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Apache James CVE-2025-66621

| EUVDEUVD-2025-211271 HIGH
Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity (CWE-345)
2026-11-06 apache GHSA-rg6c-rqpp-49q4
8.1
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: apache
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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain

  1. Access
    Obtain valid JWT scoped to another audience
  2. Delivery
    Connect to James IMAP/SMTP SASL endpoint
  3. Exploit
    Present token via OAuthBearer/XOAUTH2
  4. Execution
    James skips aud validation (no introspection)
  5. Impact
    Access unauthorized mailbox data

Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A08:2025 - Software or Data Integrity Failures
ASVS 5.0
V15 - Secure Coding and Architecture Data authenticity verification
Exploitation Conditions

Exploitation requires that Apache James (3.9.0) be configured to use SASL OAuthBearer or XOAUTH2 (JWT-based) authentication AND that token introspection is NOT configured; in that mode the server does not validate the JWT 'aud' (audience) claim. The attacker must also already hold a validly signed JWT (valid credentials, CVSS PR:L) whose audience is intended for a different service. Limiting factors: deployments not using OAuthBearer/XOAUTH2, those with introspection configured, or those on the fixed 3.9.1 release (which forces explicit aud configuration and introspection) are not affected; the attacker cannot proceed without a validly signed token, so this is an authenticated impersonation/authorization bypass, not anonymous access.

Impact

Signals conflict on urgency and should be read together. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/C:H/I:H, score 8.1) describes a serious authorization bypass reachable over the network by an attacker who already holds valid credentials (PR:L = authenticated). Against that, EPSS is very low at 0.14% (3rd percentile), the CVE is NOT on CISA KEV, and no public exploit code is referenced, so exploitation is neither confirmed nor broadly probable in the near term. The vuln.today decision label is 'this_week', which is elevated but short of act_now/emergency. The practical risk is bounded by a specific precondition stated in the description: the flaw only applies to Apache James deployments using SASL OAuthBearer/XOAUTH2 where token introspection is NOT configured, so the JWT AUD claim is not validated. This is a real, patch-worthy authorization/impersonation issue for JWT-authenticated James deployments, but it is not a mass-exploitable unauthenticated RCE; prioritize it for affected OAuth-configured instances rather than treating it as a universal emergency. The low EPSS is consistent with the narrow preconditions and the absence of KEV/POC evidence.

Exploit ScenarioDerived

In an Apache James deployment (3.9.0, prior to 3.9.1) that authenticates IMAP/SMTP clients via SASL OAuthBearer/XOAUTH2 without configuring token introspection, an attacker presents a JWT that is validly signed but whose audience (aud) claim targets a different service. Because James fails to validate the aud claim in this mode, the server accepts the token and grants mailbox access the attacker was not authorized to have. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; the attack requires the attacker to already possess a valid signed token (CVSS PR:L).

This Week Schedule remediation this week. Why: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9).
Patch available 0.1% exploitation probability (EPSS)

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AnalysisAIv2 – Nov 16, 2026

Insufficient verification of the JWT audience claim in Apache James 3.9.0 (and earlier releases before 3.9.1) lets a holder of a validly signed token reach the mail server even though that token was issued for a different service. The flaw only bites when the server is configured for SASL OAuthBearer or XOAUTH2 authentication with token introspection left unconfigured; in that mode the 'aud' claim is never checked, so a token signed for another audience is accepted. Exploitation is authenticated by definition (CVSS PR:L) because the attacker must already possess a valid signed JWT, making this an impersonation/authorization bypass rather than anonymous access; no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis and EPSS is low (0.14%, 3rd percentile), although the vendor-priority decision label places it in this_week, so the two signals should be read together.

Earlier versions of this analysis (1)
v1 Nov 06, 2026 - 12:36

Apache James deployments that use SASL OAuthBearer/XOAUTH2 authentication without OAuth introspection configured do not correctly validate the audience (aud) claim of presented JWTs, so a token legitimately issued for a different audience is accepted by the mail server. An attacker who already holds valid credentials - a properly issued JWT whose audience does not match the target James instance - can therefore gain unauthorized access, with high confidentiality and integrity impact (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N). Versions before 3.9.1 are affected; no public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis, and exposure is limited to deployments where introspection is disabled or aud is not explicitly enforced.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Apache James 3.9.1, which per the advisory forces explicit configuration of audience claims and forces introspection so the unsafe unvalidated-audience mode is no longer possible - the upgrade is the complete fix and behavior changes may require re-checking OAuth client registrations so that tokens carry the correct 'aud' value for the mail server. Where upgrading is not immediately possible, the compensating control is to configure token introspection for the OAuthBearer/XOAUTH2 flows so every presented JWT is validated against the issuer, accepting the added per-request latency and a hard dependency on the introspection endpoint's availability; alternatively, disable the OAuthBearer and XOAUTH2 SASL mechanisms entirely and fall back to other authentication mechanisms, at the cost of losing JWT-based SSO for mail clients. Neither workaround removes the underlying defect - the audience check itself only arrives with 3.9.1. Details are in the vendor advisory at https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/xz1g0blzcbxod69oktyq84h7t06xzov6 and the oss-security thread at https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q4/547.

Affected VersionsENISA

Apache James 3.9.0 <3.9.1

Affected Packages

euvd apache_james fix: 3.9.1

Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)

Affects your stack

Affects 1 package in euvd

Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.

Technical ContextAI · show details

Apache James is a Java-based mail server (SMTP, IMAP, POP3, JMAP) that supports SASL-based authentication, including the JWT-bearing mechanisms OAuthBearer (RFC 7628) and XOAUTH2. In these mechanisms the client presents a bearer JWT issued by an external authorization server, and the mail server must decide whether that token was actually minted for it. Two checks are relevant: online validation via token introspection (RFC 7662) against the issuer, and local validation of standard JWT claims - critically 'aud' (audience), plus issuer and expiry. Per the advisory, when introspection is not configured, affected versions fail to correctly validate the 'aud' claim, so a token legitimately signed for one service is accepted by Apache James as if it had been issued for the mail server. That is CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity): the signature verifies, but the authorization context of the token is not enforced. The result, scored CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N (8.1), is a post-authentication authorization bypass giving high confidentiality and integrity impact with no availability impact. Notably the vendor's fix in 3.9.1 does not merely add the audience check: it forces explicit configuration of aud claims and forces introspection, changing behavior so that the unsafe combination can no longer be configured silently.

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Severity by source

Vendor (apache) PRIMARY 8.1 MEDIUM
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
vuln.today AI 8.1 HIGH

Network-reachable SASL auth needs a validly signed token (PR:L), no user interaction; aud-check bypass yields unauthorized mailbox read/write (C:H/I:H), no availability impact.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (apache).

CVSS VectorVendor: apache

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Analysis Updated
Nov 16, 2026 - 16:34 vuln.today
v2 - CVSS changed
CVSS changed
Nov 16, 2026 - 16:22 NVD
8.1 (HIGH)
Patch available
Nov 06, 2026 - 13:17 EUVD

DescriptionCVE.org

Apache James SASL OAuthBearer/XOAUTH2 prior versions 3.9.1 fails to validate correctly AUD claim of JWT payloads when introspection is not configured.

This allows an attacker with valid credentials to access the mail server even if they are not authorized to do so.

We recommend users to upgrade to non vulnerable version that forces explicit configuration of aud claims and forces introspection.

Executive ViewAI

Why It Matters

Apache James, an email server platform, contains an authorization bypass (CVE-2025-66621) in versions up to 3.9.0 that allows a holder of any validly signed JWT-even one issued for a different service-to access the mail server when configured for certain OAuth authentication modes without introspection. This flaw primarily affects organizations using Apache James with OAuthBearer or XOAUTH2 and could enable unauthorized mailbox access if a token is compromised. Leadership should prioritize patching because the vendor has flagged it for this week, despite low exploitation activity to date.

Business Impact: High
Compensating Controls

Apply vendor patch.

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score
0.1%
Top 97% exploitable
Prevalence
Low
niche open-source Java mail server, limited enterprise deployment footprint
Data Quality
4 sources
Confidence: Medium

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue
Severity HIGH
CISA KEV No
Public POC No
EPSS 0.1%
Patch available Yes
Active threat No
Deciding rule
HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9)
What every action level means
Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.
Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.
This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.
This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.
Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.

SSVC AssessmentENISA

SSVC Decision· derived
Scheduled
Exploitation· derived
None
System Exposure· derived
Open
Automatable· derived
No
Human Impact
High

Priority Score

40
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: 0
CVSS: +40
PoC: 0
Weaponized: 0
Threat intel: 0
Gov advisory: 0

Attack Technique

Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.

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