of analysis, and no vendor fix version is disclosed in the available data.
Earlier versions of this analysis (1)
Default factory administrative credentials in Red Lion Controls 700 Series devices remain enabled and persist even after the operator configures additional administrator accounts, leaving a permanent, non-removable privileged login on every deployed unit (CWE-798). An attacker who can reach the device's management interface and knows the publicly documented factory credentials can obtain full administrative control of confidentiality and integrity (no availability impact per the vendor score). No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation have been identified at time of analysis; the vendor score is CVSS 6.0 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N), while our independent assessment rates the practical risk higher (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/C:H/I:H/A:H) because the flaw requires no legitimate account provisioning and the only real barrier is network or physical reachability of the management interface. Reported through CISA ICS-CERT as ICSA-26-281-01.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch or fixed firmware version is identified in the available data, so remediation must currently rely on compensating controls until HMS Networks publishes updated firmware on its cybersecurity portal (https://www.hms-networks.com/cybersecurity) or the guidance in CISA ICSA-26-281-01 (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-281-01). Because the factory default administrative account persists even after other administrator accounts are created, changing or adding administrator credentials is not a reliable fix on its own and should not be treated as remediation. The most effective control is to make the management interface unreachable from untrusted networks: place 700 Series devices behind a firewall or ACL that permits administrative access only from a dedicated, hardened engineering jump host, and remove any routing that exposes the management service to IT or guest segments - the trade-off is that remote engineering and troubleshooting must go through that jump host. Where remote management is not required, disable the web/remote management service entirely and disconnect the management port from the production network, accepting the loss of remote diagnostics. If remote access is operationally necessary, terminate it through a VPN with per-user authentication rather than exposing the device directly, at the cost of added latency and client-management overhead. Additionally, monitor device and firewall logs for authentication attempts using factory default account names and alert on successful logins outside approved maintenance windows, since detection may be the only reliable signal given the inability to remove the default identity.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 2 packages in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
The root cause is CWE-798, Use of Hard-coded Credentials, realized here as an enabled factory-default administrative account that persists even after operators create their own administrator accounts. This is a design/implementation defect in the device's authentication and account-provisioning logic rather than a memory-safety or injection flaw: the device ships with a known default credential pair and offers no supported path to eliminate that identity, so a 'hardened' configuration still contains a usable privileged backdoor. The affected product is identified by the CISA ICS CPE cpe:2.3:a:red_lion_controls:700_series:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*, a wildcard that covers all versions of the Red Lion Controls 700 Series; version-level granularity is not available from the supplied data. The references - the HMS Networks corporate site and its cybersecurity portal, plus CISA ICS advisory ICSA-26-281-01 and its machine-readable CSAF file - indicate the advisory was coordinated through CISA's ICS program and that Red Lion Controls products are handled under the HMS Networks brand. Because the vulnerable surface is a management/administrative service on an OT device, exposure is governed by network segmentation and firewall policy rather than by user interaction, and the scope change (S:C) in the independent assessment reflects that compromising the device can affect the broader controlled process or control network it governs.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Default admin credentials are publicly known (PR:N) and used via a network management interface (AV:N/AC:L); admin control yields full read/write (C:H/I:H) with downstream OT impact (S:C); availability left N per vendor impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (icscert).
CVSS VectorVendor: icscert
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Default factory credentials with administrative access are enabled and persist even after configuring other administrator accounts.
Executive ViewAI
Red Lion Controls 700 Series devices ship with factory-default administrator credentials that remain active and cannot be removed by adding other administrator accounts, allowing anyone who can reach the management interface to obtain administrative control. Because these devices are typically deployed in ICS/OT networks, a compromise could let an attacker alter configurations, disrupt operations, or pivot within segmented environments, making this a critical governance and resilience issue even though no public exploit or active exploitation has been identified. Leadership should prioritize immediate asset discovery, network isolation, and vendor engagement because no vendor-released patch is currently available.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations include changing any factory-default administrator credentials if supported, restricting management interface access to trusted OT network segments via firewalls/ACLs, disabling remote management where unnecessary, and monitoring authentication logs for default-account use.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
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Physical access to a Red Lion 700 Series managed switch (HMS Networks / Red Lion Controls) lets an attacker boot the dev
EUVD-2026-95803
GHSA-9rmc-2r73-v6h5
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB