Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessGain control of carousel content channel
-
ExploitDeliver crafted GoToExternalUrl URI
-
ExecutionClient passes URI to ShellExecuteW unchecked
-
ImpactInvoke arbitrary registered URI-scheme handler
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization Resource identifier sanitization
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Requires the attacker to control the server-supplied home-screen carousel content delivered to clients (compromise of the game's content backend or adjacent-network interception of the content channel) - this is the exact 'able to control the carousel content' condition in the description and is the primary limiter, since carousel content is normally server-controlled and not attacker-reachable. Affected: MTGA Windows/Steam client builds 2026.59.30.12801.127931.6 and certain later 2026.60.x builds. Once that precondition is met, no user interaction is needed (UI:N) and the client invokes any registered URI-scheme handler. Realistic impact is further limited by which dangerous scheme handlers are actually registered on the victim host and whether a separately exploitable handler exists to chain against. |
| Impact | This is a genuinely low-priority issue despite the interesting primitive. The provided CVSS is 3.4 (Low) with vector AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N, and every available signal agrees it is not an urgent threat: no EPSS score was supplied, it is not on CISA KEV, and no public exploit was flagged in the input (only a single independent researcher write-up is referenced). The dominant limiting factor is baked into AC:H - exploitation is explicitly described as requiring a 'hypothetical attacker able to control the carousel content delivered to clients,' i.e. the attacker must first compromise Wizards of the Coast's server-supplied content pipeline or MITM the content channel, which is a high bar that an ordinary remote attacker does not clear. The scope change (S:C) and 'no user interaction' (UI:N) are the notable aggravators - a controlled carousel entry can silently invoke arbitrary registered URI-scheme handlers on the client - but direct impact is only I:L with C:N and A:N, so the standalone damage is minor unless chained to a separately vulnerable local URI handler. Note the tag 'Information Disclosure' conflicts with the CVSS (C:N means no confidentiality impact); treat that tag as unreliable. Net: a real but conditional integrity flaw, correctly rated Low, not a widespread-exploitation priority. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who can inject or tamper with the server-supplied home-screen carousel content (via compromise of the content backend or an adjacent-network MITM) delivers a GoToExternalUrl action pointing at a non-https custom URI (e.g. a dangerous registered scheme instead of the expected https: link). Because the client passes the value straight to Application.OpenURL/ShellExecuteW without scheme or domain validation, the registered handler is launched on the victim host with no user interaction, potentially chaining into any locally vulnerable URI-scheme handler. A public vulnerability-research write-up describing the behavior exists, but no weaponized exploit was flagged in the input. |
Get an e-mail when this CVE is exploited, patched or re-scored. Free account.
Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 08, 2026
The Magic: The Gathering Arena Windows/Steam client (builds 2026.59.30.12801.127931.6 and certain later 2026.60.x builds) hands a server-supplied home-screen carousel GoToExternalUrl value straight to the Windows shell via Application.OpenURL/ShellExecuteW without validating the URI scheme or domain, so any URI-scheme handler registered on the host - including ones a client would never expect, such as ms-calculator: - can be invoked with no user interaction. Exploitation requires the attacker to already control the carousel content delivered to clients, either by compromising the game's content backend or by intercepting the content channel on an adjacent network; that precondition is the primary limiter and is why this is assessed as a low-priority issue despite the unusual primitive (CVSS 3.1 base 3.4; NVD AV:A versus an assessed AV:N with AC:H, PR:N, UI:N, S:C, and only low integrity impact). There is no confirmed active exploitation (not in CISA KEV) and no public exploit identified at time of analysis, though a public technical writeup of the flaw exists; the practical impact is further bounded by which dangerous scheme handlers happen to be registered on a victim machine and whether one of them can be chained into a separately exploitable action.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch was identified at time of analysis, so remediation must currently rely on compensating controls. The most effective architectural fix is on the client side: allowlist the URI schemes the carousel action may invoke (https: only, or a small fixed set) and reject everything else before calling Application.OpenURL, rather than relying on ShellExecuteW to make that decision - this is the fix the vendor would need to ship, and no released version implementing it is confirmed in the available data. Until then, the primary practical mitigation is to break the precondition: restrict or monitor the carousel content channel so it cannot be tampered with (server-side integrity/signature checking of carousel payloads, and TLS plus network segmentation or VPN-only access for client content fetches) so an adjacent-network interceptor cannot inject a malicious GoToExternalUrl value. On the endpoint, administrators can reduce the blast radius by auditing and deregistering unnecessary URI-scheme handlers (particularly ms-* and third-party protocol handlers) in the registry under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\<scheme>; the trade-off is that this can break legitimate applications that rely on those handlers, so it should be done from an inventory of actually required schemes rather than blanket removal. Note that blocking outbound network traffic or the game's servers does not address the flaw itself, and that host-based application allowlisting of the MTGA client does not prevent the client from launching a handler that is already allowlisted - the scheme surface is what must be constrained.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
The defect is a resource-injection problem in the CWE-99 class: a resource identifier (here, a URI) that originates outside the client's trust boundary is consumed by a high-privilege sink without validation. The Windows/Steam MTGA client receives home-screen carousel definitions from the game backend and, for a GoToExternalUrl action, passes the supplied URL through Application.OpenURL, which on Windows resolves to ShellExecuteW. ShellExecuteW does not restrict itself to web URLs - it defers to the operating system's registered URI-scheme handlers, so a value such as ms-calculator: (or any other registered protocol handler, including ones registered by third-party software) is launched as if the user had invoked it. Because the client is the one making the call, the action bypasses the browser and any scheme allowlisting a browser would apply. This is a classic trust-boundary crossing, which is why the submitted vector carries S:C (scope changed) and I:L (low integrity impact) while confidentiality and availability are unaffected. The essential nuance is reachability: carousel content is normally produced and signed by the game operator, so a remote attacker must first obtain control of that content path - by compromising the content backend or by intercepting the content channel on the same or adjacent network - which is what drives the High attack complexity and the AV disagreement between the NVD submission (AV:A) and the assessment (AV:N). The public research writeup at https://github.com/N0tMilk/vulnerability-research/blob/main/Magic/carousel-shellexecute-mtga.md documents the behavior.
Know when Windows gets its next vulnerability
- Watch products and get an email when something new is published
- Check this CVE against your own stack and servers
- Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources
No credit card · 7-day full trial
Severity by source
AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
Delivered over the network via the content pipeline but requiring attacker control of server-supplied carousel content makes it AC:H; no client privileges or interaction, and invoking foreign URI handlers is a scope change with only limited integrity impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (mitre).
CVSS VectorVendor: mitre
DescriptionCVE.org
Magic: The Gathering Arena (Windows/Steam client; 2026.59.30.12801.127931.6 and certain later 2026.60.x builds) passes a server-supplied URL from a home-screen carousel GoToExternalUrl action directly to the Windows shell via Application.OpenURL/ShellExecuteW without validating the URI scheme or domain. A hypothetical attacker able to control the carousel content delivered to clients can cause arbitrary registered URI-scheme handlers to be invoked on client hosts with no user interaction. For example, one might expect that the carousel content only has https: URIs, not ms-calculator: URIs.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.
Unauthenticated remote code execution in SmarterTools SmarterMail lets an attacker upload arbitrary files to any locatio
Windows Win32k fails to properly handle objects in memory, allowing local privilege escalation exploited in the wild in
A privilege escalation vulnerability (CVSS 5.5). Risk factors: actively exploited (KEV-listed), EPSS 94% exploitation pr
Windows Internet Shortcut Files (.url) contain an external control vulnerability (CVE-2025-33053, CVSS 8.8) that enables
Windows SMB contains an improper access control vulnerability (CVE-2025-33073, CVSS 8.8) enabling authenticated attacker
Twonky Server 8.5.2 on Linux and Windows allows unauthenticated access to the admin log file through a web service API b
An unrestricted file upload vulnerability exists in MiniWeb HTTP Server <= Build 300 that allows unauthenticated remote
FreeFloat FTP Server contains multiple critical design flaws that allow unauthenticated remote attackers to upload arbit
Serviio Media Server versions 1.4 through 1.8 on Windows contain an unauthenticated command injection in the /rest/actio
Twonky Server 8.5.2 uses hard-coded cryptographic keys for encrypting the administrator password. Combined with the cred
Mako Server versions 2.5 and 2.6 contain an unauthenticated OS command injection via the tutorial interface at examples/
React Native Metro Development Server binds to external interfaces by default and contains an OS command injection endpo
EUVD-2026-94696
GHSA-25hq-wqc9-cgfc
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
VulDB
Exploit-DB