ImageMagick EUVD-2026-94387

Exploitation requires the target to parse an attacker-supplied image whose embedded XMP profile contains malicious XML with circular entity declarations, processed through ImageMagick's internal xml-tree parser (ValidateEntities/ParseInternalDoctype). No authentication or user interaction is required (PR:N/UI:N) where the image reaches an automated processing pipeline. Limiting factors: the application must actually decode/parse the XMP metadata via a vulnerable ImageMagick version (before 7.1.2-32 or 6.9.13-57), and impact is confined to hanging the processing operation/thread (CPU/resource exhaustion) - there is no memory corruption, data exposure, or code execution.

This is a moderate-severity availability-only denial of service. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L, score 5.3) indicates a network-reachable, low-complexity, unauthenticated trigger with no confidentiality or integrity impact and only partial (A:L) availability impact - consistent with CWE-835 (infinite loop) where a single processing operation hangs rather than the host crashing. No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, or public POC was provided in the input, so there is no signal of active exploitation or weaponization; exploitation status is therefore 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis.' The realistic priority is driven less by severity and more by exposure: ImageMagick is frequently invoked server-side on untrusted uploaded images, so an attacker who can submit an image to such a pipeline can stall worker threads/processes and degrade service. Note the AV:N rating reflects that the malicious image is typically delivered over a network to an automated processor; there is no remote interactive access - verify your own deployment actually parses XMP metadata via ImageMagick before prioritizing. No conflicting signals were found, but the absence of EPSS/KEV/POC data means prioritization should rest on your exposure (untrusted image intake) rather than threat intelligence.

An attacker uploads an image embedding a crafted XMP profile to a web service that uses ImageMagick for processing (e.g., avatar/thumbnail generation). When ImageMagick's internal XML parser handles the profile's circular entity declarations, it enters an infinite loop, hanging the worker and consuming CPU. No public exploit code was identified, but the trigger requires only a single malformed file and no authentication.