Cherry Studio
CVE-2025-61929
CRITICAL
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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ReconLure victim to malicious page
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DeliveryDeliver crafted cherrystudio://mcp URL
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ExploitUser clicks button/link
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InstallApp decodes base64 MCP config
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C2Install pop-up click approves action
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ExecuteEmbedded command executes on host
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ImpactAttacker gains code execution
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization Code injection prevention, sandbox exec
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Execution, Initial Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Requires that the victim has Cherry Studio installed and that the cherrystudio:// custom URL-scheme handler is registered on the OS (the default behavior after installation). Exploitation is triggered specifically through the MCP installation flow: a cherrystudio://mcp URL whose base64-encoded configuration contains a command that handleMcpProtocolUrl (src/main/services/ProtocolClient.ts and src/main/services/urlschema/mcp-install.ts) decodes and executes directly. The key LIMITING factor is required user interaction (CVSS UI:R): the victim must click the malicious link/button and then click through the install pop-up, which the app mis-treats as intentional approval - so the attack depends on social engineering rather than being fully automatic. No authentication is required (PR:N). Because no patched version exists, there is no version-based mitigation; defenders must rely on user awareness and blocking the custom protocol. |
| Impact | Signals are largely consistent and point to a genuine high-priority issue for Cherry Studio users. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, base 9.6) describes network-reachable, low-complexity, unauthenticated code injection that requires only a single user click and escapes the application's scope to execute OS commands (CWE-94). This is reinforced by a publicly available exploit (POC=YES) and the vendor/GitHub advisory confirming the flaw, plus the critical aggravating factor that no patched version exists at publication - defenders cannot simply remediate by upgrading. The one tempering signal is EPSS: 0.47% (39th percentile) indicates low modeled probability of broad opportunistic exploitation in the near term, and the CVE is NOT on CISA KEV, so there is no confirmation of active in-the-wild use. This is expected for a client-side, user-interaction-dependent desktop bug (each victim must be lured into clicking) rather than a mass-scannable server flaw, so the low EPSS does not negate the severity - it reflects a social-engineering delivery model rather than wormable mass exploitation. Net: a real, actionable priority for any Cherry Studio deployment given working POC and no patch, but exploitation is targeted/lure-driven rather than automated at internet scale. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker hosts a web page (or sends a message/email) containing a button or link encoding a malicious base64 MCP configuration in a cherrystudio://mcp URL. When a Cherry Studio user clicks it, the app launches an install pop-up showing seemingly normal content; because the user's single click is treated as approval, the embedded command is executed directly on the victim's machine. A public proof-of-concept exists, and the AV:N/AC:L/UI:R profile means the only barrier is convincing the user to click once. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 08, 2026
Remote code execution in Cherry Studio allows unauthenticated attackers to run arbitrary commands on a victim's system when the victim clicks a crafted cherrystudio://mcp link. The custom protocol handler decodes a base64-encoded configuration and directly executes the command it contains, and publicly available exploit code exists. Although EPSS is low (0.47%, percentile 39%), the CVSS base score is 9.6 and no vendor-released patch was identified at the time of analysis, so users must rely on blocking the protocol and user awareness.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. The most effective mitigation is to block or remove the cherrystudio:// custom protocol handler at the operating-system level (for example, by deleting the registry entry on Windows, unregistering the LaunchServices entry on macOS, or removing the xdg desktop file on Linux), which prevents the vulnerable handleMcpProtocolUrl path from being invoked; however, this also breaks legitimate MCP installation links and may require manual re-registration. Additionally, educate users not to click unsolicited cherrystudio:// links or confirm unexpected MCP installation pop-ups, but note that social engineering can bypass training. Monitor the vendor advisory at https://github.com/CherryHQ/cherry-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-hh6w-rmjc-26f6 for a patched release. As a compensating control, consider application allowlisting or endpoint detection rules that flag command execution originating from Cherry Studio's protocol handler.
Affects your stack
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Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
The vulnerability resides in the custom URL-scheme handler cherrystudio://, registered by default when Cherry Studio is installed. Specifically, the functions handleMcpProtocolUrl in src/main/services/ProtocolClient.ts and src/main/services/urlschema/mcp-install.ts process MCP installation URLs by base64-decoding configuration data and then executing the command within it without sufficient validation. This falls under CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code / Code Injection) and affects all versions per the CPE wildcard cpe:2.3:a:cherry-ai:cherry_studio:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*. Exploitation requires no authentication (PR:N) but does require user interaction (UI:R): the victim must click a malicious link and then confirm the install pop-up, which the application erroneously treats as intentional approval, making social engineering the primary attack vector.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Network-delivered malicious URL with no authentication (PR:N, AV:N), low complexity (AC:L), one required click (UI:R), and command execution escaping the app to the OS (S:C) yields full C/I/A loss.
Primary rating from Vendor (github).
CVSS VectorVendor: github
DescriptionCVE.org
Cherry Studio is a desktop client that supports for multiple LLM providers. Cherry Studio registers a custom protocol called cherrystudio://. When handling the MCP installation URL, it parses the base64-encoded configuration data and directly executes the command within it. In the files src/main/services/ProtocolClient.ts and src/main/services/urlschema/mcp-install.ts, when receiving a URL of the cherrystudio://mcp type, the handleMcpProtocolUrl function is called for processing. If an attacker crafts malicious content and posts it on a website or elsewhere (there are many exploitation methods, such as creating a malicious website with a button containing this malicious content), when the user clicks it, since the pop-up window contains normal content, the direct click is considered a scene action, and the malicious command is directly triggered, leading to the user being compromised. As of time of publication, no known patched versions exist.
Executive ViewAI
Cherry Studio, a desktop AI assistant used by individual employees, can be made to execute arbitrary commands on a user's workstation when that user clicks a crafted cherrystudio://mcp link, and publicly available exploit code exists. Because no vendor-released patch was identified at time of analysis, the only defenses are removing the protocol handler and stopping users from clicking malicious links, leaving affected endpoints open to full compromise and possible follow-on movement into corporate systems. Leadership should treat this as a concentrated endpoint risk affecting the specific teams that have installed Cherry Studio, not as an enterprise-wide service outage.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: block or filter the cherrystudio:// URI scheme at email and web gateways; deregister or disable the custom protocol handler on affected endpoints (Windows registry Classes\cherrystudio keys, macOS Launch Services URL scheme association); temporarily uninstall Cherry Studio on high-risk machines where it is not business-critical; restrict users to non-privileged local accounts so command execution cannot escalate; deploy EDR detections for Cherry Studio spawning script interpreters or shells and for base64-decode-and-execute behaviour; and issue user guidance prohibiting clicks on cherrystudio:// links until a patched version is available.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Code injection occurs when an application accepts user input and passes it directly into a language interpreter or evaluator without proper sanitization.
Remote Code Execution represents the critical moment when an attacker successfully runs arbitrary code on a target system without physical access.
Affected Products (CPE)CVE.org
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NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
GitHub
Exploit-DB