Is there a patch available for CVE-2026-17595?

Yes, a patch is available for CVE-2026-17595. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

Nexus Repository 3 CVE-2026-17595

Q: What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-17595?

CVE-2026-17595 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 5.3 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.3%.

EUVD-2026-54519 MEDIUM

Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere (CWE-497)

2026-08-07 Sonatype

GHSA-5jh3-q5p5-fq9r

RCE Java Nexus Repository 3 Sonatype

5.3

CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: Sonatype

Severity by source

Vendor (Sonatype) PRIMARY

5.3 MEDIUM

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

vuln.today AI

4.3 MEDIUM

PR:L reflects the required non-default nexus:selectors:create permission; C:L reflects bounded JVM metadata disclosure only; no integrity or availability impact applies.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (Sonatype).

CVSS VectorVendor: Sonatype

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Aug 07, 2026 - 16:50 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

Nexus Repository 3 did not fully sandbox JEXL expressions used in Content Selectors. An account holding the nexus:selectors:create permission could construct an expression that read Java object properties not intended to be exposed to the expression engine, disclosing internal JVM class metadata such as class and classloader names. This issue does not permit method invocation, object construction, or arbitrary code execution. This has been fixed by restricting property access in the JEXL sandbox to the intended data types.

AnalysisAI

JEXL expression sandbox bypass in Sonatype Nexus Repository 3's Content Selector feature allows authenticated users holding the nexus:selectors:create permission to traverse Java object properties outside the intended sandbox scope, disclosing internal JVM metadata such as class and classloader names. The vendor description explicitly confirms this does not permit method invocation, object construction, or code execution - making the 'RCE' intelligence tag a misclassification. Fixed in version 3.95.0; no public exploit or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis.

Technical ContextAI

Sonatype Nexus Repository 3 (cpe:2.3:a:sonatype:nexus_repository_3) uses JEXL (Java Expression Language) to evaluate Content Selector expressions, which control which repository artifacts a user can access. The JEXL sandbox was designed to restrict expression evaluation to specific allowed data types, but failed to block property-access traversal paths that reach underlying Java object introspection properties such as .class and .classLoader. CWE-497 (Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere) precisely describes this root cause: the sandbox's property accessor did not enforce boundaries against reflection-accessible JVM internals. The fix in 3.95.0 restricts allowable property access to the intended data types only. Notably, the sandbox did prevent the more dangerous primitives - method invocation and object construction - limiting the escape to read-only metadata exposure.

RemediationAI

Upgrade Sonatype Nexus Repository 3 to version 3.95.0 or later, where the JEXL sandbox property accessor has been restricted to intended data types, closing the traversal path to JVM internals. Full patch details are available in the Sonatype 3.95.0 release notes at https://help.sonatype.com/en/sonatype-nexus-repository-3-95-0-release-notes.html and the security advisory at https://support.sonatype.com/hc/en-us/articles/53863820953747/. As a compensating control prior to patching, administrators should audit and restrict which accounts hold the nexus:selectors:create permission, limiting it to trusted users only; revoking this permission from non-essential accounts eliminates the attack surface entirely, with the trade-off that those accounts can no longer manage Content Selectors.