FlexGet CVE-2026-113613

Exploitation requires that the target runs FlexGet's decompress plugin (an optional archive-extraction component, not a default-enabled feature) and that the attacker can get a malicious zip or rar archive processed through a feed the target consumes - i.e., the attacker must be able to poison or supply a feed/archive source. The payload must contain archive member paths with ../ sequences or absolute paths; successful code execution additionally depends on the extraction destination being reachable from (or being) FlexGet's plugins directory so a dropped .py file is loaded. Limiting factors: decompress plugin must be configured, the attacker needs a feed path into the victim's pipeline (reflected as AT:P in the CVSS 4.0 vector), and the resulting code runs with the privileges of the FlexGet process only.

This is a genuinely high-priority flaw where the signals align rather than conflict. The provided CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N) scores 9.2 and is corroborated by the description and the vendor patch: a path traversal (Zip Slip) in the decompress plugin lets an attacker write arbitrary files, and the description explicitly maps this to code execution by planting a Python file in FlexGet's plugins directory - so VC:H/VI:H/VA:H is well justified. The one metric that tempers the raw score is AT:P (Attack Requirements: Present), which reflects that exploitation is not fully unconditional: the victim must run the decompress plugin and process an archive the attacker can influence via a feed. No EPSS score was supplied and there is no CISA KEV listing, so there is no public evidence of active exploitation; likewise no public exploit code was referenced. The caveat is that this was reported by VulnCheck with a public GitHub security advisory and a patch commit that includes regression tests demonstrating the exact malicious paths ('../../../etc/passwd', absolute paths), which materially lowers the bar for an attacker to reconstruct a working exploit from the diff. Net: treat as a real patch-now priority for anyone running FlexGet with the decompress plugin, while recognizing the deployment footprint is niche and exploitation requires a plausible but non-trivial feed-poisoning precondition.

An attacker who can influence or control a feed that a target's FlexGet instance subscribes to publishes a zip or rar archive whose member paths contain ../ sequences or an absolute path. When FlexGet's decompress plugin extracts the archive, the traversal writes an attacker-supplied .py file into FlexGet's plugins directory, which is loaded and executed as code in the FlexGet process context. No public exploit code was identified at time of analysis, but the patch commit ships regression tests that spell out the malicious paths.